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1. INTRODUCTION 
Due to its colonial history and its largely European ancestry Australia has always 
been considered a “Western”, if not European nation, even though it is geographically 
located in the Asia-Pacific. As incumbent Australian Prime Minister Rudd (PM 2008c) 
menioned, 
 
“The historical connections between Europe and Australia are profound. 
Europe has nurtured Western civilisation. Australia has inherited, 
embraced and adapted that great civilisational tradition. The modern state 
of Australia is heir to European philosophical and political thought.” 
 
As a result, Australia is sometimes regarded as a “misplaced continent” (Murray 
2005, 35) struggling between its colonial history and its geographical proximity to Asia 
(Blainey 1995, 72). An understanding of these historical and geographical 
circumstances is vital to the analysis of Australian foreign policy choices, as at different 
points in time, Australian foreign policy priorities have been attached to the United 
Kingdom, the Asia-Pacific, the alliance with the US or Europe – depending on the 
incumbent government. 
In the beginning, the relationship between Australia and Europe was almost 
exclusively focused on the United Kingdom (Murray et al. 2002, 395), because its 
former colonial status ensured close political and economic ties. When the idea of 
European integration emerged, Australia was very sceptical about the British 
application for membership in the EC in 1961, as it feared it would lose preferential 
treatment in the Commonwealth and consequently its main overseas market (Murray et 
al. 2002, 397-398). In the years following the British accession turbulent disagreement 
over the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) characterised the relationship between the 
European Community and Australia (Elijah et al. 2000, 1). However, closer bilateral 
cooperation has emerged since the early 1990s, resulting in very strong, yet 
asymmetrical economic relations and converging political perspectives (Murray et al. 
2002, 395). 
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Even though Australia has liaised with the European Union since its creation, and 
more intensely since the UK’s accession to the EU, the relationship between the 
European Union and Australia “has received little attention in academic literature” 
(Elijah et al. 2000, p. 1). This might stem from the fact that Australian foreign policy 
analysts and commentators have discovered the increasing importance of the European 
Union “only recently“ (Murray et al. 2002, 395). Moreover, literature research has 
revealed that even though this topic might have “received little attention” (Elijah et al. 
2000, p. 1) in Australian academic literature, it has been virtually neglected by scholars 
in the European Union. According to Murray (2003, 104) “study from the EU side has 
been minimal”. In addition, these analyses have usually focussed on the relationship 
between Australia and the UK, clearly “for historical and Commonwealth reasons” 
(ibid.). Consequently, no considerable research on EU-Australia relations has been 
undertaken by scholars in Europe. 
Despite the lacking academic discourse Philomena Murray, Director of the 
Contemporary Europe Research Centre at the University of Melbourne, published some 
benchmark research on this topic, investigating the history and nature of EU-Australian 
relations (Murray 2000, 2002a, 2002b, 2003, 2005; Murray et al. 2002). Although it 
was undertaken from an Australian perspective, this research is undoubtedly highly 
valuable. New research on this topic is necessary, as the most recent relevant academic 
publications date back as far as 2005 (Kenyon & Kunkel 2005; Murray 2005). 
Consequently, current developments like the change of government in Australia in 
November 2007, which resulted in (1) the willingness of both interlocutors to “upgrade 
EU-Australia relations through a new Partnership Framework” (EC RELEX 2008), (2) 
the promotion of a “new era of creative engagement between Australia and the EU” 
(ibid.) and (3) planned cooperation in international trade, climate change, the Asia-
Pacific and the fight against international security threats (ibid.) could not be analysed 
in past publications. Thus, the analysis of these current developments from a European 
Union perspective will constitute a crucial part of this thesis. 
Based on the above considerations, the main research objectives are (1) to 
examine the nature and state of EU-Australia relations primarily from a European 
Union perspective in the light of the recent changes, (2) to identify issues of mutual 
importance with regard to cooperation and conflict and (3) to assess areas of future 
cooperation and potential synergies.  
  1. Introduction 
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In order to achieve these research objectives, thorough knowledge of both 
political systems and of the history and nature of the relationship between the European 
Union and Australia is indispensable. Therefore, the following three chapters aim at 
providing this basis. The political system of Australia and the European Union will be 
presented in chapters 2 and 3, respectively, during which, aspects of foreign policy will 
be discussed in detail. Conversely, chapter 4 is aimed at analysing the development of 
EU-Australia relations. 
Based on these foundations, a qualitative study (chapters 5 to 8) will constitue the 
core of this thesis. As there is hardly any literature on the relationship in general and the 
recent developments in particular, obtaining first hand information is of vital 
importance. Therefore, qualitative interviews with experts of the European 
Commission, Members of the European Parliament and Australian experts were 
conducted in order to address the research objectives mentioned above. 
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2. POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF 
AUSTRALIA 
 
“Australia inherited democratic government in the 1850s 
without any need for a war of independence or even a campaign 
to throw off the colonial rule. Parliamentary democracy was a 
birthright. It was taken for granted, with the sun, the beaches 
and a winning cricket team, as part of the environment.” 
(Weller 2004, 630). 
 
2.1. Historical background 
In order to fully understand the nature of the Australian political system, it is 
essential to become acquainted with Australia’s historical origins. 
The first European (Dutch) encounter with what used to be known as “Terra 
Australis Incognita”1 dates back to 1606 (AGCRP 2008a). In the following 164 years 
various ships from Europe sailed across Australian waters. However, it was not until 
1770 that Lieutenant James Cook claimed Australia’s east coast as instructed by King 
George III of England at Possession Island2 naming it New South Wales (ibid.). 
Moreover, Lieutenant Cook charted Australia’s east coast. It took almost eight years 
before the first British settlers arrived in Australia. Captain Arthur Philip, who was 
supposed to establish the first British colony in Australia, and his First Fleet with 
approximately 1350 settlers on board landed at Port Jackson3 and Camp Cove on 26 
January 1788 (ibid.) with the intention to establish the first British colony in Australia. 
From 1788 until 1823 New South Wales was a penal colony (ibid.). However, the first 
free settlers started to arrive from 1793 and continued throughout the following years 
(ibid.). Following New South Wales’ example, new colonies were established: Van 
Dimen’s Land (later to become known as Tasmania) was established in 1825, Western 
                                                
1 Latin for „unknown southern land“. 
2 Today Possession Island is located in far north Queensland. When James Cook claimed Possession 
Island he named Australia’s east coast New South Wales, however, Queensland chose to separate from 
New South Wales in 1859 (AGCRP 2008a). 
3 Today Port Jackson is home to Sydney’s CBD, the world-famous Sydney Opera House and Harbour 
Bridge. 
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Australia in 1827, and South Australia in 1836 (ibid.). Victoria separated from New 
South Wales in 1851, while Queensland followed Victoria’s example in 1859 (ibid.). 
The area of today’s Northern Territory was initially a part of New South Wales, before 
it was given to South Australia in 1863 (ibid.). In 1912 it separated from South 
Australia and became a part of the Commonwealth of Australia (ibid.). When the 
Commonwealth of Australia was founded in 1901, New South Wales gave a part of its 
territory to the newly founded Commonwealth in order to establish Canberra4 as the 
capital city of Australia (ibid.). 
From a political scientist’s point of view there is one especially interesting feature 
of the British colonies in Australia; even though Australia was initially designed as a 
penal colony, a political and administrative system was introduced as early as 1823. The 
New South Wales Act set up a Legislative Council and a Supreme Court, thereby giving 
the British colony its first Parliament (AGCRP 2008a). The members of the Legislative 
Council were appointed by Britain’s Secretary of State and had the power to advise the 
New South Wales Governor (NAA 2009). They could, in normal circumstances, defeat 
a law proposed by the Governor and controlled the local appropriation of revenue 
(ibid.). Bills had to be certified by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court as compatible 
with English law and had to be set before the British Parliament in order to become a 
law (ibid.). Moreover, the Monarch still had the power to veto decisions made by the 
Governor of New South Wales and the Legislative Council (ibid.). Even though the 
Legislative Council and the Supreme Court were by no means fully autonomous 
institutions, they were “a first step towards a ‘responsible’ Parliament in Australia” 
(AGCRP 2008a). This is an important fact to be kept in mind when analysing the 
Australian political system. 
Another politically significant aspect of Australia’s history is the establishment of 
the Commonwealth of Australia. By the second half of the 19th century Australia 
consisted of six colonies, each of them having their own military and railway gauges, 
for instance (AGCRP 2007). The federation of these six colonies began as a dream of 
some political pioneers like Alfred Deakin, Henry Parkes or Edmund Barton, even 
though it was initially not a particularly popular idea (ibid.). In order to draft a Federal 
Constitution, the Premier of New South Wales, Henry Parkes, who is also referred to as 
                                                
4 The Australian Capital Territory (ACT) was established in 1911 with Canberra being its capital 
(AGCRP 2008b). 
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the “Father of Federation”, invited his colleagues to a meeting in Melbourne in 1890 
and in Sydney in 1891(ibid.). The Australian Constitution was put to a referendum 
twice, as it was rejected the first time in 1898 and was only successful the following 
year (ibid.). On 1 January 1901 the Commonwealth of Australia was inaugurated (ibid.). 
This shall, however, not imply that Australia immediately became independent and 
sovereign. In fact, Australia was “a self-governing governing colony within the nation 
of the British Empire. Britain still had control over Australia’s international relations, 
and Australian parliaments could not make laws repugnant to Britain. Australians were 
British subjects“ (Oz Politics 2009). Australia achieved independence and sovereignty 
gradually (ibid): Firstly, the executive branch became independent after the Imperial 
Conferences of 1926 and 1930 (ibid.). This was also confirmed by the Imperial Statute 
of Westminster in 1931. Secondly, independence for the Commonwealth Parliament 
was achieved through the 1931 Imperial Statute of Westminster and the 1942 Statute of 
Westminster Adoption Act (ibid.). Thirdly, the international community recognised 
Australian nationhood between the end of the First and the end of the Second World 
War (ibid.). Finally, independence for the judiciary was achieved through the 1968 
Privy Council (Limitation of Appeals) Act (ibid.). 
The idea of Federation was definitely very progressive and of extraordinary 
significance for Australia, however, it must not be forgotten, that “race” was “a key 
factor in the ambition for Federation, with the dream of a ‘white nation’ uppermost in 
the minds of federalists” (AGCRP 2007). With the establishment of the Commonwealth 
of Australia indigenous people were excluded from political participation and denied 
citizenship rights. These rights were only recognised after a successful referendum on 
this issue in 1967 (AGCRP 2007; AGCRP 2008a). 
 
A brief historic abstract of Australia would however be incomplete without 
mentioning its indigenous aspects. When discussing Australia’s history, one is tempted 
to define Australia as a “young” country, as its colonial history only begins in the 1770s 
with the arrival of first British explorers (Carter 2006, 5). However, Australia can be 
seen as an “old” country as well. After all, indigenous peoples (Aborigines and Torres 
Strait Islanders) have inhabited the country for 40,000 to 60,000 years, being the 
“longest-surviving civilisation on the planet” (ibid.). Therefore, when analysing 
Australian history, there are always two perspectives to be considered: The “white” 
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historiography tends to emphasise the “young” aspects of Australian history, which is 
often contrary to the Aboriginal perspective. This is not surprising, as “history is a 
series of present arguments, not a series of past events. Its truths are always subject to 
interpretation and re-interpretation” (Carter 2006, 12). This becomes most evident on 
26 January every year. On this day most white Australians commemorate and celebrate 
the arrival of the First Fleet under Captain Arthur Philip at Camp Cove in 1788. 
However, for many indigenous people this day is a day of protest and mourning 
(AGCRP 2008a). 
Another clash of interpretations becomes evident in the idea of Australia as an 
“empty land”. When Captain Cook arrived in Australia in 1770 he had the instruction to 
annex the land if it was uninhabited or take possession of suitable places with consent 
from the native peoples (Carter 2006, 69). The first settlers clearly saw that the land was 
anything but uninhabited, however, they did not take notice of any signs of 
“civilisation”, as they could not find any villages or domesticated animals (ibid.). 
Although the land was never officially declared “terra nullius”5 (Carter 2006, 70), the 
indigenous peoples were de facto dispossessed, displaced and denied any rights. It is 
cynical to declare a culture that has inhabited Australia for 40,000 to 60,000 years 
“uncivilised”, when in fact, Aborigines have lived in harmony with nature and practiced 
sound “environmental management and exploitation” (Carter 2006, 76). 
The last example for a discrepancy of interpretations of history has recently been 
in the centre of media attention due to the Rudd Government’s new approach towards 
history, with an emphasis on the so-called “Stolen Generations”. As the settlers spread 
further and their contacts and sexual encounters with the indigenous community 
increased, the number of so called ‘half-cast’ children increased as well. This 
constituted a source of discomfort and anxiety to the public, the Church and policy-
makers. Both States and Church “aimed to protect as well as advance civilization by 
completely eliminating Aboriginality in this hybrid form” (van Krieken 2004, 127). This 
was conducted by removing Aboriginal children from their families, cutting off their 
contact with their relatives and cultural roots, and placing them in institutions or white 
foster families. That is why the victims of this policy are frequently referred to as 
“Stolen Generations”. Even though the official concern was to protect children from 
being neglected, often the true reason for these procedures was often the belief that 
                                                
5 Land belonging to nobody. 
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“Aboriginal blood could be ‘bred out’ over successive generations” (Carter 2006, 421). 
This dark chapter in Australian history was not critically discussed or resolved for a 
long time. Successive governments refused to apologise, as there was an unexpressed 
fear that an official apology would “open the government to massive compensation 
claims“ (Carter 2006, 423). However, Kevin Rudd chose to follow a different path and 
officially apologised for the injustice indigenous Australians had been subjected to in 
the past centuries (PM 2008a) – less than four months after being elected the Prime 
Minister of Australia in November 2007. 
 
Recapitulating the most significant aspects of Australian history, it is important to 
understand the difference between the notion of Australia being a “young” or an “old” 
country. However, for the following analysis of the political system and the relations 
with the European Union, the notion of “young” Australia will be the predominant 
perspective. 
 
2.2. Constitutional framework and distinctive features of the political 
system 
2.2.1. The hybrid system 
Like most features of the political system, the Constitution of the Commonwealth 
of Australia cannot be analysed without first understanding the historical context out of 
which it has emerged. Before the Constitution came into effect on 1 January 1901 its 
drafters spent much time debating about its contents (HoR 2008d). It is important to 
mention that many of them were politicians from Australian colonies, which were 
independent self-governing entities not willing to lose too much power to the newly 
founded Commonwealth of Australia (Parkin & Summers 2006, 46-47). When agreeing 
on the formal Constitution, the drafters were influenced by the Westminster notion of 
responsible government and by the US notion of federalism (Parkin & Summers 2006, 
47). Therefore the final version of the Constitution of the Commonwealth is actually a 
compromise between these two notions and is the origin of the so-called Australian 
hybrid system, which combines both elements of the Westminster and of the US model 
(“Wash-minster”) (ibid.). 
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Responsible government (Westminster model) 
Firstly, the elements of the Westminster model, which were adopted in the 
Australian political system, will be discussed. In the United Kingdom, the Parliament 
consists of two chambers: the unelected House of Lords and the elected House of 
Commons. The House of Commons is therefore meant to represent the citizens and to 
fulfil legislative functions, whereas the government is the executive body. However, 
there is no clear separation of legislative and executive powers, since the party (or 
coalition) winning the majority of seats in the House of Commons (or the House of 
Representatives in Australia) also wins the government (Parkin & Summers 2006, 47). 
The Prime Minister and other ministers are directly drawn from the members of the 
winning party of the House of Commons in the UK or the House of Representatives in 
Australia (Weller 2004, 632). Nevertheless, the Parliament is a very important body, as 
the government cannot raise taxes or spend money without its authorisation. Essentially, 
this is the fundamental principle of the Westminster system, which was also adopted in 
Australia (Parkin & Summers 2006, 48). 
Moreover, the term “responsible government” is used to describe the 
interrelation between the government and the parliament, as the government is drawn 
from and responsible to the parliament (ibid; HoR 2008f, 1). 
Still, there is one important aspect that differentiates the British political system 
from its Australian counterpart: Great Britain does not have a written Constitution, 
whereas Australia does (Parkin & Summers 2006, 49). The reason for Great Britain not 
having a formal written Constitution can be found in the long history of the British 
Parliament out of which common law and many unwritten conventions evolved 
throughout the course of time. Australia could not build its political system on such a 
long political and institutional history. Moreover, many drafters of the Australian 
Constitution insisted on written rules in order to protect their interests against the newly 
established Commonwealth of Australia (ibid.). This argument leads to the second 
aspect and formative feature of the Australian hybrid political system, namely 
federalism. 
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Federalism (US model) 
Federalism is the second facet of the Australian hybrid model and can be defined 
as “a political solution to the problem of how to combine previously separate self-
governing entities to form a new common national government” (Parkin&Summers 
2006, 50). The Australian Founding Fathers faced the same problems as their American 
counterparts did about 120 years before. The Australian continent consisted of more or 
less populous British colonies. There are three reasons why the model of federalism was 
adopted in Australia (Parkin & Summers 2006, 50-51): Firstly, the less populous states 
were concerned about introducing a new national (Commonwealth) government, 
because they feared it could be dominated by representatives of the more populous 
states, making it difficult to have their voices be heard on a national level. Secondly, the 
economic depression of the 1890s favoured the belief, that there would be significant 
economic advantages in creating a single Australian common market instead of 
continuing to uphold trade barriers between the states. Thirdly, the drafters of the 
Australian Constitution knew that the US model had worked quite well. Therefore, three 
key features of the US federal system were introduced in Australia (Parkin & Summers 
2006, 52): the Senate, a specified division of powers between the Commonwealth 
government and the State governments and judicial review. 
In the Australian Senate each state is represented equally independent of its 
population (ibid.). The Senate consists of 76 Senators – twelve are elected from each of 
the six states6 for six-year terms, whereas only two Senators are elected in the 
Australian Capital Territory (ACT) and the Northern Territory7 for a term of three years 
(DoS 2008a, 1). Unlike the British Upper House, the House of Lords, the Senate has the 
same powers as the House of Representatives, except for the right to initiate and amend 
bills that impose taxation or appropriate money (DoS 2008b, 5; HoR 2008c, 3). This 
causes tensions with regard to the principle of responsible government (Parkin & 
Summers 2006, 55). As all laws must be approved by the parliament as a whole (HoR 
2008a, 6), the government is dependent on both chambers of parliament. In practical 
terms it is rather difficult for a government to obtain a majority in the Senate as well, 
even though the Howard government managed to do so in the 2004 federal election, for 
                                                
6 The six states are (in alphabetical order): New South Wales (capital: Sydney), Queensland (capital: 
Brisbane), South Australia (capital: Adelaide), Tasmania (capital: Hobart), Victoria (capital: Melbourne), 
Western Australia (capital: Perth). 
7 The two territories are: Australian Capital Territory (ACT, capital: Canberra), Northern Territory 
(capital: Darwin). 
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instance (UWA 2009). Whenever this situation occurs, the government becomes 
disproportionally powerful, making it easier to pass laws in such circumstances. 
Nevertheless, the Senate’s behaviour was one of the reasons that contributed to the 
Constitutional crisis in 1975, which will be explained in chapter 2.2.2. 
The second key feature of the US federal system adopted by Australia was the 
specified division of powers and responsibilities between the national government and 
the state governments (Parkin & Summers 2006, 52). Section 51 of the Constitution8 
determines that the states retain whatever residual powers are not explicitly given in this 
way to the Commonwealth. Moreover Section 109 states that the Commonwealth law 
prevails in case of a conflict between these two federal levels. In practice the 
Commonwealth is assigned with “trade and commerce, postal, telegraphic and 
telephonic services, defence, currency, banking, quarantine, copyright, migration, 
marriage and divorce, pensions, external affairs and conciliation and arbitration of 
interstate industrial disputes” (DoS 2008b, 2). Residual powers, like public schools, 
public housing, police, roads, personal welfare services, public hospitals etc. are left to 
be exercised by the states (Parkin & Summers 2006, 52). Initially the state governments 
were intended to be the government the citizens encounter first and most often, which is 
the case even today (ibid.). 
The third feature of federalism is judicial review (Parkin & Summers 2006, 53). 
The Australian High Court, which is the counterpart of the American Supreme Court, 
acts as an “umpire” between the national and state governments (ibid.). It has the power 
to determine the meaning of the Constitution and to invalidate laws that it determines 
exceed the powers given to the government by the Constitution (ibid.). 
Even though federalism in Australia can be seen as the structure of the Senate, the 
federal-state division of powers and the separate state Constitutions, Australia remains 
rather centralist. The centralist hegemony of the Commonwealth can probably be seen 
best when looking at its dominance in taxation collections9. Today the income tax is 
collected by the Commonwealth, but the revenues are only partly given back to the 
states, sometimes in form of “tied grants” (Weller 2004, 631), as will be explained in 
the following paragraph. States do have the right to levy taxes, but the states’ citizens 
                                                
8 All quotations of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia refer to the following website: 
<http://www.comlaw.gov.au/comlaw/comlaw.nsf/440c19285821b109ca256f3a001d59b7/57dea3835d797
364ca256f9d0078c087/$FILE/ConstitutionAct.pdf>, viewed 12 November 2008. 
9 For a discussion of taxation collections and its significance for federalism see Carling (2008). 
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must pay the federal tax first, and then the one of the state (ibid.). Obviously, states levy 
less taxes than the Commonwealth does. Consequently, states have only a small tax 
base and are therefore very dependent on Commonwealth resources (ibid.). The Goods 
and Services Tax (GST) is collected by the federal government as well, but is returned 
completely to the states (Weller 2004, 631). 
Moreover, there is another feature of the so-called “vertical fiscal imbalance”, 
which basically describes a situation in which “the revenue collection of the 
Commonwealth and State governments does not match those governments' expenditure 
responsibilities“ (Queensland Treasury 2008). In other words, the states do no levy 
enough taxes in order to fund their own expenditures, making them very dependent on 
Commonwealth funding (ibid.). There are two ways the Commonwealth can provide the 
money needed by the states (ibid.): (1) general revenue assistance (mostly as GST 
entirely returned by the Commonwealth) and (2) specific purpose payments, commonly 
known as “tied grants”. Furthermore, Section 96 of the Constitution provides that the 
Commonwealth Parliament “may grant financial assistance to any State on such terms 
and conditions as it thinks fit”. What is known as “tied grants” rather resembles bribery 
in some cases. Special purposes payments or tied grants are paid to the states provided 
they meet the objectives the Commonwealth has previously set for them (OECD 1997, 
83). 
Furthermore, the drift towards centralism was advantaged by the High Court. The 
High Court’s interpretation of common law and the Constitution doubtlessly allowed 
the Commonwealth to consolidate its power (Wiltshire 2006, 190). Moreover, dramatic 
events or crises (like the Port Arthur massacre in 199610) always encourage demand for 
national leadership even in areas of clear state responsibility. Finally, it is important to 
restate that the Australian Constitution was never based on a strict separation of 
Commonwealth and state powers anyway. 
 
 
 
                                                
10 What has become known as the Port Arthur massacre was Australia’s deadliest killing spree. On 28 
April 1996 a young man killed 35 people and injured many more at the historic prison colony in Port 
Arthur (Tasmania), which is a popular tourist attraction. The man was arrested and sentenced to life 
imprisonment (Port Arthur 2009). 
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Analysis 
An interesting question is whether the advantages of the Australian federal system 
outweigh its disadvantages. In order to answer this question, it is necessary to describe 
both the advantages and disadvantages of federalism. 
Firstly, federalism guarantees that the (state) government remains close to the 
people, their needs and wishes. This is especially important for such a large country like 
Australia. It would probably be impossible to govern an area of 7,686,850 square 
kilometres with an absolutely centralistic system. It might be easier now, but it was 
definitely impossible when the Constitution was agreed on. 
Secondly, it encourages the regions or states to find unique solutions to their 
unique problems. One example is Queensland, who introduced a unique method of 
funding and controlling its public hospital system, for instance (Surrao et al. 2002). 
Thirdly, federalism is an obstacle for the dominance of the majority. In the past 25 
years the government could gain a majority in the Senate only once. This occurred from 
2004 to 2007 for the Liberal-National coalition government under Prime Minister John 
Howard (DoS 2008a, 5; UWA 2009) 
Nevertheless, there are some limitations of federalism. Since the separation of 
powers between the federal government and state governments remains unclear in many 
respects, it can lead to overlaps and over-regulation of the government policies as well 
as contradictions. Moreover, federalism can lead to unhealthy inequality, competition 
and rivalry between states. One facet of this competition is stealing major sports events 
from other states11 and trying to attract industry at the expense of other states. 
Recapitulating the benefits and limitations of federalism in Australia, it is 
important to add one more crucial fact. Even though Australia is a federation, the states 
cannot really change their own political direction at will, because an imbalance exists in 
the distribution of powers between the Commonwealth and the states. Nevertheless, 
some federal features do exist and do function. Establishing the Commonwealth of 
Australia as a federal country was a wise decision of the Founding Fathers. After all, 
Australia has always been a huge country impossible to run with a purely centralist 
political system. However, “federal power, whether social, economic or international, 
is far greater than originally envisaged in 1901.” (Weller 2004, 632) 
                                                
11 For an example of stealing major sports events from other states see Benson & Sikora (2007). 
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2.2.2. Formal Constitution vs. informal conventions 
As already stressed, Australia does have a written Constitution unlike the UK 
(HoR 2008d, 1). Nevertheless, the Constitutional framework does not only consist of 
the formal Constitution, but also of informal conventions, which are “common law” 
built up over many years (HoR 2008f, 1; Parkin & Summers 2006,  54). 
The formal Constitution mentions the Governor-General as the monarch’s 
representative. Section 61 goes even further and states: “The executive power of the 
Commonwealth is vested in the Queen and is exercisable by the Governor-General as 
the Queen's representative, and extends to the execution and maintenance of this 
Constitution, and of the laws of the Commonwealth.” This section highlights the most 
significant discrepancy between the formal Constitution and informal conventions. In 
practice the Prime Minister (who is not mentioned in the Constitution), and his Cabinet 
perform all executive tasks (HoR 2008f, 2; Parkin & Summers 2006, 54). Moreover, the 
Governor-General uses his powers only in accordance with the Prime Minister’s and the 
other minisers’ advice (HoR 2008f, 4). He assigns the winning party or coalition to 
form the government and he appoints ministers as recommended by the party leader 
(Parkin & Summers 2006, 54-55). Nevertheless, the Constitution accredits a range of 
so-called reserve powers to the Governor-General, which he – by convention – usually 
exercises only on ministerial advice  (HoR 2008f, 2-4). He can dissolve (or refuse to 
dissolve) the House of Representatives (Section 5), dissolve the House of 
Representatives and the Senate simultaneously on the occasion of a deadlock (Section 
57) and appoint or dismiss ministers (Section 64). The use of these reserve powers and 
the consequences thereof will be discussed in the next section when the Constitutional 
Crisis of 1975 will be analysed. 
Moreover, the Constitution mentions the institutions of the House of 
Representatives and the Senate, declaring that elections must be held periodically, that 
ministers have to be Members of Parliament (who by convention are Members of the 
House of Representatives, not of the Senate), and states that the Government cannot 
spend money without the Parliament’s appropriation (Parkin & Summers 2006, 54). 
However, by convention, a government resigns by convention if its budget is refused, 
even though this did not happen in 1975, either (Parkin & Summers 2006, 59). Figure 1 
on page 15 illustrates the discrepancy between the formal constitution and informal 
conventions. 
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Figure 1: Constitution vs. conventions 
 
 
Source: HoR 2008f, 4 
 
Constitutional Crisis of 1975 
When the Labor Party under Prime Minister Gough Whitlam won the elections in 
the House of Representatives, there was a deadlock in the Senate. There were 29 Labor, 
29 Liberal-National and 2 Independent Senators (DoS 2008a, 5; UWA 2009). The 
situation changed dramatically, when one of the Independents died and the second one 
resigned. According to democratic considerations and conventions, the state 
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governments usually send Senators from the same party to replace the vacant seats in 
the Senate (Parkin & Summers 2006, 58). In 1975, however, Queensland and New 
South Wales did not do so and instead, nominated two Coalition (Liberal–National) 
Senators (ibid.). Therefore, the Whitlam government no longer had a majority in the 
Senate. 
The opposition leader, Malcolm Fraser, announced that the Senate would refuse 
the budget unless new elections were called. Formally the Senate did act within its 
powers given by the Constitution, but it acted against the convention of responsible 
government, which only makes sense when the second chamber takes the same course 
of action as the first chamber (ibid.). 
Prime Minister Whitlam refused to resign even though he knew very well that 
budget would not pass in the Senate. He acted within his formal powers, too, but once 
again he chose a way contrary to the convention that stated the Government must have 
support in Parliament in order to remain in office (ibid.). 
Finally, on 11 November 1975 Governor-General John Kerr dismissed the 
Whitlam government, appointed the opposition leader as “caretaker” Prime Minister 
and announced the double dissolution of the Parliament (Parkin & Summers 1975, 58-
59). The Liberal-National coalition under Fraser won the following elections (UWA 
2009). John Kerr did act in accordance with Section 64 of the Constitution, but against 
the convention that the Governor-General should only appoint a Prime Minister with a 
majority in the House of Representatives and against the convention of acting on 
recommendation of the Prime Minister (Parkin & Summers 2006, 59). 
 
Analysis 
The crisis of 1975 clearly mirrors the discrepancy between the written 
Constitution and informal conventions. It is probably a paradox of the Australian 
political system that actions taken by political leaders, who formally act within their 
powers given by the Constitution, can have such drastic effects on the political stability 
of a country. Nevertheless, the hybrid system as a whole advantages such outcomes, 
because the Senate is (almost) as powerful as the House of Representatives. This may 
appear to be a good means of democratic control, but it eventually led to a political 
deadlock and impasse in 1975. However, this should not imply that the Australian 
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hybrid system is particularly vulnerable to political deadlocks and instability. There was 
only one Constitutional crisis in 108 years of parliamentary democracy in the 
Commonwealth of Australia. 
 
2.2.3. Monarchy or republic? 
Since the early 1990s there has been a debate about converting Australia from a 
monarchy to a republic (Irving 2000; Cross 2007). The Queen does not play an active 
role in Australian politics and the transformation into a republic would not have made 
much difference to political day-to-day business, as Australia can already be seen as a 
“de facto republic” in practical terms (Parkin & Summers 2006, 61). In 1999, a 
referendum on the question of the head of state took place. 
An important question the drafters of the referendum (15 delegates of the so-
called People’s Convention) faced was, however, the method of appointment of the new 
head of state. While the supporters of the minimalist model only “sought to sever the 
connection with the British monarch, but otherwise change the Australian 
Constitutional framework as little as possible” (Parkin & Summers 2006, 62), there 
were also experts in favour of a more radical change to the Constitution, e.g. the 
incorporation of a Bill of Rights (ibid.). Furthermore, there were advocates of a direct 
election of the head of state, whereas others supported the model of the Prime Minister 
appointing the head of state (ibid.)  
On 6 November 1999 the following two questions recommended by the People’s 
Convention were put to the electorate in a Constitutional: 
 
“to alter the Constitution to establish the Commonwealth of Australia 
as a republic with the Queen and the Governor-General being 
replaced by a President appointed by a two-thirds majority of the 
members of the Commonwealth Parliament” (Irving 2000, 111) 
and 
“to alter the Constitution to insert a preamble” (ibid.) 
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This was eventually rejected by 56 per cent in the referendum (Parkin & Summers 
2006, 63). 
 
Analysis 
The rejection of the referendum should not be overestimated. The fact that the 
Australians voted against the proposal does not consequently mean that they rejected 
the idea of establishing a republic. Firstly, it has to be highlighted that the Australian 
electorate has always “shown great caution in relation to changing the Constitution” 
(Parkin & Summers 2006, 63). Only eight of the 44 referendum questions passed the 
vote of the electorate (ibid.; Weller 2004, 632). Secondly, public opinion polls revealed 
that it was not the idea of becoming a republic that was rejected; it was the proposed 
model of a republic with a head of state endorsed by two thirds of both houses of 
Parliament that the electorate disliked. In fact “a model in which the head of state was 
selected by politicians and not directly elected by the people was unpopular.” (ibid.) 
 
2.3. Relevant aspects of the political system in detail 
After the description of the relevant historical aspects and distinctive features of 
the political system, the main actors and institutions in the Australian political system 
shall now be identified. 
 
2.3.1. Legislative power - the Parliament of Australia 
The Parliament of Australia consists of the Queen, who is represented by the 
Governor-General, and the two houses (HoR 2008f, 1). The lower house, the House of 
Representatives, has 150 members and is elected for a maximum of three years 
(Parliament of Australia 2008a). The Senate, the Upper House, has twelve Senators 
from each of the six states, respectively, and two Senators each from the two territories, 
totalling 76 senators (DoS 2008a, 1). While state senators are elected for a term of six 
years, territories Senators are only elected for three-year terms (Parliament of Australia 
2008a.). However, in order to ensure a “continuing, but rotating, membership” (DoS 
2008a, 3), half the senators are elected every three years. Furthermore, there is a link 
between the number of members of the House of Representatives and the number of 
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senators; Section 24 of the Constitution provides that “the House of Representatives 
shall be composed of members directly chosen by the people of the Commonwealth, and 
the number of such members shall be, as nearly as practicable, twice the number of 
senators”. However, territory senators are not part of this calculation (DoS 2008a, 3). 
This so-called nexus provision is aimed at preventing the House of Representatives 
from becoming too large and powerful (ibid.). Nevertheless, the Parliament may change 
the number of senators in order to proportionally change the number of members of the 
House of Representatives, which happened in 1948 and 1983 (ibid.). 
 
Thus, elections for the House of Representatives and the Senate are held every 
three years, respectively, unless they are dissolved sooner (DoS 2008a, 3; HoR 2008b, 
1). Usually they are held on the same day. Candidates for the House of Representatives 
must be Australian citizens and be eligible to vote, i.e. not be convicted of certain 
crimes, not be citizens of a foreign country and not be undischarged bankrupts (ibid.). 
There are two interesting aspects with regard to parliamentary elections. Firstly, voting 
is compulsory – not only for parliamentary elections, but also for all national, state and 
local elections (Weller 2004, 635). It is mandatory that every Australian citizen above 
the age of 18 must enrol as a voter (HoR 2008b, 1). As registration and voting are 
compulsory, enrolled voters who fail to cast a ballot have to justify their absence and 
can be fined (20 $) if the excuse is not regarded adequate or sufficient (AEC 2007; 
Weller 2004, 635). 
The second interesting aspect with regard to the elections for the House of 
Representatives concerns the preferential system of voting. Elections for the Senate are 
based on a preferential system as well, however, “the House of Representatives and the 
Senate have different electoral means for registering electors’ preferences” (DoS 
2008a, 2). Elections for the House of Representatives employ a single transferable vote 
(Weller 2004, 635). Voters have to rank the candidates in order of their preference – 
they are not allowed to vote for only one candidate (HoR 2008b, 2). In order to be 
elected into the House of Representatives, the candidate has to be supported by the 
majority (50 percent + 1 vote) of the electors in his constituency. If no candidate 
receives more than 50 percent of first preference votes, the candidates with the fewest 
votes are progressively eliminated and the next preferences of their voters distributed 
among the remaining candidates. This takes place until a candidate finally receives 
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more than 50 percent of the votes (DoS 2008a, 2; HoR 2008b, 2). Figure 2 will illustrate 
the preferential system of voting based on a concrete example: 
 
Figure 2: Example of the distribution of votes in a preferential voting system 
 
Source: HoR 2008b, 2 
 
As Australia is currently divided into 150 constituencies12, exactly one member of 
the House of Representatives is drawn from each electoral division. Therefore, the aim 
of preferential voting is to secure one candidate with a majority of votes, allowing the 
candidate to win the seat for his/her constituency in the House of Representatives (DoS 
2008a, 2). 
The initial position for Senate elections is somewhat different, as each state elects 
six senators. Using proportional representation voting, the objective is to identify the six 
candidates, who obtained “a number of votes equal to or exceeding a required quota” 
(ibid.). Candidates, who receive more votes than the required quota, distribute their 
surplus votes in accordance with their voters ranking of preferences (ibid.). However, 
the system of proportional representation in the Senate was only introduced in 1948; 
prior to that the “first past the post” and the group preference system were used (DoS 
2008a, 1). Therefore, it is now comparatively easier for smaller parties and 
independents to be elected into the Senate, than into the House of Representatives, 
contributing to the phenomenon, that the government rarely gains a majority in the 
                                                
12 Currently there are 49 electoral divisions in New South Wales, 37 in Victoria, 29 in Queensland, 15 in 
Western Australia, 11 in South Australia, 5 in Tasmania, 2 in the Australian Capital Territory and 2 in the 
Northern Territory (HoR 2008b, 3). 
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Senate13. In the 48 years following 1961 on there were only eight years where the 
government had a majority in both houses of Parliament (Parkin & Summers 2006, 55); 
John Howard was the last Prime Minister who managed to obtain a majority in the 
Senate from 2004 to 2007 (DoS 2008a, 5; UWA 2009) 
The party or coalition of parties winning the majority of seats in the House of 
Representatives forms the government (HoR 2008e, 1; HoR 2008f, 1), after being 
authorised to do so by the Governor-General (Parkin & Summers 2006, 55). 
Furthermore, by convention, the Governor-General appoints the ministers in accordance 
with the recommendation of the leader of the winning party or coalition of parties 
(ibid.). While ministers can be members of either of the houses, the Prime Minister and 
the Treasurer by convention have to be members of the lower house (Weller 2004, 632). 
The political culture in the Australian House of Representatives is probably best 
described by Uhr (from a publication in 1995 cited in Weller 2004, 633): 
 
“Australian politics is played like Australian sport, up front, down to 
earth and with a blatant desire to win at any cost.” 
 
Even though the Senate was historically seen as the State’s House and intended to 
protect the interests of the less populous states against the newly founded 
Commonwealth of Australia (DoS 2008c, 1), it is now a comparatively powerful upper 
house, as “the powers of the two Houses to initiate and amend bills are identical except 
in relation to bills that impose taxation or appropriate money.“ (DoS 2008b, 5). In fact, 
the Australian Senate is currently regarded one of the most powerful upper 
parliamentary house in the world (DoS 2008a, 1). However, according to Section 53 of 
the Constitution “proposed laws appropriating revenue or moneys, or imposing 
taxation, shall not originate in the Senate“. Similarly, the Senate cannot amend money 
bills (in contrast to all other bills), but it can only request amendments to such bills 
(ibid.; Weller 2004, 633). Nevertheless, apart from the restrictions concerning money 
bills and taxation, the Australian Senate has considerable rights and possibilities to fulfil 
its role as a “check on government” (DoS 2008c, 2). As outlined above, it is rather 
                                                
13 For a detailed breakdown of Senate election results since 1948 (including a detailed information on 
party affiliations) see DoS (2008a, 5). For details an all Australian elections UWA (2009). 
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difficult for the government to gain a majority in the Senate due to a different voting 
system. Consequently, government legislation does not always easily pass the Senate 
and is subject to genuine debate, negotiations and consultation with all parties in order 
to gain a majority (ibid.). Therefore, the Australian Senate is (except for the case when 
the government does have a majority in the Senate) a powerful instrument for holding 
the government accountable. 
 
2.3.2. Executive power – cabinet government and Governor-General 
Under the Constitution (Section 61) the “executive power of the Commonwealth is 
vested in the Queen and is exercisable by the Governor-General as the Queen's 
representative, and extends to the execution and maintenance of this Constitution, and 
of the laws of the Commonwealth.” Consequently, the Governor-General has, among 
other things, the right to (1) appoint and dismiss ministers, (2) appoint judges, (3) be 
commander in chief of the defence forces, (4) assent to legislation that has been passed 
by both Houses of Parliament and to (5) block or propose amendments to any law 
passed by both Houses of Parliament (HoR 2008f, 2-3). In practice, however, the 
he/she14 does not exercise these rights and only acts on (Prime-) ministerial advice 
(HoR 2008f, 3). Typically the Governor-General, who is appointed by the Queen based 
on the Prime Minister’s recommendation, performs ceremonial functions as the head of 
state on behalf of the Queen (ibid.). In addition to the rights outlined above, the 
Governor-General holds so-called reserve powers, including the right to dissolve the 
House of Representatives or both Houses in a “Double Dissolution” (ibid.). However, 
these powers are only to be exercised in extraordinary circumstances, i.e. with 
constitutional experts not being able to agree on the nature and scope of these 
circumstances (ibid.). As mentioned in section 2.3.1., the Governor-General is – along 
with the House of Representatives and the Senate – regarded a constituent part of the 
Parliament (HoR 2008f, 4). Consequently, the Governor-General combines and fulfils 
both legislative and executive functions. In order for a bill to become an Act of 
Parliament and part of the law of the land, the Governor-General has to assent to the bill 
(HoR 2008a, 4-5). 
                                                
14 On 5 September 2008 Quentin Bryce was sworn in as the first female Governor-General of Australia 
(GG 2008). 
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In practice, however, the Prime Minister is the Head of the Executive Government 
(HoR 2008f, 4). Even though the Prime Minister is not mentioned in the Constitution 
(Weller 2004, 630), he draws his power from the majority in the House of 
Representatives, and hence, from the people (HoR 2008f, 2). Consequently, the 
Governor-General appoints the leader of the strongest party (or coalition of parties) in 
the House of Representatives to the Prime Minister (HoR 2008f, 4). Ministers are 
appointed by the Governor-General based on the recommendation of the Prime Minister 
(ibid.). The Prime Minister heads a Cabinet of currently 19 senior ministers (PM 
2009a), which is in reality the most significant policy-making body of the government 
(HoR 2008f, 2). In addition to the members of Cabinet, the current Rudd government 
has ten “assistant ministers who are allocated responsibility for sections of the 
departmental duties” (Weller 2004, 641). Moreover, there are currently twelve 
Parliamentary Secretaries who “assist or represent ministers in their administrative 
responsibilities” (HoR 2008f, 2). 
 
2.3.3. The judiciary 
Under the Constitution, the High Court and other federal courts have the power to 
interpret laws and judge whether they apply in individual cases (HoR 2008f, 3). As 
outlined in Section 71 of the Constitution, the “judicial power of the Commonwealth 
shall be vested in a Federal Supreme Court, to be called the High Court of Australia, 
and in such other federal courts as the Parliament creates, and in such other courts as 
it invests with federal jurisdiction.” While judges (currently six Justices and one Chief 
Justice) are appointed by the Governor-General on the advice of the Prime Minister, 
they can only be removed from office by the Governor-General as a result of 
misbehaviour or incapacity, but only after a request from both Houses of Parliament 
(ibid.). 
 
2.3.4. Political parties 
The two most dominant parties in Australia are the Labor and the Liberal Party. 
Founded in 1891, the Australian Labor Party is the oldest political party in Australia 
(ALP 2009; Weller 2004, 637). The Liberal Party was founded in 1944 as a response to 
Labor’s domination. The leader of the opposition, Robert Menzies, wanted all non-
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Labor parties to unite in order to constitute a strong opposition (LPA 2009). 
Nevertheless, “both parties were initially based on class” (Weller 2004, 637).  
An interesting aspect in regard to the two major parties in Australia concerns the 
selection of party leaders. Party leaders can only be selected by the parliamentary group, 
consequently, “no one outside gets a vote” (Weller 2004, 639). What is even more 
interesting is the fact that “a vote can be called at any meeting” (ibid.). Therefore, the 
Prime Ministers are dependent on the support of their party group in Parliament, which 
is why they are usually keen on establishing good relations with backbenchers and other 
parliamentary party members (ibid.). After all, “accountability to the party room is 
constant; action can be immediate. That simple truth affects the way that Cabinet and 
parliamentary politics operate” (Weller 2004, 640.). 
Even though Australia was one of the first countries to introduce female suffrage, 
it took 40 years for a woman to be elected into the House of Representatives (ibid.). 
Women have been extremely underrepresented in the government, with only four out of 
the 20 members of the current Cabinet being female (PM 2009a). Nevertheless, the 
opportunities for women in political top-positions seem to have improved. Not only 
does the Rudd government account for the first female Deputy Prime Minister, but also 
for the first female Governor-General (GG 2008; PM 2009a). 
Until the 1960s Aboriginal peoples had been denied the right to vote (Weller 
2004, 641), therefore, it is not surprising that they are virtually non-existent in 
Commonwealth politics. Similarly, first generation immigrants are underrepresented. 
According to Weller (2004, 641) “it takes two or more generations before those waves 
of migration have an impact on national politics”, even though Australia is a traditional 
nation of immigrants. 
 
2.3.5. Summary 
After the brief discussion of the most relevant aspects of the Australian political 
system, Figure 3 on page 25 presents a model of the Australian political system and is 
intended to be a brief summary of the information given in the sections above. As the 
constitutional framework and relevant aspects of the Australian political system have 
been discussed so far, the next chapter shall emphasise the distinctive features of 
Australian foreign policy and the foreign policy-making process. 
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Figure 3: Model of the Australian political system 
 
Source: Oz Politics 2008 
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2.4. Foreign policy 
2.4.1. Distinctive features of Australian foreign policy 
In order to undertake an analysis of Australian foreign policy, it is necessary to 
define this term first. According to Gyngell & Wesley (2003, 23) foreign policy “relates 
to the management of disturbances to a range of policy spaces that either originate 
from sources external to the country, or can be addressed at sites external to the 
country”. What becomes evident in this definition is a crucial factor of foreign policy – 
the external environment. 
However, before discussing Australia’s external environment, it is important to 
examine its internal environment first, as they are intertwined. With an area of 
7,686,850 square kilometres, a coastline of 25,600 kilometres and a population of 
21,262,64115 Australia is an extremely large, but sparsely populated country. However, 
Australia is also one of the most urbanised countries in the world with 89% of the total 
population living in urban areas; vast areas remain uninhabited. 
With regard to the external environment, Australia’s neighbours are of particular 
interest. Australia is surrounded by the Pacific Ocean to the east, the Antarctic to the 
south, the Indian Ocean to the west and the Asian continent to the north. Therefore, 
there are two significant aspects of the Australian external environment. Firstly, it is 
characterised by geographic isolation. Secondly, Australia’s neighbouring (Asian) states 
are “different in history, language, culture, society, economy and politics” (Gyngell & 
Wesley 2003, 10). Hence, Australia is sometimes referred to as the only “Western” 
country in a region, where it culturally does not fit in. 
Despite or maybe because of its geographical isolation, Australia has been an 
active actor on the world stage since federation in 1901 (ibid.). For example, Australia 
sent troops to almost every major war. Australian troops were involved in the Boer War 
in South Africa, in both World Wars, in Korea, Vietnam, both Gulf Wars, Afghanistan 
and most recently in Iraq (ibid.). Furthermore, Australia played a leadership role in the 
only two United Nations peacekeeping missions in the Asia-Pacific; 1992-1993 in 
Cambodia and 1999-2001 in East Timor (ibid.). This involvement can, therefore, be 
regarded as a commitment to multilateralism. Moreover, Australia was a founding 
                                                
15 The figures concerning area, population, urbanisation, etc. refer to the CIA World Factbook (CIA 
2009a). 
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member of both the League of Nations and the United Nations (ibid.) and also made a 
significant commitment to the establishment of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC 2009). 
Apart from geographical isolation, there are two more factors that might have lead 
to Australia’s activism with regard to its foreign policy. Firstly, Australia has always 
been concerned about instability and uncertainty in its international environment and 
therefore interpreted events in this light (Gyngell & Wesley 2003, 11). As Gyngell & 
Wesley (2003, 10) conclude, “Australians are prone to watch the world around them 
apprehensively”. Secondly, Australia has developed a sense of being a “middle power” 
(Gyngell & Wesley 2003; Jones & Benvenuti 2006; Ungerer 2007). According to 
Ungerer (2007, 540), “Australia’s self-identification as a middle power has been one of 
the strongest influences on the form and conduct of Australian diplomatic practice”. 
Even though there is no academic consensus on a general definition of a middle power 
(Ungerer 2007, 539), some features are regarded as being important. Firstly, middle 
powers tend to have specific interests in global or regional issues, but lack the power 
and capacity to impose their will (Gyngell & Wesley 2003, 11; Ungerer 2007, 540). 
Therefore, middle powers have to find “specific, niche opportunities to exercise their 
power and influence” (Ungerer 2007, 540). Typically, middle powers rely on 
multilateral institutions, are committed to promoting international legal norms, and use 
their diplomatic, military and economic resources pro-actively in order to achieve their 
goals (Ungerer 2007, 539). 
Consequently, being a middle power, Australia is dependent on coalition building 
in order to make its voice heard on a global level. With regard to coalitions there are 
two perspectives in Australian politics. The first view is to stick to “great and powerful 
friends”, like former Prime Minister Menzies stated (cited in Gyngell & Wesley 2003, 
12). In the past it was the United Kingdom and more recently the United States, which 
fall into the category of “great and powerful friends”. The second and younger idea 
(promoted by Prime Minister Paul Keating, for instance) is to reinforce ties with the 
closest neighbours, i.e. Asian countries (ibid.). 
Apart from coalition building and closer ties with strategic allies, Australian 
politicians sometimes tend to implement more activist foreign policy than other middle 
powers do, given the geographic isolation and lack of close powerful neighbours. 
Alexander Downer, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade in the Howard coalition 
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government, gave the following pertinent analysis: “We are a middle power with the 
capacity to influence events. We have to make our way in the world in a way other 
countries don’t” (cited in Gyngell & Wesley 2003, 11). 
 
2.4.2. Foreign policy-making in Australia 
Activism, geographical isolation and lack of strong neighbours, the need for 
coalition building, the middle power concept and multilateral commitments have been 
defined as distinctive features of Australian foreign policy. Now, a description of the 
main actors in the Australian foreign policy-making process follows. 
In general, foreign policy is usually concerned with trying to anticipate, 
preventing, reacting to or initiating certain events on the world stage. According to 
Gyngell & Wesley (2003, 24) foreign policy issues  
 
“are defined by whether a certain event introduces significant disturbance 
into the policy space. The limits of quietude and disturbance are determined 
by the goals set for foreign policy, or the expectations about how the foreign 
policy apparatus should promote or protect given social values”. 
 
But who is responsible for setting the goals for foreign policy? Which actors are 
involved in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy in Australia? 
According to Firth (2005, 76), concentration of power is the “defining characteristic of 
foreign policy-making in Australia”, as the executive branch plays a predominant role. 
In practice, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Trade Minister, the Cabinet, 
senior public servants (also referred to as bureaucrats) and ministerial staff are the 
makers of Australian foreign policy (ibid.). The bureaucracy acts as an advisor to the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, because it has access to necessary information and has the 
experience and expertise to interpret the information available, hence, wielding 
significant influence on the formulation of foreign policy (Firth 2005, 77). 
The main institution and source of bureaucrats involved in the foreign policy-
making process is the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). Initially, the 
Department of External Affairs was established in 1935 (Firth 2005, 78). The first 
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challenge of the newly founded department was to escape from London’s diplomatic 
dominance in the 1940s and to establish an Australian identity on the world stage 
(ibid.). In 1987 the Department of Trade was incorporated into the Department of 
Foreign Affairs, establishing today’s DFAT (ibid.). This merger of departments clearly 
mirrors the significance trade has in Australia’s foreign affairs. Moreover, DFAT is 
responsible for Australia’s diplomatic missions all over the world, including missions to 
multilateral organisations, e.g. to the UN in New York, to the OECD in Paris or to the 
European Communities in Brussels (DFAT 2009a). Because overseas missions have 
been subject to cost reduction, DFAT is now employing considerably less diplomats 
and has less overseas representations; in 2003 only 15 percent of DFAT staff was 
working overseas (Firth 2005, 78). Even though embassies are expensive to maintain, 
diplomats play a crucial role as they are “Australia’s eyes and ears abroad” (Firth 2005, 
79) and are the source of important information and thorough analyses. 
Even though DFAT is the most prominent department with regard to the process 
of foreign policy-making, the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C), 
Defence, Treasury and the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and 
Indigenous Affairs also wield influence on foreign policy (Firth 2005, 80). Morever, the 
Howard government established the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) as an 
independent research centre16 (ibid.). 
With regard to the powers of the legislative branch in foreign policy, the 
Parliament has “little say” (Firth 2005, 81). In fact, Parliament cannot prevent the 
ratification of treaties or stop government from declaring war (ibid.). The only active 
role Parliament can play is in Question Time and parliamentary committees (ibid.). The 
Australian Parliament indeed has three committees dealing with foreign affairs. The 
Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade was established in 
1952 and draws members both from the House of Representatives and from the Senate 
(Firth 2005, 83). Its major activities include meeting visiting parliamentary delegations 
and making overseas visits, holding inquiries, inspecting defence installations and 
publishing comprehensive reports (ibid.). The Senate Standing Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Defence and Trade was formed in 1971 and only consists of six to eight 
Senators. This committee is also responsible for many comprehensive reports of foreign 
                                                
16 According to its website, ASPI is “is charged with the task of informing the public on strategic and 
defence issues, generating new ideas for government, and fostering strategic expertise in Australia” 
(ASPI 2009). 
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policy, for which it can – just like the Joint Standing Committee – request a government 
response (Firth 2005, 83-84). Most recently the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties 
was established in 1996 in order to provide an incentive for government to “table” 
treaties in Parliament, i.e. lay treaties on tables in both houses for MPs to examine them 
before ratification (Firth 2005, 84). The reason for the establishment of this committee 
once again deals with the discrepancy between the Constitution and informal 
conventions. While the Constitution gives the executive the sole power to make treaties, 
they used to be ‘tabled’ prior to ratification by convention (ibid.). However, successive 
governments since the 1970 “increasingly ignored parliament in both signing and 
ratifying treaties” (ibid.). Now the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties possesses the 
treaties for at least 15 days, including a National Interest Analysis. However, the 
government may still bypass the Parliament in especially “sensitive or urgent” 
situations without first “tabling” treaties (Firth 2005, 86). 
With regard to foreign policy-making in Australia, the power is distributed very 
unequally in favour of the executive. Therefore, “Parliament might require and report, 
but the executive decides” (Firth 2005, 86). 
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3. POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
After the description of the political system of the Commonwealth of Australia, its 
distinctive features and constitutional framework, as well as its characteristics with 
regard to its foreign policy, the attention shall now be drawn to the political system of 
the European Union. The European Union is based on a complex interaction of 
institutions, which have emerged over the course of time. In order to understand the 
implications of the formation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the 
main instrument of the European Union’s foreign policy, and in order to analyse the 
role of the European Union as an international actor in general and the relations 
between the European Union and Australia in particular, it is imperative to deal with 
historical and institutional aspects of European integration. Hill & Smith (2005a, 7) also 
stress the significance of history with regard to the European Union’s international 
relations:  
 
“An historical understanding of the origins of the EU’s international 
relations is essential, as they have highly particular characteristics and are 
still affected by readings of the past.” 
 
Therefore, these aspects shall be addressed first, followed by an outline of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and an analysis of the European Union as 
an international actor. 
 
3.1. Brief introduction, historical and institutional aspects 
“We must build a kind of United States of Europe […] 
Therefore I say to you: ‘Let Europe arise’ ” 
(Winston Churchill, Speech at the University of Zurich, 19 September 194617) 
 
Contrary to some recent interpretation, the roots of the European Union have 
never been solely economic. There was definitely an economic perspective, as Europe’s 
                                                
17 Winston Churchill was one of the pioneers who first promoted the idea of European unity. The full 
speech can be downloaded from the website of the Council of Europe (2009). 
3. Political system of the European Union 
 32 
dependence on American supply after the Second World War had severe effects on its 
trade balance deficit (Pollak & Slominski 2006, 17). However, the idea of European 
integration was primarily concerned with the formation of a new peace framework after 
the Second World War, which intended to limit the powers of the nation states (ibid.). 
The devastating aftermath of the Second World War, the fear of the Soviet Union 
gaining strength and the initiative of some political pioneers and masterminds like Jean 
Monnet, Winston Churchill, Robert Schuman, Alcide de Gasperi and Konrad Adenauer 
was conducive to European integration (Pollak & Slominski 2006, 18). Five motives are 
mirrored in the idea of European integration (Weidenfeld & Wessels 2006, 15-16.): (1) 
the desire for a new self-image as an alternative to nationalist leadership; (2) the desire 
for security and peace: the nation states were not able to prevent the Second World War. 
In politically instable times and with the Soviet Union becoming stronger, the belief that 
only European unity could protect its citizens gained momentum; (3) the desire for 
freedom and mobility after the constraints during the World Wars; (4) the hope for 
economic prosperity by means of a common market; (5) the hope for regaining power 
jointly: as the international system seemed to become increasingly bipolar after the 
Second World War, the only possibility for European states to regain some power in the 
international system was to cooperate and act jointly. 
An important prerequisite for a successful start of European integration was the 
commitment of both Germany and France to reconcile their differences. The Second 
World War and “the legacy of the Nazi era […] had left Germany a pariah notion” 
(Bache & George 2006, 97). On the other hand the existence of a Federal Republic of 
Germany posed a problem for France, as the threat of the re-emergence of this former 
power was omnipresent (Bache & George 2006, 89-103; Pollak & Slominski 2006, 24-
28). Moreover, France was concerned how to ensure continuing supply of coal from the 
Ruhr for its own steel industry (ibid.). Therefore, on 9 May 1950 Robert Schuman, 
French Minister of Foreign Affairs, presented a plan for pooling the coal and steel 
supplies of both France and Germany under the auspices of a supranational organisation 
(ibid.). Other European states were invited to participate, however, only Italy and the 
Benelux states accepted the invitation (ibid.). The British government was particularly 
sceptical about the commitment to supranationalism (ibid.). In addition, Britain strongly 
emphasised its close ties to other Commonwealth countries: “In every respect except 
distance we in Britain are closer to our kinsmen in Australia and New Zealand on the 
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far side of the world, than we are to Europe” (Stirk & Weigall from a publication in 
1999 cited in Pollak & Slominski 2006, 26). On 18 April 1951 France, Germany, Italy, 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg signed the Treaty of Paris establishing the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) (Pollak & Slominski 2006, 26). For the 
first time these states were willing to give up their sovereign powers with regard to their 
coal and steel industry and accept the majority decisions of the ECSC bodies (Pollak & 
Slominski 2006, 27-28). Article 2 of the Treaty of Paris18 outlines the ultimate goals of 
the ECSC: 
 
“The European Coal and Steel Community shall have as its task to 
contribute […] to economic expansion, growth of employment and a rising 
standard of living in the member states.” 
 
Under the Treaty of Paris the ECSC member states gave all their powers 
regarding the coal and steel industry (e.g. investment assistance, market and price 
regulation, the elimination of custom duties and other trade barriers) to the 
supranational, nine member, High Authority (Bache & George 2006, 103; Pollak & 
Slominski 2006, 27). Furthermore, the Council of Ministers, which consisted of one 
national government representative from each member state, fulfilled legislative 
functions (ibid.). The Common Assembly had the power to request reports from the 
High Authority and force it to resign with a two-third majority (ibid.).  The 
responsibility of the Court of Justice, which consisted of judges drawn from national 
judiciaries, was to examine the actions taken by the High Authority with regard to their 
legality (Bache & George 2006, 103). 
After the successful communitisation of the coal and steel industry, the motivation 
for further political integration gained momentum. However, the project to establish a 
European Defence Community (EDC) and the proposal to create a European Political 
Community (EPC) failed in 1954 (Pollak & Slominski 2006, 30), as governments were 
evidently “not prepared to surrender their sovereignity” (Bache & George 2006, 106). 
Despite this setback, the process of European integration did not stop completely. It was 
                                                
18 For access to European Union law, including treaties, international agreements, case law, etc. see the 
European Union’s EurLex website: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/>, viewed 15 April 2009. 
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merely the direction of integration that changed; the process of political integration was 
paused in favour of economic integration. Hence, the Treaties of Rome created the 
European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euroatom) in 1957. The explicit objective of the EEC was the creation of a common 
market inter alia based on the elimination of trade barriers, the establishment of a 
common customs tariff and the establishment of the four freedoms (Bache & George 
2006, 129; Pollak & Slominski 2006, 32): (1) the free movement of goods, (2) the free 
movement of persons, (3) the free movement of services and (4) the free movement of 
capital. The institutional framework of the EEC followed ECSC’s example (ibid.): A 
supranational Commission was the equivalent of the High Authority and consisted of 
nine Commissioners, who were appointed by national governments. The Council of 
Ministers comprised one representative from each member state and decided upon the 
Commission’s proposal. The rights of the Parliamentary Assembly were limited, as it 
was only intended to act as a consultative body. The 142 members were initially 
appointed by national parliaments from their own members, however, the Treaty of 
Rome made provisions for direct elections at a later date. The Assembly eventually 
changed its name to European Parliament (EP) in 1962 and held the first direct elections 
in 1979. The last institution of this framework was the European Court of Justice (ECJ), 
consisting of one judge from each member state, and of one head judge, who was 
appointed by the Council of Ministers. The role of the ECJ was to interpret the Treaty 
of Rome and to act as arbiter in disputes between the member states and the EEC 
institutions. The only institution not having an equivalent in the ECSC was the newly 
founded Economic and Social Committee (ESC), which played an advisory role. 
Euratom employed a similar institutional framework, consisting of an Assembly, 
a Commission, a Council, a Court of Justice and an Economic and Social Council 
(Pollak & Slominski 2006, 33). It is remarkable that the basic institutional arrangements 
established in the 1950s have remained until today (ibid.). Therefore, recapitulating the 
time between the creation of the ECSC and the Treaties of Rome, it might be argued 
that 
 
 “if the failure of the EDC had meant several steps backwards in the 
process of integration, the Treaties of Rome promised a major leap 
forward.” (Bache & George 2006, 116). 
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In 1960, as a response to the establishment of the EEC, a group of other European 
states not willing19 (or able20) to contribute to economic integration on a supranational 
level founded the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) (Pollak & Slominski 2006, 
33). At that time Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the 
United Kingdom preferred economic cooperation on an intergovernmental level (ibid.). 
The early years of the EEC were particularly successful for the Commission while 
under the presidency of Walter Hallstein who acted in a very proactive manner (Bache 
& George 2006, 130-131). As a result of this success, the member states gave their 
consent to accelerating the process of creating a common market and introducing a 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) (ibid.). However, the prevailing mood changed 
drastically when French President Charles de Gaulle unilaterally vetoed the British 
application for membership in the EEC in 1963 and pursued a strategy of the “empty 
seat” in the Council of Ministers in reaction to the French rejection of the plans for 
funding the CAP (Bache & George 2006, 131-136; Pollak & Slominski 2006, 34). In 
contrast to the successful actions taken by the Commission, de Gaulle wanted to 
enhance intergovernmental structures, as outlined in the Fouchet Plan21 (Bache & 
George 2006, 132). This crisis was averted in 1966 in the so-called Luxembourg 
Compromise, which basically introduced an “agreement to disagree” (Pollak & 
Slominski 2006, 34). France interpreted this compromise as the right of the 
governments of the member states to “veto proposals where they deemed a vital 
national interest to be at stake” (Bache & George 2006, 134). 
During this time, time the Merger Treaty was signed in 1965, which aimed at 
merging the institutions of the ECSC, EEC, and Euratom in order to increase efficiency 
(Bache & George 2006, 596; Pollak & Slominski 2006, 35). Consequently, there was 
                                                
19 The United Kingdom was particularly cautious with regard to giving up national sovereignity in favour 
of a supranational institution (Bache & George 2006, 99). 
20 Prior to the conclusion of the main founding document of the Austrian Second Republic (the Austrian 
State Treaty between the Allied Powers and Austria) Austria had to make concessions to the Soviet 
Union to „maintain permanent neutrality of the same type as that maintained by Switzerland“ 
(Memorandum on the outcome of the negotiations between the government delegations from Austria and 
the Soviet Union; Moscow, 15 April 1955). Therefore, the Soviet Union reminded Austria that a 
participation in the EEC would not be in line with its neutrality (Pollak & Slominski 2006, 33). 
21 French President de Gaulle presented the Fouchet Plan to other members of the Communities in 1961. 
The plan proposed forming a „confederation of states with a Council of Ministers, a Consultative 
Assembly of seconded national parliamentarians, and a Commission“, which, unlike the Commissions of 
the Communities, would not be a supranational body with independent powers, but would rather consist 
of national officals (Bache & George 2006, 132). 
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only one Assembly, one Commission, one Council of Ministers, and one Court of 
Justice for the three independent Communities (ibid.). 
Understandably, the period after the Luxembourg Compromise commenced with 
low expectations at best (George & Bache 2006, 137). The change of government in 
both France and Germany provided fertile ground for the Hague Summit in December 
1969, which explicitly aimed at relaunching European integration (George & Bache 
2006, 140). Therefore, (1) the completion of outstanding business after the 1965 crisis 
(i.e. granting the European Community (EC) its own resources), (2) the enlargement of 
the EC, i.e. the accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom in 1973 and (3) 
the strengthening of integration efforts, i.e. the creation of an Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) as well as the establishment of a common foreign policy under the 
auspices of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) were defined as the three 
objectives of the Hague Summit (Bache & George 2006, 142;  Pollak & Slominski 
2006, 35; Weidenfeld & Wessels 2006, 22). 
The institutionalisation of the European Council, the meeting of heads of state and 
government, took place in 1974 on the initiative of French President Giscard d’Estaing 
and German Chancellor Schmidt (Pollak & Slominski 2006, 36). It was agreed to hold 
these summits three times a year in order to give general guidance on the direction of 
the EC (Bache & George 2006, 278). Still, this body had no legal basis until the Single 
European Act (SEA) came into force in 1987. Moreover, it is not directly answerable to 
the European Parliament (EP) and is not subject to judicial review by the ECJ (Bache & 
George 2006, 144). It may therefore be argued that the creation of the European Council 
“was symbolic of a profoundly inter-governmental era in the history of the EU” (ibid.). 
The 1980s were characterised by the Mediterranean Enlargements with Greece 
joining the EC in 1981, and Spain and Portugal acceding in 1986. The agreement on the 
Single European Act (SEA) in 1987 marked another highlight of European integration 
(Bache & George 2006, 150-163; Pollak & Slominski 2006, 37-39). 
 
“Although modest in the changes that it introduced in comparison with the 
hopes of federalists in the European Parliament and within some member 
states (particularly Italy), the SEA rejuvenated the process of European 
integration.” (Bache & George 2006, 160) 
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In fact, the mere objective of the SEA was the completion of the common market 
as outlined in the Treaty of Rome (ibid.). Apart from economic implications the SEA 
introduced several institutional changes on a political level (Pollak & Slominski 2006, 
39): (1) single majority voting was introduced in the Council of Ministers, (2) the 
cooperation procedure was introduced, thereby giving more powers to the European 
Parliament (EP), and (3) the European Council and the European Political Cooperation 
(EPC) were for the first time given a legal basis. 
The “acceleration of history”, as former Commission president Delors referred to 
the events after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of communism in Eastern 
Europe, contributed to further steps towards European integration (Bache & George 
2006, 168). The next considerable leap forward was the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU), which was the result of the preceding intergovernmental negotiations prior to 
the Maastricht summit in December 1991 (ibid.). Even though it may be argued that the 
TEU is “the lowest-common-denominator bargaining position of governments” (ibid.), 
it represents a significant legal basis, as it established the three-pillar structure, more 
commonly known as the European Union (EU) (ibid.). The EEC was renamed into 
European Community (EC) and was placed in the first supranational pillar, whereas the 
intergovernmental Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home 
Affairs (JHA) were allocated in the second and third pillar, respectively (Pollak & 
Slominski 2006, 41). Figure 4 on page 38 illustrates the framework of the European 
Union as discussed above. 
The TEU introduced several innovations (Bache & George 2006, 170-171): (1) 
The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was created which was later responsible for 
the launching of the Euro as in world money markets in 1999 and as real currency and 
in 2002, this included all EU member states, except Denmark, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom, (2) The Committee of Regions and Local Authorities was formed in line with 
the principle of subsidiarity, establishing as a general principle of the EC, and (3) The 
co-decision procedure was extended in order to strengthen the European Parliament. “In 
sum, these measures provided a strong political dimension to the economic imperatives 
that had dominated the integration process to date” (Bache & George 2006, 171). 
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Figure 4: Pillars of the European Union (under the Treaty on European Union) 
 
 
Source: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/droit_communautaire/union_europeenne.gif> 
 
In 1995 three former EFTA members joined the European Union: Austria, 
Finland, and Sweden (Pollak &Slominski 2006, 42). When application talks with twelve 
predominantly Eastern European candidate countries began in the late 1990s, it became 
evident that institutional as well as decision-making provisions would have to be made 
in order to cope with the enlargement of 15 to 27 members (Pollak & Slominski 2006, 
43). Even though the Treaty of Amsterdam, which was signed at the European Council 
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in June 1997, was supposed to address the institutional drawbacks and problems 
associated with decision-making procedures after the planned enlargement, its scope 
remained rather modest (Bache & George 2006, 185).  
However, a new position of the High Representative for the CFSP was created, 
the number of seats in the EP was limited to 700, and the Schengen Agreement was 
incorporated into the Treaty of Amsterdam (Pollak & Slominski 2006, 43). 
As the Treaty of Amsterdam failed to make institutional provisions for the 
accession of new members to the European Union, the European Council had to take up 
these issues in Nice in December 2000 (Pollak & Slominski 2006, 44). Negotiations 
were tedious and lengthy, as there were particular tensions with regards to voting 
weights under the qualified majority vote (QMV) between larger and smaller states 
(Bache & George 2006, 200). However, after four days and one night the following 
agreement was reached (Bache & George 2006, 196-200; Pollak & Slominski 2006, 44; 
Europa Press Releases 2003): (1) the larger member states agreed to give up their 
second Commissioner, hence the Commission would be comprised of one 
Commissioner from each member state. After the accession of the 27th member a ceiling 
will have to be negotiated, limiting the number of Commissioners and agreeing on a fair 
method of appointment. (2) The number of votes allocated to each member state in the 
Council of Ministers was changed. With the new total number of votes in the Council 
rising to 321, a qualified majority vote now requires 232 votes as well as a majority of 
member states. Furthermore, verification that the majority vote represents at least 62% 
of the total population can be requested, stopping the adoption of the decision, if this 
condition is not met. Moreover, the qualified majority vote was extended into 
approximately 30 new areas, while keeping the veto in other areas. (3) The distribution 
of seats in the European Parliament (EP) changed and rose to 732 once the new 
members had acceded. 
Eventually22, the Treaty of Nice entered into force in February 2003 (Europa 
Press Releases 2003) and paved the way for the accession of ten new members in May 
2004: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia (Pollak & Slominski 2006, 46). Bulgaria and Romania acceded 
to the EU in January 2007, raising the total number of members to 27 (Europa Press 
Releases 2006). 
                                                
22 The Irish population had rejected the treaty at first and only ratified it in the second attempt in 2002. 
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The European Union soon realised that there was a need to “connect the EU more 
closely with its citizens” and to establish a framework that would allow “the EU to 
speak with one voice on international issues” (Bache & George 2006, 204). Therefore, a 
Constitutional Convention was created in 2001, which was responsible for drafting a 
Constitutional Treaty comprised of four parts: Part I addressed principles, institutional 
provisions and objectives, Part II comprised the European Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, Part III was devoted to provisions governing the policies and functioning of the 
European Union, while Part IV outlined general and final provisions of the 
Constitutional Treaty (Pollak & Slominski 2006, 48-49). The Constitutional Treaty 
never entered into force, as the French and Dutch population rejected the treaty put 
forward in a referendum in May and June 2005 (ibid.). After all actors had recovered 
from the referendum-shock, a new effort was undertaken in June 2007 with the 
Agreement on the Treaty of Lisbon, which is also known as the Reform Treaty. 
Nevertheless, the Irish population rejected the treaty in a referendum. Once again the 
European Union is at crossroads. Even though Bache & George (2006, 222) 
investigated the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty, the concluding remarks of their 
analysis can also be applied to the rejection of the Treaty of Lisbon: 
 
“The question raised by the current crisis is not whether the EU will  
survive - it surely will. The question raised is ‘what kind of EU will emerge 
from the crisis’”. 
 
3.2. Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
3.2.1. European Political Cooperation – The hour of birth of foreign policy in the 
European Community 
In 1957, the signing of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) 
not only created a common market based on the elimination of trade barriers, the 
implementation of a common customs tariff and the promotion of the four freedoms, but 
also the first time the economic relations of the EEC were given an external dimension 
(Bache & George 2006, 515; Luif 1995, 31). However, the member states soon realised 
that they could only fully benefit from economic integration if they cooperated more 
closely on a political level (Opi & Floyd 2003, 300).  At the Hague Summit in 1969, 
3. Political system of the European Union 
 41 
given the need to coordinate external economic relations of the six member countries, 
the Heads of States and Governments agreed to establish a system to coordinate foreign 
affairs (Bono 2006, 337; Opi & Floyd 2003, 303). This purely intergovernmental 
mechanism was named European Political Cooperation (EPC) and was based on 
traditional diplomatic procedures, like periodical meetings of Foreign Ministers and 
Foreign Office political directors (Bache & George 2006, 516; Bono 2006, 338). Apart 
from these meetings other institutional innovations emerged in the course of time. 
COREU (correspondance Européenne) telex link, for instance, allowed officials in the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs to communicate with each other confidentially (Bache & 
George 2006, 516).  Moreover, EPC was governed by rules of general international law; 
therefore, agreements could only be taken unanimously (Bono 2006, 338). Consensus, 
confidentiality and consultation were the three key characteristics of EPC in practice, 
however, states avoided formal commitments to allow for easier renegotiations in case 
of future disagreement (ibid.). This lack of legal obligations combined with the absence 
of institutional links between the EPC and the EC was responsible for the modest 
success in the first years (Bono 2006, 339). As the EPC had no secretariat to provide 
administrative support, the responsibility became that of the member state holding the 
presidency of the Council at that time (Bache & George 2006, 516). Consequently, 
continuity was hard to maintain, as the persons responsible rotated every six months 
(ibid.). Therefore, to “ease the problems in the six-monthly transition between 
presidencies” (ibid.) rules of procedure were codified in a document (The Coutumier), 
which later became “EPC common law” (Bono 2006, 340). 
Even though the EPC machinery “purported to add, strengthen and facilitate the 
economic integration objectives laid down in the EC Treaties” (Bono 2006, 338), it was 
initially placed outside the framework of the treaties and only in 1987 did it receive a 
legal basis in Title III of the Single European Act (SEA) (Bache & George 2006, 515; 
Luif 1995, 32). Consequently, EPC acquired the status of primary law (Bono 2006, 
338), therefore becoming part of the acquis (communautaire)23 requiring every new 
member state to accept and comply. While Article 30 of the SEA was concerned with 
the EPC practice, Article 2 institutionalised the European Council, which was originally 
                                                
23 The French term acquis (communautaire) refers to „the body of laws, policies, and practices that have 
accumulated over the lifetime of the European Communities, and now the European Union“ (Bache & 
George 2006, 584). Every new member state joining the European Union has to fully accept the acquis 
and comply with it (ibid.). 
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established in 1974 (Opi & Floyd 2003, 303). However, the SEA also made further 
institutional provisions with regard to EPC (Bono 2006, 340): (1) The Presidency of 
EPC was established, (the member state presiding the Council of Ministers also held the 
presidency of EPC and had the right to coordinate national positions and take 
initiatives) (2) a Secretariat was created in order to assist the Presidency, (3) National 
Political Directors formed the Political Committee, whose responsibility was to ensure 
impetus and continuity, (4) The Commission and the European Parliament (EP) were 
associated with EPC. 
It may, therefore, be argued that the inclusion of EPC in the SEA highlights the 
emergence of close ties between political and economic integration. Even though EPC 
was initially rigidly separated from EC matters24, the two areas have become 
increasingly interrelated in the course of time, particularly after the signing of the SEA 
(Bache & George 2006, 516-517). This stems from various developments (ibid.).  (1) 
The separation of EC and EPC was overcome in the course of time. The “Euro-Arab 
dialogue” in 1974 accelerated this development, as the Arab representatives insisted on 
linking economic and political topics. (2) The Commission has gradually become a 
more important actor after the breakdown of the rigid EPC/EC distinction, even though 
it was initially excluded from participation in foreign policy25. (3) After the 
Commission became involved in EPC meetings, it started acting as an administrative 
bridge-builder between the Council of Ministers and the EPC, as the latter did not have 
its own Secretariat until 1987. (4) As the Commission was gaining importance in EPC, 
reports to the European Parliament (EP) were introduced for reasons of democratic 
legitimacy. Consequently, the development of EPC can be characterised as reaching 
from pure intergovernmentalism to the cautious blend of elements of political and 
economic integration. 
Despite some successes, like a high degree of unity in the United Nations (UN) or 
a common position at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 
Helsinki in 1975, there were substantial failures (Bache & George 2006, 517). These 
shortcomings were concerned with the inability to respond effectively to the Soviet 
                                                
24 The idea of rigid distinction of EC and EPC matters was particularly promoted by the French 
government (Bache & George 2006, 516). 
25 The Commission’s role gained significance after the creation of the European Council in 1974. Even 
though the European Council was originally designed as an intergovernmental conference of the Heads of 
States and Governments, it soon became a „supreme political instance of both the EC and the EPC“, as 
the President of the Commission was invited to participate in European Councils (Bono 2006, 339). 
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Invasion in Afghanistan in December 1979, to the Gulf Crisis in 1990-1991 and to the 
crises in former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s (Bache & George 2006, 532). 
 
3.2.2. Transforming European Political Cooperation into Common Foreign and 
Security Policy 
In the beginning of the 1990s, the European Community faced fundamental tasks. 
On one hand it was struggling to come to terms with the crises in the Gulf region and in 
former Yugoslavia, while on the other hand it was in the process of transforming itself 
into the European Union (Bache & George 2006, 521). However, it was the 
“uncoordinated action at the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis [that] displayed the 
EPC’s fragility” with regard to coordinating its foreign policy actions (Opi & Floyd 
2003, 307). This shortcoming raised the member states’ awareness of the need to 
strengthen structures for cooperation in foreign and defence policy (ibid.). 
In January 1991, the future evolution and direction of EPC was discussed at the 
Intergovernmental Conference (ICG) (Bache & George 2006, 521). In principle, there 
were two perspectives on the future development of EPC (ibid.): While France and 
Germany wanted to allocate EPC within the framework of the European Community, 
thereby allowing for majority voting in the Council of Ministers, the United Kingdom 
disliked precisely this idea of majority voting and feared that the establishment of a 
common security and defence policy would possibly undermine NATO operations. 
Eventually, the Treaty of Maastricht26 adopted a three-pillar structure (Bache & 
George 2006, 522; Opi & Floyd 2003, 307). As already mentioned in chapter 3.1., the 
first supranational pillar comprised the European Communities, while the second and 
third intergovernmental pillar consisted of the newly created Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), respectively. It may be 
argued that “the TEU really represented a victory for the minimalist position on CFSP” 
(Bache & George 2006, 522), as decisions of principle had to be taken unanimously, 
while only implementation measures could be adopted using majority voting. 
Nevertheless, majority voting could only be employed if all states accepted that 
procedure in a particular case (ibid.). 
The TEU also established two links between the EC in the first and the CFSP in 
                                                
26 Also known as Treaty on European Union (TEU). 
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the second pillar (Opi & Floyd 2003, 308): (1) Article 28 TEU27 provides that operating 
expenditure can be charged to the budget of the European Communities if the Council 
decides so by unanimity, as the European Parliament has to assent to the provision of 
non-compulsory funds, its role in the CFSP was thereby strengthened. (2) The CFSP 
introduced Article 301 to the TEC, stating that the “Council shall act by a qualified 
majority on a proposal from the Commission” in order to implement a common position 
or joint action, which were decided by unanimity in the context of the CFSP, “to 
interrupt or to reduce, in part or completely, economic relations with one or more third 
countries.” 
 
3.2.3. Objectives of the CFSP as outlined in TEU 
In contrast to the imprecise provisions of EPC in the SEA (Opi & Floyd 2003, 
309), the Treaty of Maastricht (TEU) defines five overall objectives of the CFSP.  The 
TEU contains words and phrases that “had hitherto been politically unacceptable” 
(White 2001, 96); not only was the term “foreign policy” explicitly included for the first 
time, but “security” and “common” mentioned in the same context. Under Article 11.1 
TEU the objectives of the European Union’s CFSP “covering all areas of foreign and 
security policy” are: 
(1) “to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence 
and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United 
Nations Charter,”  
(2) “to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways,”  
(3) “to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance 
with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles 
of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including 
those on external borders,” 
(4) “to promote international cooperation,” 
(5) “to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms.” 
                                                
27Hereinafter, the numeration of Articles refers to the 2003 consolidated version of the TEU. While the 
original verion of the TEU devotes Article J to J.11 to CFSP, the consolidated version replaced the 
original numeration with Articles 11 to 28.  
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Furthermore, Article 11.2 TEU calls for member states to cooperate actively and 
in mutual solidarity in order to enhance the European Union’s foreign and security 
policy activities. Actions in opposition to the EU’s common interest are to be avoided. 
With regard to the objectives outlined in Article 11.1 TEU there are two 
interesting features worth considering. Firstly, the definition of CFSP objectives 
remains very vague and general. Firstly, the reference to “all areas of foreign and 
security policy” defines the area of action of the CFSP “in the broadest terms” 
(Eeckhout 2004, 164). Moreover, the objectives of the CFSP are “so general that they 
do not circumscribe the scope of the CFSP” (ibid.). It may also be argued that the 
provisions made in Article 11.1 TEU are intended to be general policy principles 
instead of precise operational objectives (Keukeleire from a publication in 1998 cited in 
Eeckhout 2004, 143), or even the institutionalisation of certain “core values of the 
European Union” (Eeckhout 2004, 143). Notwithstanding the different interpretations 
of the CFSP objectives, it is surprising that the first legal foundation of the CFSP lacks 
a clear demarcation of objectives. Secondly, the phrase “all areas of foreign and 
security policy” should be read with caution. According to Article 47 TEU the CFSP is 
not the only pillar responsible for the European Union’s external affairs, but it is also 
“constitutionally juxtaposed to the EC’s external policies” (Eeckhout 2004, 165). 
Therefore, the CFSP is only responsible for areas of the European Union’s external 
affairs, which do not lie within the remit of the EC (ibid.). 
 
3.2.4. Institutional framework of the CFSP as outlined in TEU 
Under the TEU there is a single institutional framework for all three pillars, 
therefore, the same actors are involved in EC (first pillar) as well as CFSP (second 
pillar) matters (Opi & Floyd 2003, 310). More precisely, the Council of Ministers28, the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER29) and the European Commission 
were given the joint responsibility for decision-making with regard to the EC and the 
CFSP in order to enhance more coherence in foreign affairs (Peterson 1998, 7; White 
2001, 97). However, due to the supranational character of the EC and the strong 
intergovernmental traits of the CFSP, the power among the EU institutions is distributed 
differently in the second pillar (Opi & Floyd 2003, 310-312), as the following 
                                                
28 Also referred to as Council of the European Union or simpy Council. 
29 Abbreviation of the French term comité des représentants permanents. 
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paragraph illustrates: 
Firstly, the role of the European Council30 gained significance in the CFSP, as it 
was entrusted with the definition of principles and guidelines in general and with the 
provision of principles for joint actions in particular. Secondly, the decision-making 
power was left to the Council of Ministers, stressing the predominantly 
intergovernmental character of the CFSP. Consequently, it is the Council’s 
responsibility to adopt common positions and joint actions, as will be explained later. 
Moreover, the representation of the European Union “in matters coming within the 
common foreign and security policy” (Art. 17.1 TEU) was delegated to the Presidency 
of the Council31. Thirdly, the position of the European Commission was slightly 
enhanced. Article 18.4 TEU outlines that the Commission is “fully associated in the 
tasks” of CFSP, however, the lack of further specifications leaves much room for 
interpretation. In contrast to this terminological uncertainty the Commission was given 
the right to refer any questions related to the CFSP and to submit proposals to the 
Council of Ministers (Article 22.1 TEU). Unlike procedures in the first pillar32, the 
Commission shares these rights with the member states in CFSP matters. 
Notwithstanding the CFSP’s importance, it is essential to highlight that the CFSP is not 
the only aspect of the EU’s foreign policy. Not surprisingly, "the Commission is solely 
responsible for a number of external policies of the EU, such as trade, […] 
humanitarian [and] development assistance, rehabilitation and reconstruction and 
sanctions regulations” (European Commission 2002). Fourthly, the European 
Parliament (EP) still lacks substantial power with regard to the CFSP. It cannot change 
the direction of the CFSP, however, it can request information from the European 
Commission and the Presidency and make recommendations to the Presidency (Article 
21 TEU). Moreover, it has to hold an annual debate on the development and 
implementation of the CFSP (ibid.). Most importantly, as already mentioned in chapter 
3.2.2., the EP has to assent to the provision of non-compulsory funds, e.g. CFSP 
operating expenditure, provided the Council has decided unanimously. Lastly, the most 
striking aspect with regard to the unequal distribution of power between the EU 
                                                
30 According to Article 4 TEU the European Council shall consist of the Heads of States and 
Governments of the member states and of the President of the European Commission. Moreover, the 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs and a Member of the Commission shall take on a supportive role. 
31 The Presidency of the Council of the European Union rotates every six months. 
32 The European Commission has the sole right to refer questions or submit proposals to the Council of 
Ministers in the first pillar, i.e. in Community matters (European Commission 2002). 
3. Political system of the European Union 
 47 
institutions in the first and second pillar is the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) in CFSP matters. This implies that member states or 
the Commission cannot bring an infringement action against another member state. 
Under Article 11.2 TEU, it is the Council’s responsibility to ensure that the principles 
outlined in the relevant Articles of the TEU with regard to the CFSP are complied with. 
However, this lack of judicial review by the ECJ only applies for actions taken in the 
second pillar. Therefore, the same institutions are subject to judicial review by the ECJ 
for their actions taken in the first pillar. Eeckhout (2004, 145) refers to the theoretical 
possibility of recourse to the International Court of Justice, even though it is “hardly 
conceivable” in practice. 
 
3.2.5. Instruments of the CFSP as outlined in the TEU 
In order for the newly created CFSP to become a successful part of the European 
Union und meet the objectives outlined in Article 11.1 TEU, certain decision-making 
instruments had to be agreed on. Therefore, three new instruments for the 
implementation of the CFSP were introduced (Eeckhout 2004, 398-408; Opi & Floyd 
2003, 312-314): 
The first new instrument, systematic cooperation (Article 12 TEU), was explicitly 
created in order to ensure that the objectives outlined in Article 11.1 TEU were met. 
Systematic cooperation was concerned with the mutual consultation on foreign policy 
issues between member states in the Council of Ministers. The common position was 
the second instrument to be introduced in the TEU. Interestingly, the TEU did not 
provide a definition of this particular instrument. Only the Treaty of Amsterdam set out 
to create more precision by “offering some type of definition” of common positions 
(Eeckhout 2004, 399). According to Article 15 of the consolidated version of the TEU, 
“Common positions shall define the approach of the Union to a particular matter of a 
geographical or thematic nature”. Once they have been adopted unanimously by the 
Council of Ministers, all member states have to comply with this position and take 
necessary domestic measures in order to execute this position. Prominent examples 
include common positions imposing economic sanctions against Libya, Haiti or the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. However, common positions may also aim at defining 
a code of conduct that member states have to adhere to whilst participating in 
international organisations’ meetings. Not only did the Treaty of Maastricht lack to 
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provide a definition of common positions, it also did not precisely define the nature and 
scope of joint actions. As the third instrument, only Article 14 of the consolidated TEU 
provides the legal basis for joint actions: “Joint actions shall address specific situations 
where operational action by the Union is deemed to be required”. Even though the TEU 
made no satisfactory distinction between common positions and joint actions, joint 
actions imply the sharing of resources between member states. In practice, it is easier to 
agree on a common position than on a joint action. Just like common positions, joint 
actions are adopted by unanimity in the Council of the European Union. However, in 
order for a joint action to be adopted, the Council must first unanimously decide that a 
specific foreign matter should be addressed employing a joint action. With regard to the 
mode of decision-making, a qualified majority vote (QMV) was introduced for 
implementing common positions or joint actions for the first time. However, it has not 
been used so far. 
In spite of the importance of the CFSP provisions made in the TEU, the 
inconsequence with regard to precise definitions can be regarded as a substantial 
shortcoming of the Treaty of Maastricht. “The TEU appeared to have created some kind 
of halfway house between informal co-ordination of policies and the adoption of formal 
legal instruments with specific legal effects” (Eeckhout 2004, 398). Therefore, the 
Treaty of Amsterdam set out to address these shortcomings. 
 
3.2.6. Reform of the instruments and decision-making processes of the CFSP after 
the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Treaty of Nice 
The Treaty of Amsterdam, May 1999, once more set out to improve the CFSP 
with regard to avoiding shortcomings, which were evident in the sometimes 
inappropriate response to sudden crises (Opi & Floyd 2003, 320). Interestingly, member 
states were willing to introduce more supranationalism in the second pillar, as also 
reflected in the wording of the Treaty (ibid). While Article J.1 of the TEU always refers 
to the “Union and Member States”, the Treaty of Amsterdam only makes mention of 
“the Union”. 
Moreover, the Treaty of Amsterdam changed some aspects of the CFSP in general 
and decision-making processes in particular (Bache & George 2006, 523; Bono 2006, 
347-353; Opi & Floyd 2003, 320-322).  The most significant change was the 
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appointment of a High Representative. This amendment of the TEU stems from the 
internal and external perception of the CFSP as being “faceless”. In order to ensure 
visibility and leadership, the position of a High Representative for the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy was created. The High Representative would simultaneously act as 
Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union. Javier Solana, former 
Secretary-General of NATO, was appointed the first High Representative for the CFSP 
and has remained in office until today. Apart from the High Representative’s role as the 
“face” of the European Union’s external relations, he supports the Presidency of the 
Council. Moreover, Declaration number six annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam 
provides the legal basis for the creation of the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, 
which supports the High Representative by monitoring and assessing current event of 
interest to the CFSP.  The second major change brought about by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam deals with the instruments of CFSP. Principles and general guidelines, as 
well as the newly added common strategies emerging from these principles and 
guidelines, have to be agreed on by unanimity.  In contrast to that, joint actions, 
common positions and implementing decisions can be adopted by a qualified majority 
vote, except for cases having military of defence implications. More precisely, common 
strategies shall be implemented by the Council by means of adopting joint actions and 
common positions. The Treaty of Amsterdam also allowed for so-called “constructive 
abstention” with regard to decisions without military of defence implications. Thereby, 
a member state has the option to abstain from voting, without vetoing the decision. In 
such a case, the abstaining state is not legally bound by the vote, whereas the EU as a 
whole is committed to the decision. However, the abstaining state must not hamper the 
implementation. Nevertheless, a decision cannot be adopted if the members in the 
Council abstaining from voting represent more than a third of the weighted votes.  
Lastly, the amendments introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam (Art. 24) endowed the 
CFSP apparatus with some powers to conclude international agreements with third 
countries and international organisations. Furthermore, the Treaty of Nice rephrased this 
Article and highlighted the role of the Union as a distinct entity, as “Agreements 
concluded under the conditions set out by this Article shall be binding on the 
institutions of the Union“. Thus, the wording of this Article implies that the European 
Union as a distinct entity concludes agreements with third countries and international 
organisations, rather than the member states acting collectively. 
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3.2.7. Current nature and institutional framework of the CFSP 
After the provisions of the historical as well as legal background as identified in 
Chapters 3.2.1.-3.2.6., the main actors in the current CFSP institutional framework shall 
be addressed. The coordination of CFSP matters takes place in five layers (European 
Commission 2002; Wessels 2008, 398-403): 
(1) The European Council comprises the peak of the CFSP hierarchy. It is 
responsible for the definition of principles and general guidelines of the CFSP, as well 
as for the adoption of common strategies. (2) The Council of the European Union, more 
precisely the General Affairs and External Relations Council33 (GAERC), is endowed 
with the formulation of joint actions and common positions. (3) The High 
Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, whose position was 
introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam, acts along with the Presidency as the external 
representative of the European Union and assists the Council in the implementation of 
CFSP matters. The High Representative is supported by the General Secretariat of the 
Council, which works closely with the Directorate-General for External Relations 
(RELEX) of the European Commission. (4) The Political and Security Committee 
(PSC), which is composed of national senior officials, is entrusted with the preparation 
of Council meetings. The most significant function of the PSC is its leadership role in 
areas of conflict, where it is advised by the European Union Military Committee 
(EUMC). (5) Experts from EU member states form the 36 Working Groups, which 
prepare policy documents for consideration in the CFSP. Moreover, this layer also 
includes the cooperation of Ambassadors in third countries within the framework of 
Heads-of-Mission Meetings.  
The institutional framework presented above shall not imply that other actors are 
not involved in the CFSP. While the powers of the European Parliament are restricted to 
requesting information and making recommendations, the European Commission has 
become an important actor within the CFSP framework (Weidenfeld & Wessels 2006, 
271). With regard to referring questions or making proposals to the Council, the 
European Commission has the same powers in the CFSP as member states (European 
Commission 2002). Moreover, the Commission (Directorate-General External 
                                                
33 This composition of the Council of the European Union brings together the Foreign Ministers of the 
member states as well as the External Relations Commissioner (Council of the EU 2009; European 
Commission 2002). 
3. Political system of the European Union 
 51 
Relations) is responsible for the administration of more than 120 delegations in third 
countries and the liaison with international organisations (European Commission 
2008a). On the other hand, the Commission is solely responsible for external policies of 
the EU falling into the first pillar, like external trade or sanctions regulations (European 
Commission 2002). 
 
3.3. The European Union as an international actor 
Grasping the external relations of the European Union is anything but easy. Even 
former European Commission President Jacques Delors used to refer to the European 
Union as an “unidentified political object” (Zielonka 2008, 472). This is due to the 
complex, multi-level nature of EU external relations, which co-exist in the first pillar 
(external economic relations, trade sanctions, development aid), the second pillar 
(CFSP, diplomatic and military activities), and the third pillar (justice and internal 
security of border-crossing nature) (Fröhlich 2008, 14). 
According to Diez & Whitman (2002, 55) the existing literature on the foreign 
policy of the European Union can “largely be divided into approaches that treat EU 
foreign policy either in comparativist or in sui generis terms.” While comparativist 
studies focus on the question of whether or not the international role of the EU can be 
compared to other states or international organisations, supporters of the sui generis 
approach assess the EU’s international role as unique. 
This has been the starting point for scholarly discourse, which has delivered much 
insight into this complex topic (e.g. Diez & Whitman 2002; Fröhlich 2008; Hill 1993; 
Hill 2004; Hill & Smith 2005a; Hill & Smith 2005b; Zielonka 2008).  The study at hand 
does not set out to review or compare various theoretical approaches with regard to the 
European Union or its foreign policy. Instead, in order to provide a theoretical and 
terminological background for the empirical study in chapters 5 to 7, the two most 
suitable concepts and perspectives on the international role of the European Union will 
be discussed in this section. In order to describe the two most suitable concepts for the 
purpose of the study at hand, these two questions shall be addressed: 
 
(1) How can the European Union’s activities around the world be conceptualised? 
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(2) From which three perspectives can the EU’s international existence and 
impact be analysed? 
In order to answer the first question, the attention shall be drawn to Hill’s (1993) 
analysis of the European Union’s so-called “capabilities-expectations gap”. Hill’s 
approach seems suitable for the analysis of the relationship between the European 
Union and Australia, for its aim is “to look at the functions which the Community (EC) 
might be fulfilling in the international system, but also at the perceptions which are held 
of its role by third parties” (Hill 1993, 306). In order to analyse the external activities of 
the twelve EC-members34, Hill (1993, 308-310) employed the two basic concepts of 
actorness and presence. Thereby, actorness refers to the question, whether the EC – or 
EU now – “can be termed a genuinely independent actor in international relations” 
(Hill 1993, 309). In this context, Hill (ibid.) follows Sjöstedt’s definition of an 
international actor. Thus, an international actor is (1) delimited from its environment, 
(2) autonomous with regard to making its own decisions (and laws), and (3) has 
structural prerequisites for becoming involved on the international level (e.g. a legal 
personality35 or the ability to negotiate with third parties). In contrast to that, the 
concept of presence refers to the way the European Union is perceived36 in international 
affairs. This concept “accepts the reality of a cohesive European impact on 
international relations despite the messy way in which it is produced” (ibid.).  
These concepts of actorness and presence are of vital importance for the analysis 
of the various functions that the European Union performs in the international system. 
Following Hill’s (1993, 307) line of argument, it is not reasonable to focus on a single 
role Europe might play. Instead, the aim is to provide deeper understanding for the 
various external functions of the European Union. Therefore, function refers to the 
assumption that “within the international states system some actors have an identifiable 
presence” to such a degree that certain events may or may not have occurred in a 
different way without this particular actor’s presence (Hill 1993, 310). Hill (ibid.) 
credits the European Union with four functions it has already performed in the past and 
                                                
34 At the time Hill was writing this article, the Treaty of Maastricht (TEU) was not yet ratified. Therefore, 
he refers to „the Twelve“ or the EC throughout the text. 
35 Currently only the two Communities (European Community and Euratom) have a full legal 
personality, i.e. „the power to conclude and negotiate agreements in line with its external powers, to 
become a member of an international organisation and to have delegations in non-member countries“ 
(Europa Glossary 2009). See also footnote 44. 
36 For an interesting study of how the EU’s commitment in international affairs is perceived by Australian 
and New Zealand media see Rogahn (et al. 2006). 
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with six other functions, possibly performed by the EU in the future. However, it should 
be highlighted that these functions were identified in 1993, when the EC consisted of 
only twelve members and was in the process of transforming itself into the European 
Union. The following four functions performed by the EC in the past were determined 
(Hill 1993, 310-312): (1) stabilising Western Europe after the Second World War and 
during the second half of the 20th century, (2) managing world trade as the most 
important economic entity on a global scale (in terms of trade balance), (3) being a 
principal voice of the developed world in relations with the South, with regard to acting 
as a link between the rich and the poor, e.g. in the UN, and (4) providing a second 
Western voice in international diplomacy (apart from US dominance). With regard to 
the possible future functions of the EC (from a 1993 perspective) the following aspects 
were identified by Hill (1993, 312-315): (1) replacing the USSR in a new world order 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, (2) acting as a regional pacifier in the area behind 
the former Iron Curtain (3) being a global intervenor;(4) mediating conflicts, (5) 
building bridges and links between the rich and the poor, and (6) acting as a joint 
supervisor of the world economy (along with the USA, the IMF and former GATT). 
Since the EC/EU had performed the four tasks in the past, it is expected by both 
insiders and outsiders to perform the future tasks successfully. This is a serious 
challenge “to the actual capabilities of the EC, in terms of its ability to agree, its 
resources, and the instruments at its disposal” (Hill 1993, 315). Because the actual 
capabilities do not meet the high expectations, Hill (ibid.) refers to this issue as the 
“capabilities-expectations gap”.  In addition, there are two reasons for the existence of 
this gap (Hill 1993, 318): firstly, because a truly coherent system and its full acting 
capabilities have not yet been realised, and secondly, because the EU itself, including 
outsiders, have simply chosen to ignore this inconvenient fact. 
Even though the capabilities-expectations gap was identified in 1993, the concept 
still seems applicable today. The future functions the European Union could have 
performed, as outlined by Hill (1993, 312-315), might have been different in reality. 
This, however, does not impact the capabilities-expectations gap, as there is still a clear 
discrepancy between the EU’s ambitions and perceptions on the world stage and the 
actual capabilities. Consequently, Bache & George (2006, 522) argue that “the start of 
CFSP did not suggest a great leap forward in either the capabilities or the ambitions of 
the EU.”  
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The second suitable approach for providing a theoretical background for the study 
at hand are Hill’s & Smith’s (2005a, 7-13; 2005b, 398-406) three perspectives for the 
analysis of the EU’s international existence and impact: (1) the EU as a sub-system of 
international relations, (2) the EU as part of the wider processes of international 
relations, and (3) the EU as a major power impacting on international relations. These 
perspectives were introduced in order to come to terms with the multiplicity of actors, 
levels, and policies contributing to the European Union’s role in the world, provided 
that no typical international relations theory or approach seemed suitable for grasping 
this particularly complex topic (Hill & Smith 2005b, 398). 
The first perspective, which regards the European Union as a sub-system of 
international relations, examines three distinct issues (Hill & Smith 2005a, 7-9). Within 
this perspective the first field of interest is concerned with the way the European Union 
has dealt with its own internal relations, i.e. the relations between its member states. 
The second field of interest deals with the question concerning the preferences and 
interests of the member states can be coordinated for international purposes in such a 
way that collective action and policy-formation emerge as a response to the outside 
world. Finally, the question concerning what ideas bind the EU member states together 
is discussed, whereby the role of the historic European “heritage” is highlighted in this 
context. 
The second perspective on the EU’s international role defines the European Union 
as part of the wider processes of international relations, i.e. the “common mechanisms, 
formal and informal, through which international problems are confronted” (Hill & 
Smith 2005a, 9-10). This perspective focuses on the European Union’s international 
involvement and activities in the light of major contemporary global issues (ibid.). In 
particular the EU’s capabilities and capacities with regard to shaping international 
processes are addressed, as well as the extent of EU involvement in international issues 
in comparison to other actors.  
The third perspective deals with the European Union as a power in international 
relations (Hill & Smith 2005a, 11-13). Power refers to the influence the European 
Union exerts in international relations. More specifically, the way in which the EU 
“impacts on the shape of the global arena” and on other actors is examined (Hill & 
Smith 2005a, 12). Hill & Smith (2005b, 403-404) suggest that the extent to which the 
European Union can make a difference to outcomes on the world stage can be measured 
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by both the actual patterns of events and by external perceptions. They draw the 
conclusion that the European Union can be regarded as a significant power, which has 
the capacity to influence the international arena, if it is measured in relative terms 
against the capabilities and powers of other actors (ibid.). Even though China and India 
have the potential to become superpowers, it will take a long time until they have 
reached that status. Therefore, according to Hill & Smith (2005b, 404) only the USA 
has more power to influence the shape of international politics than the European 
Union. 
It is also important to put the power of the European Union into perspective. The 
EU undoubtedly exerts a majority influence in external trade and regulatory matters 
(ibid.). This is in line with Zielonka’s (2008, 475) reasoning, which argues that the EU 
“has also used economic power to further its objectives, including the instruments of 
sanction, bribes and even coercion.” Examples like the 899 million euro antitrust fine 
imposed on Microsoft for failing to comply with European regulatory demands or the 
more recent record fine of 1,06 billion euro imposed on Intel for “violating EC Treaty 
antitrust rules on the abuse of a dominant market position“ (Europa Press Releases 
2009a) support this reasoning. However, the impact of classical diplomacy of the 27 
member states should not be underestimated (Hill & Smith 2005b, 404). It may be 
argued further that the European Union places emphasis on joint diplomacy, as it 
currently has more than 120 delegations of the European Commission in third countries 
at its disposal. Moreover, both the rejected Constitutional Treaty and the subsequent 
Treaty of Lisbon set out to establish a diplomatic corps of the European Union (External 
Action Service of the European Union) under the auspices of the High Representative 
for the CFSP. Finally, the European Union has “small but useable military capabilities” 
(ibid.). 
 
In his 2007 speech to the College of Europe in Bruges, David Miliband, the 
incumbent British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, described 
the powers of the European Union as follows: 
 
“We can use the power of the EU – the size of our single market, our ability 
to set global standards, the negotiating clout of 27 members, the attractions 
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of membership, the hard power of sanctions and troops, the power of 
Europe as an idea and a model – not to substitute for nation states but to do 
those things to provide security and prosperity for the next generation.” 
(Miliband 2007, 1) 
 
 
4. Development of EU-Australia relations 
57 
4. DEVELOPMENT OF EU-AUSTRALIA RELATIONS 
This chapter will explore the development of EU-Australia relations in order to 
provide a background for the study in the following chapters. Firstly, Australia’s early 
focus on the United Kingdom will be discussed. Secondly, the conflict over the 
European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) will be presented. Thirdly, 
Australia’s focus on new bilateral relations with the European Union will be 
highlighted. Finally, a comparison between the state of EU-Australia relations under 
Prime Minister John Howard and more recently under Prime Minister Kevin Rudd will 
be made, highlighting current developments. The comparison of the Australian and EU 
perspective with regard to research on EU-Australia relations shall mark the transition 
to the next chapter. 
 
4.1. Australia’s early focus on the United Kingdom 
“For decades after 1901 a great majority of Australians 
continued to see themselves as British folk living overseas, good 
and solid members of a British family of nations which played 
an essentially united role in the world.” 
(Gelber 1992, 66) 
 
Australia’s interest in European integration began as early as 1948, when the idea 
of a Western European Customs Union was discussed at an informal level (Murray et 
al. 2002, 396). It was not primarily the idea of European integration itself, which 
captured Australian attention; it was rather, through thorough observation, the question 
of possible British involvement and its implications for Australia (Elijah et al. 2000, 2). 
Australia feared that the Commonwealth as a whole and the system of imperial 
preference37 would be undermined by the potential accession of the UK to the EC 
(Murray et al. 2002, 397-398). Even though Australia tended to see its role and foreign 
policy through a British lens (Reynolds 2005, 347), the concerns with regard to the 
British accession to an integrated Europe were predominantly, at that time, of economic 
                                                
37 The system of imperial preference introduced in 1932 included raising tariffs against countries outside 
the Empire, “thus creating a British-led trading bloc, which actively discriminated against those not 
involved” (Shaw 1966 cited in Murray et al. 2002, 397). 
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nature. The UK was Australia’s most important trade partner, as Australia’s economy 
was developed to supply raw materials and primary produce to the UK, while, at the 
same time, being a market for British manufactured goods (Elijah et al. 2000, 5). At the 
time of the first British application for membership into the EC, Australia feared it 
could lose 20 per cent of its total exports and up to 70 per cent of exports specifically to 
the UK (Murray et al. 2002, 397). Indeed, the exports to the UK dropped to just 11 per 
cent by 1970, however, Australia managed to develop new export markets and become 
more independent from the UK. Therefore, Australia was not being economically struck 
by the British accession to the EC in 1973 (Elijah et al. 2000, 7). “The persistence of the 
British frame of reference for Australian foreign policy” (Reynolds 2005, 347) is 
highlighted by the establishment of Australian diplomatic relations with the EC in 
March 1962 - shortly after the first British application for EC membership (Murray et 
al. 2002, 397). 
The EC and the Commission soon became the centre of Australia’s diplomatic 
action with regard to trade policy (Elijah et al. 2000, 7). Even though the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) had always been anathema to Australia, agriculture was to 
become “the major point of contact – and of conflict” in the following years (Murray et 
al. 2002, 398). 
 
4.2. Conflict over the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
“Cows in Europe earn $3 in government subsidies while half the 
world’s people live on less.” 
(Murray 2005, 99) 
 
According to Murray (2005, 106), the relationship between Australia and the EC 
was overshadowed by the EC’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) beginning with the 
British accession to the EC in 1973 and lasting until the mid-1990s. In these 20 years, 
Australia tended to see the EC only through a “CAP-lens”, labelling the EU 
obstructionist and protectionist (Murray 2005, 108). In order to assess whether this 
image of the EC/EU was the expression of Australian “victim mentality about the CAP” 
(Murray 2005, 107), or whether the CAP was indeed an obstacle to healthy agricultural 
trade relations, both the EU and the Australian perspective must be taken into account. 
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With regard to the EC/EU perspective, the CAP was introduced on the basis of the 
1957 Treaty of Rome in the early 1960s and was the first redistributive common policy 
of the EC (Bache & George 2006, 379). The CAP was created as a response to price 
fluctuations of agricultural produce and in order to ensure food supply in post World 
War II Europe (Murray 2005, 99-100). However, the importance that the French 
government attached to agriculture should not be underestimated in this context (Bache 
& George 2006, 381). Due to their determination to maintain a significant rural 
population by means of agricultural subsidies, the French were the driving force of the 
creation of the CAP. On the other hand, Germany was eager to cut its comparatively 
high food prices in order to ensure fair competition in industrial products38. Due to the 
interrelationship between food prices and production costs, all member states agreed to 
equalise food prices in order to ensure fair competition in the common market (Bache & 
George 2006, 400). Therefore, Articles 38 to 47 of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Economic Community (also known as the Treaty of Rome) are devoted to establishment 
of a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Article 39.1 outlines the following objectives 
of the CAP:  
 
“(a) to increase agricultural productivity by developing technical progress and by 
ensuring the rational development of agricultural production and the optimum 
utilisation of the factors of production, particularly labour; 
(b) to ensure thereby a fair standard of living for the agricultural population, 
particularly by the increasing of the individual earnings of persons engaged in 
agriculture; 
(c) to stabilise markets; 
(d) to guarantee regular supplies; and 
(e) to ensure reasonable prices in supplies to consumers.” 
 
Prior to the first CAP reform attempts in the 1980s, the so-called Price-Support 
System was the central instrument of the CAP (Bache & George 2006, 379), where 
Ministers of Agriculture agreed on prices for agricultural products every year. In case 
                                                
38 Higher food prices lead to the call for higher wages, consequently increasing production costs. 
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the prices rose above or fell below the agreed levels, the Commission would buy up or 
release the previously bought products onto the market in order to maintain the agreed 
price levels. The prices were set at a relatively high level, in order to ensure that the 
least efficient farmers would still have a reasonable income (ibid.). However, this led to 
“obscene levels of overproduction” (Dinan 1999, 341), because the prices encouraged 
more efficient large-scale farmers to maximise their output and guaranteed them a 
return on their investment (Bache & George 2006, 379). 
With more than 50 years of allowed controversial history, the CAP continues to 
be one of the most significant policy areas in the European Union, which is also 
apparent in the EU budget. In the financial framework for 2007 – 2013, the spending on 
agriculture, rural development, environment and fisheries accounts for 43 per cent of 
the total EU budget (European Commission 2009a).  
From an Australian perspective, the problems concerning the CAP stemmed from 
three interrelated factors (Elijah et al. 2000, 7-8): (1) Australia’s position as a major 
exporter of agricultural produce, (2) Australia’s dependence on the UK as its major 
export market for agricultural produce and the implications after the UK accession to 
the EC in 1973, and (3) the nature, importance and role of the EC’s CAP both within 
the EC and with regard to the relations with third countries, including Australia. More 
precisely, the following two aspects of the CAP were particularly problematic for 
Australia (Murray et al. 2002, 398-399): (1) Australian imports to the EC were severely 
restricted because of the EC’s “internal price controls and barriers” (ibid.) e.g. with 
regard to dairy, beef, sugar and cereals, and (2) Australia’s role as an exporter of 
agricultural produce was even more undermined, when the EC became a net exporter. 
This development stemmed from huge EC subsidies and internal pricing structures, 
which allowed EC farmers to sell their over-supply at considerably lower prices on the 
world market.  In addition, Australia was caught in the crossfire, when the US launched 
its Export Enhancement Program as a response to European produce being sold at 
extremely subsidised prices on the world market (Murray et al. 2002, 399). 
Consequently, Australia’s exports were also negatively affected, even though Australia 
was not the primary target of this US retaliation policy (ibid.). 
When Australia was directly confronted with the severity of CAP implications on 
its trade balance in the 1970s, Prime Minister Fraser suggested introducing regular 
high-level meetings between EC and Australian representatives (ibid.). This idea was 
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finally institutionalised in 1979 and the first Ministerial was held in 1981 (ibid.). 
In the beginning, these meetings were not particularly successful due to very 
inflexible EC bureaucracy and the “bruising argumentative style” employed by the 
Australian side, which was coupled with the firm conviction that “they were ‘in the 
right’ and that the workings of the CAP, particularly in external markets, were unjust” 
(Elijah et al. 2000, 9-10). As addressed by Burnett (from a publication in 1983 cited in 
Elijah et al. 2000, 46), the Australian argumentative manner, no matter how 
sophisticated and polished, would not have changed the CAP. Still, these robust 
Australian attacks on the EC left a bitter aftertaste and saw EC-Australia relations reach 
an all-time low (Murray et al. 2002, 399). The discrepancy between the Australian and 
the EC perspective on agricultural issues becomes most evident in this context. While 
Australians tend to see themselves as victims of the powerful, inflexible and unjust CAP 
behemoth, the EC meets this Australian “crusade” with complete incomprehension 
(Murray 2005, 110). 
However, this noise in the communication process not only harmed the overall 
relationship between the EC and Australia, but it also prevented the Australian side 
from realising that the EC itself was deeply divided on the CAP issue, therefore 
preventing an opportunity to liaise with influential Europeans who were also critical of 
the CAP (Murray 2005, 112). 
Even though CAP issues were still on the agenda at Ministerial meetings in the 
early 1980s, the overall tone was less confrontational under Prime Minister Hawke, 
which might also stem from his wish to improve the relationship between the EC and 
Australia (Elijah et al. 2000, 10). Even the Commission described the meetings as being 
held “in a spirit of constructive dialogue” (Murray et al. 2002, 400). This thaw was also 
accelerated by the 1985 Andriessen Agreement, which outlined the Commission’s 
commitment “not to supply subsidised beef to Australia's traditional markets of Japan, 
Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan” (EC DEL 2009a). This does not, 
however, imply that the Australian voice complaining about the CAP was heard or 
taken into account in Brussels (Elijah et al. 2000, 12). 
The agreement to put agriculture on the agenda of the Uruguay Round of GATT 
negotiations changed both the context and the nature of EC-Australia relations (Murray 
2005, 400-401). This is shown in two ways.  Firstly, the decision shifted agricultural 
negotiations from a bilateral to a multilateral level, hence increasing Australia’s 
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influence as it was not the only state fighting for liberalisation in agricultural trade any 
more. Australia found support in multilateral fora like the GATT and the OECD and 
was able to utilise international pressure with regard to the CAP to achieve at least 
minimum success. It may therefore be argued that the shift to multilateral negotiations 
was the first step to breaking down some inflexible and contested CAP structures, 
although this is not to imply that the conflict has been overcome completely. Secondly, 
the Australian initiative for the creation of the Cairns Group in 1986 also contributed to 
the consolidation of Australia’s role in negotiations. The Cairns Group is a coalition of 
19 agricultural-exporting members39, which lobbies for the liberalisation of agricultural 
exports (Cairns Group 2009). For the first time “Australia was no longer a lone voice at 
the negotiation table with the EC” (Murray 2005, 113). 
Moreover, the shift of agricultural negotiations to a multilateral level had two 
implications for the state and nature of the EC-Australia relationship (ibid.): (1) The 
asymmetry of the relationship with a bigger and more influential EC (in terms of 
population, GDP and as an overall political player) was partly evened up in the area of 
agricultural negotiations thanks to the Cairns Group, and (2) the shift of agriculture to a 
multilateral level fostered the expansion of the EC-Australia dialogue to issues beyond 
agriculture. 
In the early 1990s the external pressures on the EC and its CAP increased 
resulting in the 1992 CAP reform (Murray et al. 2002, 401). The key feature of this 
reform was to reduce the intervention prices for key agricultural products and to offset 
the impact of these cuts on producer incomes by direct payments (European 
Commission 2009b). Even though the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade (DFAT) assessed this reform in a cautiously positive way, the Howard 
government once again chose a more confrontational style towards the EU in the 
context of the CAP (Elijah et al. 2000, 15). 
In spite of the “burden of memory”40 with regard to the CAP, the major 
agricultural conflict between the EC/EU and Australia has been overcome and has led 
to an expansion of the relationship beyond the CAP (Murray et al. 2002, 402). 
                                                
39 The current members are: Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, 
Thailand and Uruguay (Cairns Group 2009). 
40 The first chapter of Murray’s (2005) book is devoted to the problems of the European-Australian 
relationship in its first decades. The title of this chapter is „The burden of memory“. 
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4.3. Strengthening the relationship beyond the CAP and the UK 
From the 1980s onwards, slow, but persistent convergence between the EC/EU 
and Australia could be witnessed. With the first signs of thaw in the context of the CAP 
and with the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations the relationship 
between the EC/EU and Australia was gradually upgraded (Murray et al. 2002, 402). 
Hence, there was “scope to expand the relationship with the EU into new and more 
productive areas” (Evant & Grant 1995, 309). Moreover, the cooperation between the 
Delegation of the European Commission in Canberra and the Australian government, 
and particularly former Trade Minister Tim Fischer in the late 1990s, considerably led 
to diminishing “the official animosity towards the CAP” (Papadakis 2001, 136). 
According to Murray et al. (2002, 402-410), there are three factors which have 
influenced the development of the current relationship between the European Union and 
Australia: (1) the development of a strong economic relationship beyond the CAP, (2) 
the increase in high-level political contacts and an agenda covering a wide range of 
issues and (3) Australia’s engagement in the Asia-Pacific and the EU’s interest in that 
region. 
 
4.3.1. Stronger economic relationship beyond the CAP 
With regard to the first factor, the EU-Australian economic ties became closer in 
the 1990s (Elijah 2000, 17). As Figure 5 on page 65 illustrates bilateral merchandise 
trade has constantly increased from the 1970s onwards with the late 1980s and 1990s 
displaying the largest growth rates. In the 1990s, 25 per cent of Australia’s exports went 
to the EU, in contrast to only 17 per cent to Japan or 15 per cent to the United States 
(ibid.). Additionally, the EU accounted for 20 per cent of all Australian overseas 
transactions (ibid.). Table 1 on page 64 exemplifies these major trends for 1998 and 
2000 in absolute numbers.  
However, it may be argued, that the nature of this economic relationship is 
characterised by inequality and asymmetry, as Australia only accounted for 
approximately 1.5 per cent of the total EU trade in the same time frame (Murray et al. 
2002, 403). This asymmetry also becomes evident in considerable trade deficits, which 
have increased over the last years, as outlined in Figure 6 on page 65. 
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Table 1: Australia’s economic relations with the EU in 1998 and 2000 (in AUD) 
Merchandise trade 1998 2000 
Exports $ 12.3 billion $ 12.5 billion 
Imports $ 23.1 billion $ 25.5 billion  
Merchandise trade balance - $ 10.7 billion $ - 13.0 billion 
Trade in services 1998 2000 
Credits $ 5.1 billion $ 6.3 billion 
Debits $ 6.7 billion $ 7. 2 billion 
Services trade balance - $ 1.6 billion $ - 0.9 billion 
Foreign investment 1998 1999 (end of June) 
Inwards total $ 194.5 billion $ 199.6 billion 
Inwards direct $ 57.3 billion n.a. 
Outwards total $ 73.9 billion $ 73.9 billion 
Outwards direct $ 29.7 billion n.a. 
Source: Own illustration based on data provided by Elijah et al. 2000, 18 and Papadakis 
2001, 138 
 
Even though the relationship might appear asymmetrical in absolute terms with 
regard to merchandise trade, this asymmetry does not necessarily imply disadvantages 
for either partner. Firstly, trade in services is much more balanced, as outlined in Table 
1. Secondly, by the end of June 1999, the European Union invested almost 200 billion 
Australian dollars, becoming the largest foreign investor (Papadakis 2001, 138). 
Therefore, in spite of the considerable merchandise trade deficit, the degree to which 
Australia could benefit from the remarkable volume of service exports to the European 
Union and from the amount of EU foreign investment should not be underestimated. 
Consequently, asymmetry cannot be regarded as a disadvantage for Australia in this 
context. 
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Figure 5: Development of Australian merchandise trade with the EU 1977 - 1999 
 
Source: Own illustration based on data provided by Elijah et al. 2000, 18 
 
Figure 6: Australian merchandise trade with the European Union 1977 - 1997 
 
Source: Own illustration based on data provided by Elijah et al. 2000, 18 
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Conversely, the European Union also benefited from closer ties with Australia. 
Some EU members came to regard Australia as a gateway to the Asia-Pacific in the 
1990s before the Asian economic crisis of 1997 (Papadakis 2001, 138). From 1994 to 
1997, more than 160 companies from the EU established their regional headquarters in 
Australia, before further expanding into the Asia-Pacific (ibid.). This is not surprising, 
as Australia’s close cultural, historical, and linguistic ties with Europe are beyond 
controversy. 
The 1990s were characterised by healthy development and growth of economic 
relations, although important European developments like the Single Market did not 
attract much Australian attention (Murray et al. 2002, 406). Nevertheless, both 
government and business acknowledged the positive implications of the free movement 
of goods, services, capital and labour and the advantages of a single customs document 
(Elijah et al. 2000, 20). Similarly, the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) and the introduction of the euro “were not widely debated for two reasons” 
(Murray 2005, 72): Firstly, the UK (Australia’s main frame of reference with regard to 
trade in Europe) did not introduce the euro. Secondly, the euro was not expected to 
become a major reserve currency. In spite of this expectation, the Reserve Bank of 
Australia (RBA) held approximately 45 per cent of international reserves in euro in 
2004 (ibid.).  
In contrast to Murray’s (ibid.) analysis, Papadakis (2001, 133) regards a “lack of 
‘literacy’ concerning Europe” combined with a strong Asia-centric focus of Australian 
foreign and trade policy in the late 1990s, becoming the main reason for the initial 
misjudgement of the EMU.  This attitude was reflected “in the scepticism in 1996 about 
the capacity of the EU to achieve Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), even a few 
months before it was realised” (ibid.). 
Recapitulating the development of the economic relations between the European 
Union and Australia, the upgrade of trade beyond the CAP can be seen as the most 
important facet of the 1990s. 
 
4.3.2. Increase in high-level political contacts 
Apart from the economic agenda moving beyond the CAP conflict, high-level 
political contacts have influenced the current nature and scope of the relationship 
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between the European Union and Australia (Murray et al. 2002, 402-410). Moreover, 
political issues gaining significance in the 1990s led to an increase of high-level 
political contacts and the conclusion of agreements between the European Union and 
Australia (Elijah et al. 2000, 21-28; Murray et al. 2002, 406-409; Murray 2005, 61-68, 
82-87; Papadakis 2001, 140-145). 
Even though formal Ministerial meetings between Australia and the Commission 
were institutionalised in 1981, other high-level contacts were initiated throughout the 
course of time. Since 1981, annual inter-parliamentary meetings (IPMs) between the 
Parliament of Australia and the European Parliament have been held (EP 2009). It is 
worthy to note that these meetings have been “less acrimonious than those at 
ministerial level” (Murray et al. 2002, 407). Additionally, regular meetings between 
Australian and European Commission officials were initiated (Elijah et al. 2000, 21). 
This level of cooperation was undoubtedly enhanced in 1981 by the formation of the 
European Commission’s Delegation to Australia in Canberra, as the Head of Delegation 
acts as the “official representative of the European Commission in Australia” (EC DEL 
2009b). Interestingly the Australian government aimed at providing a forum for regular 
discussion on current developments in agricultural commodity trade by reviving the 
Agricultural Trade and Marketing Experts’ Group (ATMEG) in 1991 (Elijah et al. 
2000, 21). 
The first signs indicating that the trade agenda has moved beyond the CAP can be 
found in the 1980s, when the Labour government declared its commitment to trade 
liberalisation (Murray et al. 2002, 407). This commitment was in line with the 
Commission’s ideals, consequently resulting in regular bilateral and multilateral trade 
negotiations covering competition policy, industrial tariffs, investment, and services 
(ibid.). As Australia and the European Union appeared to be “whistling the same trade 
tune” (Raffin 2008, 83) in the WTO with regard to the elimination of non-tariff trade 
barriers and trade liberalisation, high-level consultations on trade were not confined to 
agriculture any more (Elijah et al. 2000, 22). 
May 1990 can be regarded a significant date for the widening and improvement of 
EU-Australia relations. As the Australian government acknowledged the political 
dimension of the EC’s external relations, the EC and Australia agreed to “enhance both 
the level and the quality of their political contact on foreign policy questions” (Murray 
et al. 2002, 407), resulting in dialogues on Ministerial level on European Political 
4. Development of EU-Australia relations 
68 
Cooperation (EC DEL 2009c). Meetings on Ministerial level took place whenever 
deemed necessary, while meetings with the Presidency Political Director were held 
every six months (ibid.). Moreover, annual meetings at the Troika41 level, twice-yearly 
bilateral meetings with the EU-Presidency and regular meetings at the annual ASEAN 
Regional Forum42 (ARF) and at the annual ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference43 were 
introduced (Elijah et al. 2000, 22). Consequently, the development of closer political 
ties between the European Union and Australia not only becomes evident in the 
introduction and institutionalisation of new fora for joint dialogue, but it is also 
emphasised by the mere number of meetings (Table 2). Additionally, Appendix 1 
provides an overview of all levels of political dialogue between Australian and 
European Union officials.  
 
Table 2: High-level political meetings between the European Union and Australia 
(1997-2004) 
Type of meeting Number of meetings 
Consultations with the EU Presidency 13 
Annual Ministerial consultations, Senior Officials’ and 
ATMEG meetings 21 
Total number of Australian Ministerial visits to Brussels 
and European Commissioner visits to Australia 33 
Total number of Parliamentary Delegation visits 4 
Source: Own illustration based on data provided by EC DEL & DFAT 2004 
 
Apart from the enhancement of both the level and quality of the EU-Australian 
                                                
41 Definition of the Troïka (Europa Glossary 2009a): “Since the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Troïka has 
brought together: (1) the Foreign Affairs Minister of the Member State holding the Presidency of the 
Council of the European Union; (2) the Secretary-General/High Representative for the common foreign 
and security policy; (3) the European Commissioner in charge of external relations and European 
neighbourhood policy. The Presidency can also be assisted, where necessary, by the representatives of 
the future Presidency (Article 18 of the Treaty on European Union).” 
42 The ARF aims at fostering dialogue on political and security issues in the Asia-Pacific and comprises 
the following participants: Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, China, 
European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, 
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Russian 
Federation, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor Leste, United States, Vietnam (ARF 2005). 
43 The Association of Souteast Asian Countries (ASEAN) was established in 1967 and consists of Brunei 
Darussalam, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and 
Vietnam. The ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference with dialogue partners (e.g. the European Union or 
Australia) is held after the annual ASEAN meeting (Elijah et al. 2000, 48, endnote 37). 
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political dialogue, the number of bilateral agreements has increased significantly since 
the mid 1990s (Appendix 2). Prior to that the 1982 agreement between the European 
Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the Government of Australia concerning the 
transfer of Australian nuclear material to Europe was the only bilateral agreement (EC 
TO 2009). The widening of the relationship between the European Union and Australia 
in the following twelve years resulted in the signing of the Wine Agreement in 1994 
(Murray et al. 2002, 407), which was further amended in 2003 (EC TO 2009). As 
outlined in Article 1 of this agreement, the overall objective was to “facilitate and 
promote trade in wine originating in the Community and in Australia on the conditions 
provided for in this agreement”, i.e. on the basis of reciprocity and non-discrimination. 
It is not surprising that the Wine Agreement led to a substantial increase in Australian 
wine exports to the European Union, as the agreement provided a basis for the 
acceptance of Australian wine-making practices in the EU and for the removal of 
technical barriers to exports of some Australian wines (Elijah et al. 2000, 23). 
The Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation was also signed and 
entered into force in 1994 and was later expanded in 1999 (EC TO 2009; Murray 2005, 
83). The agreement enabled Australian and European researchers to be full participants 
in either Australian or European research programmes, the latter managed by the 
European Commission (Murray et al. 2002, 407). Even though the agreement broadened 
in 1999, the six initial areas of cooperation under Article 4.2 were biotechnology, 
medical and health research, marine science and technology, environment, information 
and communication technologies. It is noteworthy, that this was the first agreement of 
this kind to be concluded by the European Community44 with an industrial country 
outside Europe and that the agreement included rules relating to intellectual property 
(EC TO 2007). 
Negotiations on a Mutual Recognition Agreement on Conformity Assessment 
were also initiated in 1994 and eventually concluded in 1998. Australian certification 
facilities were thereby accredited in the European Union, leading to a reduction of time 
and costs of (manufactured) product certification and to the facilitation of 
trade (Elijah et al. 2000, 23; Papadakis 2001, 140). 
                                                
44 Unlike the second (Common Foreign and Security Policy) and third (Cooperation in Justice and Home 
Affairs) pillar, only the first pillar (European Community and Euratom) has a legal personality. 
Consequently, only the European Community “has the power to conclude and negotiate agreements in 
line with its external powers” (Europa Glossary 2009b). Conversely, the European Union as such does 
not have “institutionalised treaty-making powers“ (ibid.). See also footnote 35. 
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In 1995, following the successful conclusion of these agreements and the 
constructive bilateral efforts, first attempts were made to consolidate EU-Australian 
cooperation by means of a Framework Agreement, i.e. a formalised cooperation 
structure (Murray et al. 2002, 408). In April 1996, Australian Foreign Minister 
Alexander Downer announced that the relationship between the European Union and 
Australia had entered a “new phase“, further paving the way for negotiating a 
“Framework Trade and Cooperation Agreement accompanied by a Joint Political 
Declaration” (Elijah et al. 2000, 26). The Framework Agreement was initially intended 
to enhance and diversify trade, investment as well as cooperation on multiple issues 
between the European Union and Australia (ibid.). Moreover, a budget line for the 
European Commission’s Delegation to Australia was envisaged in order to provide a 
financial background for a wide range of projects, including the areas covered by 
existing and possible future agreements (Papadakis 2001, 141). However, the idea of a 
Framework Agreement was soon abandoned by the Australian government, as it refused 
to sign an agreement, including a human rights clause (Murray et al. 2002, 408).  
Following a Council decision in May 1995 a so-called human rights clause must be 
included in all bilateral agreements of general nature with third countries (Brandtner & 
Rosas 1998, 473). This human rights clause provides that “respect for fundamental 
human rights and democratic principles as laid down in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights of 1948 […] inspire the internal and external policies of the parties and 
constitute and ‘essential element’ of the agreement” (ibid.). Australia’s vehement and 
dismissive reaction to the human rights clause is even more surprising, given that this 
standard clause does not transform the basic nature of the agreement (Brandtner & 
Rosas 1998, 474), that it does not aim at establishing new human rights standards, but  
merely seeks to reaffirm existing commitments, which “as general international law 
already bind all states as well as the EC in its capacity as a subject of international 
law” (Brandtner & Rosas 1998, 475). Therefore, it is rather surprising that the 
Australian Howard government reacted in such a renunciative manner to the human 
rights clause when abandoning the Framework Agreement. As the Australian 
government refused to partner trade with human rights, a non-binding, but face-saving 
Joint Declaration45 was signed in June 1997 (Brandtner & Rosas 1998, 474; Murray et 
                                                
45 The key agreements between the European Union and Australia can be downloaded from the European 
Commission’s (Directorate-General External Relations also known as RELEX) website: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/australia/docs/index_en.htm>, viewed 15 May 2009. 
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al. 2002, 408; Papadakis 2001, 142). 
This first political declaration was indeed modest in scope, still it provided (1) a 
definition of common objectives including the support of democracy, the rule of law as 
well as the respect for human rights and the UN Charter, (2) a statement of areas of 
enhanced dialogue and cooperation comprising trade, environment, employment, 
science and training and development issues ,and (3) a framework for further political 
consultations ranging from inter-parliamentary meetings to consultations on official and 
ministerial level. Moreover, the introduction of possible summit meetings between the 
President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the 
Prime Minister of Australia was mentioned in this Declaration. 
The lack of a formalised Framework Agreement did not have any substantial 
effects with regard to high-level political contacts, which continued on a regular basis 
and addressed a multitude of areas ranging from veterinary checks to security and 
geopolitical issues in the Asia-Pacific region (Murray et al. 2002, 408-409). 
The 2002 ministerial consultations in Brussels paved the way for the 2003 
Agenda for Cooperation46. At this meeting, both Australia and the European Union 
agreed to “take stock of developments in [their] relationship since the signing of the 
Joint Declaration and to identify priorities for future cooperation” (Agenda for 
Cooperation). While the objectives defined in the 1997 Joint Declaration were 
reaffirmed, Figure 7 on page 72 summarises the seven key areas of cooperation as 
outlined in the 2003 agenda. Furthermore, it is noteworthy, that the agenda for 
cooperation was concluded for a lifespan of five years (EC DEL & DFAT 2007), hence 
provisions for a subsequent agreement would have to be made by 2008. 
Recapitulating the 1980s, which saw the emergence and development of high-
level political contacts, two aspects are noteworthy. Firstly, the levels of political 
consultations were marked by both diversification (now ranging from regular inter-
parliamentary meetings, official and Ministerial consultations to occasional summits 
between the EU Presidency, the Commission’s President and the Australian Prime 
Minister) and intensification with regard to the frequency and regularity of meetings. 
Secondly, the areas of dialogue increased substantially, moving beyond the disputed 
CAP and trade barriers, hence fostering cooperation on a multitude of new issues, inter 
                                                
46 See footnote 45. 
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alia including science and higher education, security and strategy as well as 
environmental issues. 
 
Figure 7: High priorities and key areas as set out by the 2003 Agenda for Cooperation 
 
Source: Own illustration based on Murray 2005, 89 and the 2003 Agenda for 
Cooperation 
 
4.3.3. Australia’s engagement in the Asia-Pacific and the EU’s interest in that 
region 
Not only did closer economic and political cooperation beyond the conflict over 
the CAP contribute to the state and nature of current EU-Australia relations (Murray et 
al. 2002, 402-410), but Australia’s engagement in the Asia-Pacific and the EU’s 
growing interest in that region are also responsible for the enhancement of cooperation 
and closer relations. 
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From an Australian perspective, the Asia-Pacific region has been of particular 
interest since the 1980s. In the time from 1983 to 1996 the Hawke and Keating Labour 
governments defined Asia as the highest priority in foreign policy, hence placing 
emphasis on geographical, not historical ties (Elijah et al. 2000, 28-29). To the 
disadvantage of Europe, Foreign Affairs Minister Gareth Evans defined Asia as the 
most important area for the Australian national interest (Murray et al. 2002, 409). Even 
though Evans’ successor, Liberal Party Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, was more 
cautious with regard to underestimating Europe’s role in Australian foreign policy, 
Downer still reiterated that “Australia’s highest foreign policy priority is closer 
engagement with Asia” (Downer from a publication in 1997 cited in Papadakis 2001, 
135). This judgement made in 1997 largely stemmed from economic forecasts, which 
saw East Asia growing two and a half times faster than the rest of the world and defined 
this region as the “key locomotive of the world economy” (ibid.). 
The European Union followed the same line of (economic) reasoning with regard 
to justifying its interest in closer relations with Asia. Under the 1994 German 
Presidency the Commission presented a “New Asia Strategy” (CEC 1994), outlining its 
plans for closer engagement in Asia as being driven by economic and security interests. 
Firstly, the Commission relied on World Bank estimates that by 2000, Asia and 
Southeast Asia would account for half the growth in the global economy. Secondly, the 
post-cold-war “regional environment of unparalleled political fluidity” (CEC 1994, 1) 
posed a concern to the European Union, which consequently decided to cooperate more 
closely with Asia in order for both partners to “play a constructive and stabilising role 
in the world” (ibid.). Accordingly, the Commission concluded that “the European 
Union needs therefore to accord Asia a higher priority than is at present the case” 
(ibid.). 
Motivation and shared interests are not the only common features with regard to 
EU-Asia and Australia-Asia relations. The EU and Australia sought to engage in Asian 
regional fora. Both Australia and the European Union participate in regular meetings at 
the annual ASEAN Regional Forum (AFR) and at the annual ASEAN Post Ministerial 
Conference (Elijah et al. 2000, 22), even though they are not ASEAN members. 
Moreover, both Australia and the European Union created multilateral regional fora in 
Asia in order to provide an institutional basis for future dialogue. Australia was the 
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driving force with regard to the creation of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation47 
(APEC), whose overall objective is to provide “stability, security and prosperity for 
[the members’] people“ (APEC 2009). Conversely, the European Union (particularly 
France) and Singapore initiated Asia-Europe Meetings48 (ASEM) in 1996, in order to 
enhance the relationship and cooperation between these two major blocs (Murray et al. 
2002, 409). Despite strong Australian lobbying and European, Japanese, South Korean 
and Philippine support Australia was not invited to participate in this particular forum 
(Elijah et al. 2000, 29). This can be attributed mostly to Malaysian Prime Minister 
Mahathir’s opposition49 to Australian membership (Murray 2003, 104). Therefore, with 
the European Union not belonging to APEC and Australia not being a part of ASEM, 
cooperation opportunities between the EU and Australia in regional Asian fora has 
indeed been limited. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, the notion that Australia had to choose between Europe 
and Asia prevailed in Canberra (Elijah et al. 2000, 28). Until the mid 1990s, the choice 
was clearly Asia. This idea of mutually exclusive foreign policy priorities was only 
partially overcome by the Howard government. Alexander Downer, Australian Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, stated that “an Asia first policy does not mean Asia only […] So, just 
as Australia would urge Europe not to be narrowly Euro-centric, the Australian 
Government will not make the mistake of being exclusively concerned with our 
immediate region” (Downer from a publication in 1997 cited in Papadakis 2001, 136). 
However, in the period after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001.  
The Howard government intensified its relations with the United States. If Europe did 
not feature prominently on Labour’s foreign policy radar screen in the 1980s and 1990s, 
Europe’s role and significance for Australia was once again downplayed in the post 
                                                
47 Currently, the following 21 countries are APEC members: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, 
Chile, People's Republic of China, Hong Kong China, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, 
Thailand, United States and Viet Nam (APEC 2009). 
48 ASEM currently comprises the 27 EU members, the EU Commission, the ASEAN Secretariat and 16 
Asian countries, including Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, India, Japan, Korea, Laos, 
Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam (ASEM InfoBoard 
2009). 
49 This blockade was just another one of Prime Minister Mahathir’s jibes on Australian and Western 
leaders. Even though Mahathir has to be credited with leading Malaysia “on a remarkable development 
path“ (CNN 2003), he seldom left out an opportunity to trade barbs with Western leaders (ibid.). On the 
other hand Australian Prime Minister Keating’s comment on Mahathir’s failure to attend the first APEC 
meeting in Seattle in 1993 (stating that the concept of APEC was bigger “than Mahathir and any 
recalcitrants“) led to “a frosty period in leader-to-leader relations that has extended to Keating’s 
successor, John Howard” (ibid.). 
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9/11-period, as the Howard government increasingly concentrated on a stronger alliance 
with the US (Murray 2003, 104) as a result of the new security threats and focused 
primarily on bilateral relations with European member states, therefore undermining 
EU-Australia relations (Murray et al. 2002, 410). 
However, this shall not imply that EU-Australia relations were downgraded in the 
course of time. On the contrary they improved due to Australia’s expertise in the Asia-
Pacific and shared EU-Australian values and interests in that region, including trade, 
development aid and security issues. It may be argued that Australia’s role in the Asia-
Pacific is of particular interest for the European Union for two reasons. Firstly, 
according to Murray (2005, 257) the EU has benefited from the expertise of Australia’s 
Asian specialists on current events in the Asia-Pacific and South Pacific region, 
particularly with regard to human rights and security issues. This expertise not only 
stems from Australia’s geographical proximity to that region, but also from Australian 
leadership in international security interventions in East Timor and in the Solomon 
Islands in 200350. Secondly, Australia has been touted as fulfilling the function of a 
culturally familiar headquarters for Asian operations of European companies (Murray 
2005, 257-258). In fact more than 135 companies from the EU had their regional 
headquarters in Australia in 2005, including Ericsson, Philips, Siemens and many others 
(Murray 2005, 271). 
It is not surprising that both Australia and the EU might be economically more 
interested in Asia than in each other (Murray 2005, 257). However, the political 
dimension of EU-Australian cooperation in Asia should not be underestimated, as “their 
combined weight might help push Asian partners to open markets as well” (Wise from a 
publication in 1996 cited in Murray 2005, 257). It may be argued, that both Australia 
and the European Union have been well advised to work closely on “befriending the 
awakening tiger” (Raffin 2008, 86).  
 
4.3.4. General remarks on EU-Australia relations up to the end of the 1990s 
From the mid 1980s onwards gradual but persistent convergence between the 
European Union and Australia took place. With the CAP losing its status as primary 
priority in EU-Australia relations, new issues of mutual concern and interest could be 
                                                
50 For further information on these missions see Ayson 2007 & Wainwright 2005. 
4. Development of EU-Australia relations 
76 
placed on the cooperation agenda. While trade links have strengthened throughout the 
course of time, political ties have been institutionalised in terms of regular meetings and 
consultations on multiple political and official levels. Moreover, Australia’s expertise in 
the Asia-Pacific region has been valued by the European Union. Therefore, it may be 
argued that “[on] balance, however, official levels of understanding of, and emphasis 
on, the importance of Australia-EU links increased over the period under review” 
(Papadakis 2001, 135), given the Australian government’s understanding of the broader 
EU-context (Murray 2005, 88). 
 
4.4. Developments under Prime Minister John Howard (1996-2007) 
As already discussed in the previous sections, the relationship between the 
European Union and Australia was undoubtedly enhanced and strengthened under 
Prime Minister Howard in general terms, with the 1997 Joint Declaration and 2003 
Agenda for Cooperation being signed and trade links moving beyond the CAP conflict. 
However, there were also lines of conflict and areas of mutual misunderstanding in EU-
Australia relations. Firstly, the Howard Coalition government’s focus on bilateralism 
and on the national interest contributed to the USA gaining the status of a special ally in 
every respect. Secondly, environmental issues including measures to combat climate 
change were the areas of greatest dispute and incomprehension. 
 
4.4.1. A new foreign policy agenda – Strengthening bilateral ties 
In 1996, the Australian foreign policy agenda was subject to a paradigm shift 
when the Howard Coalition (comprising the Liberal and National Parties) won the 
elections. The Coalition positioned its foreign policy objectives against traditional 
Labor values, including the middle power label51, multilateral and regional engagement 
through the WTO and APEC and the faith in the United Nations system (Capling 2005, 
42; Ungerer 2007, 548-549). This opinion was also expressed in the 1997 foreign policy 
White Paper (cited in Ungerer 2007, 549): 
 
                                                
51 According to Liberal Party Foreign Minister Downer the middle power label “sells us short and 
overlooks the rich potential that Australia has to play a vital role in the world”. As he refused to “accept 
Australia merely as a middle power”, he rather preferred the “pivotal power” label (Downer cited in 
Ungerer 2007, 549). 
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“A central feature of the Government’s approach to foreign and trade 
policy is the importance it places on bilateral relationships as a means of 
advancing Australia’s interests […] Australia must be realistic about what 
multilateral institutions such as the United Nations can deliver.” 
 
It is not surprising that the new foreign policy agenda underlined the significance 
of bilateral relations, particularly with the United States, Japan, China and Indonesia 
(Capling 2005, 49). The negotiations of a free trade agreement with the United States 
were also in line with Howard’s bilateral preferences. This agreement has been 
criticised for favouring the United States at the expense of discriminating against other 
major trade partners like Japan, China or even the European Union (Capling 2005, 55). 
Moreover, Australia’s decision to negotiate a free trade agreement with the US did not 
only stem from economic considerations, but other motives like the Australian desire to 
strengthen strategic and political links with the United States seemed to prevail (Capling 
2005, 53). In August 2002, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer declared that this 
particular trade agreement between Australia and the United States would “help 
engender a broader appreciation – in both countries – of the bilateral security alliance” 
(cited in Capling 2005, 53). As can be seen in the above quotation the view that 
Australia had to stick with and rely on “great and powerful friends” (Capling 2005, 14) 
apparently gained momentum in the period after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 
2001. This line of reasoning may partly be explained by Prime Minister Howard’s very 
personal experiences. John Howard was in Washington D.C. on 11 September 2001, in 
a hotel directly next to the Pentagon when it was attacked (Summers 2007). Howard 
had met President Bush, his “political soul mate” (ibid.), for the first time the day 
before the attacks. Seeing the devastation and being at the epicentre of consternation 
and fear, Prime Minister Howard announced the day after the attacks that “Australia 
will provide all support that might be requested of us by the United States in any action 
that might be taken” (ibid.). It may therefore be argued that Howard’s commitment to 
the US, including the free trade agreement and the unquestioned fealty in Iraq, “is a 
personal, partisan one - not the kind of multilayered, apolitical liaison that a robust and 
resilient alliance requires” (ibid.). Consequently, the Howard government seemed to 
have regarded the United States as “great power protector” (Murray 2005, 35) who 
would be willing and able to look after its little brother across the Pacific. 
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Understandably, Australia’s relations with the US intensified in the period of insecurity 
following September 2001. However, “Australia is still regarded in some quarters in 
Europe as the US’s deputy sheriff of the Asia–Pacific region, despite denial from 
official Australian sources” (Murray 2005, 13), which might also have had effects on 
EU-Australian relations. 
 
4.4.2. Unfortunate choice of words 
Apart from the EU’s loss of importance for Australia in political terms due to 
Australia’s choice of the United States as strategic and political ally in an era of 
insecurity, Prime Minister Howard’s occasional rhetoric can also be regarded as 
counterproductive to healthy relations with the European Union. Prime Minister 
Howard seemed to have a vivid recollection of his position as Minister for Special 
Trade Negotiations with the EC in the late 1970s (Murray et al. 2002, 399), which was 
not particularly successful. In 1998 Prime Minister Howard stated: 
 
“I have spent a large part of my political life denigrating, quite rightly, with 
some passion, the rotten anti-Australian policies of the EU that have done 
such immense damage to the agricultural industries of Australia and 
represent one of the high water marks of world trading hypocrisy.“ 
(cited in Murray 2005, 14). 
 
First of all this unfortunate choice of words did not contribute to a convergence 
between the European Union and Australia on agricultural issues, nor was it conducive 
to providing a healthy diplomatic environment. Moreover, it mirrored John Howard’s 
political U-turns with regard to diplomatic contacts with the European Union52. 
However justified the criticism on the CAP may be, this statement (along with some 
other verbal attacks) does not do justice to the European Union’s role as Australia’s 
single most important economic partner in terms of trade in goods, services, and 
investment (Murray 2005, 14). 
 
                                                
52 For pro- and anti-EU statements of Prime Minister John Howard see Murray 2005, 14. 
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4.4.3. Diverging perspectives on environmental issues 
Even though Australia’s role as “US deputy sheriff” (Murray 2005, 13) and Prime 
Minister Howard’s occasional verbal attacks on the EU were not conducive to 
strengthening political relations between Australia and the EU, the diverging 
perspectives on environmental issues and climate change appeared to be the main 
stumbling block.  
This divergence mostly stemmed from mutually exclusive positions on measures 
to combat climate change and the obvious unwillingness to understand or accept the 
other partner’s view. Even though Australia has long criticised the principle of 
multifunctionality53 in EU policies, Australia’s opposition to ratifying the Kyoto 
Protocol was anathema to the European Union (Oxley 2002, 110-111). It may therefore 
be argued that even though climate change has been a contested issue in EU-Australian 
relations in general, “there is particular tension […] with emphasis on the Kyoto 
Protocol” (Murray 2005, 155). 
Australia’s position, which was very similar to stance taken up by the United 
States, clearly mirrored “the Coalition’s emphasis on environmental pragmatism” 
(Elliott 2001, 262), with “practical” and “achievable” being the most commonly used 
words in the context of the Kyoto Protocol (ibid.). Although Australia was one of the 
first countries to sign the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), it opposed ratifying the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC due to the 
following reasons (Murray 2005, 155): Australia once again followed the American line 
of reasoning with regard to the Kyoto Protocol placing the burden of cutting emissions 
on coal-producing and coal-consuming industrialised economies (ibid.). Moreover, 
Australia’s interests as “the world’s largest exporter of coal and one of the world’s 
cheapest generators of energy, largely from the combustion of coal” (Oxley 2002, 111) 
are obvious in this context. However, Australia was willing to support the Protocol, if 
(1) a global emissions trading system was provided for, (2) the US ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol, (3) all greenhouse gases and carbon sinks (e.g. forests) were included, and (4) 
Australia was granted special targets with regard to carbon dioxide emissions (ibid.). 
The reasons for the Kyoto “Cold War” (Murray 2005, 155) between the EU and 
                                                
53 “An activity is said to be multifunctional when it plays a number of roles that may contribute to the 
well-being of society” (Government of Canada 2002). In the European Union multifunctionality is often 
mentioned in the context of agriculture, as agriculture is also credited with the following key roles: (1) 
protection of the environment and landscapes and (2) preservation of an active rural community. 
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Australia can largely be explained by mutually exclusive perspectives and positions on 
the framework of the Protocol. While Australia supported the inclusion of carbon sinks, 
the EU resisted precisely these efforts as well as the idea of establishing a global 
emissions trading system (ibid.). 
Apart from the conflicting perspectives on factual issues, the roles both 
interlocutors chose to play added to mutual incomprehension. As the United States was 
very critical of the Kyoto Protocol, the European Union chose to take up the leadership 
role in environmental issues because no other country was willing to take this stance 
(Murray 2005, 156). Therefore, Australia’s opinion on the Kyoto Protocol and the 
obvious similarities to the position of the US were indeed surprising to some EU 
officials, despite some understanding of Australia’s strategic and security dependence 
on the US (ibid.). Conversely, Australia regarded the EU’s leadership pretensions in 
environmental issues as a modern form of imperialism, while the European Commission 
was viewed as “being very political on Kyoto and having very clear personal and 
national agendas” (ibid.). 
It may therefore be argued that while the EU condemned Australia for not 
complying with “moral standards” (Murray 2005, 155) Australia perceived the EU’s 
perspective as merely reflecting “its political economy” (ibid.). Clearly this divergence 
could only be overcome if both interlocutors either drastically changed their opinions or 
if the political leaders (Prime Minister, Commission President, other important EU 
Heads of State) were replaced. This was the case in November 2007, when the 
Australian Labor Party won the elections and Kevin Rudd became the new Prime 
Minister of Australia. 
 
4.5. Developments under Prime Minister Kevin Rudd (since 2007) 
On 24 November 2007, a fresh breeze swept across Australia’s foreign policy and 
external relations (with the EU and other major partners) when Labor candidate Kevin 
Rudd was elected Prime Minister. As an Oxford Analytica Daily Brief (2008) noted 
“governments change, relations warm”. With regard to Australia’s relations with the 
European Union the political thaw may be explained by the following factors, which 
will be further explained below: (1) a shift in foreign policy efforts towards traditional 
middle power values, (2) the Prime Minister’s diplomatic background and expertise, 
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and (3) symbolic acts enforced by the Prime Minister which were in line with the EU’s 
core values. 
(1) As discussed in section 4.4.1. the Howard Coalition government interpreted 
Australia’s role in the world as a “pivotal” rather than a “middle power”, which was 
seen as selling Australia’s real potential short (Foreign Minister Downer cited in 
Ungerer 2007, 549). In his position as shadow Foreign Minister of the Labor Party, 
Kevin Rudd has formulated the “three pillars of foreign policy” (Sheridan 2006), which 
he later reaffirmed as Prime Minister (Franklin 2008): engagement with the UN, the US 
alliance and “comprehensive engagement with Asia” (ibid.). Kevin Rudd also refers to 
his foreign policy approach as “creative middle power diplomacy” (Tisdall 2008). Even 
though the European Union is not explicitly mentioned in these foreign policy priorities, 
the strong commitment to multilateralism via the UN and the EU (Tisdall 2008), which 
was also praised by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (Sheridan 2008), replaced the 
strong bilateral focus of the Howard government (ibid.) and provided fertile ground for 
a stronger relationship with the European Union. Moreover, Kevin Rudd’s early visit to 
Brussels as part of his first major overseas journey (only three months after being 
elected) was seen as a symbolic gesture for improving EU-Australian relations. 
(2) Even though Kevin Rudd is Labor Prime Minister, he is not the stereotypical 
ALP leader. Assuming office at the age of 50, Kevin Rudd is relatively young for the 
position of a Prime Minister and is moreover “unique as a leader in Australian political 
history in coming to the leadership entirely through foreign policy” (Sheridan 2006). 
Rudd joined the diplomatic service and served in Stockholm and Beijing after gaining a 
Bachelor degree in Asian studies with majors in Chinese language (PM 2009b). 
Therefore, he represents a “new Labor generation” (Deutsche Welle 2007) and feels 
more comfortable on the diplomatic world stage than with trade unionists (ibid.). 
Bearing in mind his professional career, Kevin Rudd is primarily a diplomat. 
Consequently, he places more emphasis on foreign policy, gets more involved in 
foreign summitry54 and is more comfortable in official international settings than his 
predecessor. This has also contributed to a political thaw in EU-Australian relations, as 
the Prime Minister chose not to follow the example of past governments to “travel to 
Brussels, bash up the commission, issue a press release, then go home“ (Rudd cited in 
                                                
54 The Economist (2008) even calls Kevin Rudd’s foreign involvement a “love of foreign summitry“, as 
he spent nearly two of his first twelve months in office abroad. 
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Coorey & Davies 2008). 
(3) Finally, certain actions taken by Kevin Rudd were of symbolic importance to 
the relationship between the European Union and Australia.  Prime Minister Rudd’s 
first major overseas working visit55 took him to the United States (six days in 
March/April 2008), to Europe (seven days in April 2008) and to China (four days in 
April 2008) (PM 2008b). The fact that Brussels was on the Prime Minister’s itinerary 
was definitely of significant symbolic value to EU-Australia relations, for three reasons: 
firstly, it underlined Kevin Rudd’s “international policy aspirations” (ABC 2008), 
secondly, it mirrored the Prime Minister’s commitment to multilateralism, and thirdly, it 
demonstrated that the EU was once again featured on Australia’s foreign policy radar 
screen. These emphases are undoubtedly in line with the EU’s core values, which is 
why the President of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, noted that the 
Commission has “certainly noticed with satisfaction the emphasis the Prime Minister is 
placing on effective multilateralims [sic!]“ (ABC 2008).  During the seven days in 
Europe, Kevin Rudd spent two days in Brussels and five days in the United Kingdom, 
indicating the importance Australia attaches to its relationship with the UK. 
Nevertheless, the inclusion of Brussels in his first overseas visit, along with traditional 
destinations like the US, the UK, and Asia, demonstrates Prime Minister Rudd’s 
willingness to overcome the former governments’ custom, which, at a political level, 
“concentrated on [the] divisions, not on the things [the EU and Australia] could do 
together“ (Rudd cited in ABC 2008). Similarly, the nationwide newspaper, “The 
Australian” argued that: 
 
„The China visit was obvious and self-explanatory, the Brussels trip was 
neither and not in the tradition of PMs' first visits. Negotiations for the trip 
ensured that Rudd would go to Belgium and meet the leadership of the EU 
in a calculated, deliberate shift in Australia's attitude and policy towards 
the EU. This was a clear diplomatic signal of the importance the Prime 
Minister attached to going to Brussels and EU headquarters.“ 
(Shanahan 2008) 
                                                
55 According to a media release, the purpose of this visit was “to advance Australia’s security, foreign 
policy and business interests, and to advance Australia’s contribution to the global response on climate 
change“ (PM 2008b). 
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Apart from this important visit to Brussels in April 2008, there are certain other 
actions taken by Prime Minister Rudd, which are in accordance with the European 
Union’s core values and its soft power status56. On 3 December 2007, the Government 
of Australia ratified the Kyoto Protocol in its first official act “demonstrating [the] 
Government’s commitment to tackling climate change” (PM 2007). Prime Minister 
Rudd presented the instrument for ratification of the Kyoto Protocol to UN Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon at the UN Conference on Climate Change in Bali on 14 
December 2007, earning the Prime Minister praise and many rounds of applause (AAP 
2007). The fast ratification of the Kyoto Protocol had a positive impact on EU-Australia 
relations for three reasons: Firstly, it demonstrated a clear paradigm shift in Australian 
foreign policy efforts away from John Howard’s “subservience to President Bush” (EIU 
2007). Secondly, it underlined the importance Prime Minister Rudd attaches to the issue 
of climate change. Finally, the ratification was in line with the European Union’s core 
values in the area of climate change and complied with the EU’s “moral standards” 
(Murray 2005, 155). Of course the ratification was largely a symbolic act, but “as 
symbolic gestures go, this was one of the big ones” (AAP 2007). Most importantly, it 
demonstrated a clear shift towards the moral standards and core values of the European 
Union, which was welcomed in Brussels and other European capitals: A German 
newspaper referred to Kevin Rudd and his Minister for the Environment as 
“Weltenretter” or “world saviours” (Stratmann 2007); Prime Minister Rudd was also 
awarded the EnBW (Energie Baden-Württemberg) Climate Prize for 2008 during the 
third German Climate Conference (Australian Embassy Germany 2008). It may, 
therefore, be argued that by ratifying the Kyoto Protocol “the Rudd Government has 
moved from the US camp in the global warming debate to join the European position” 
(ABC 2008). 
Of course there has been criticism with regard to Kevin Rudd’s major milestones. 
As the British newspaper “The Guardian” noted, the major political actions like the 
ratification of the Kyoto protocol “have been largely symbolic and reflect and absence 
of substantive policy achievements” (Soutphommasane 2008). Because analysis of the 
Rudd government’s overall performance is not part of the study at hand, the presence or 
absence of “substantive policy achievements” (ibid.) will not be assessed. However, it 
must be noted that symbolic gestures do matter when it comes to rebuilding relations 
                                                
56 According to Zielonka (2008, 475) the European Union applies soft power with regard to “shap[ing] 
institutions by setting agendas [and] rely[ing] on [its] normative power of attraction to spread values”. 
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with formerly neglected or misunderstood partners all over the world. Karns (2008, 3) 
addressed the challenges facing the new US president to “rebuild US credibility, 
goodwill and soft power lost during the Bush administration”. She furthermore outlined 
that “symbolic gestures, words, and actions early in the new administration will be 
essential” (ibid.). It may be argued that Australia lost some sympathy within the 
European Union during the Howard administration. But, Kevin Rudd’s early visit to 
Brussels and the fast ratification of the Kyoto Protocol demonstrate the new Prime 
Minister’s goodwill to “upgrade EU-Australia relations” (EC RELEX 2008).  However 
symbolic these gestures might have been, they are nonetheless of vital importance to 
enhancing EU-Australia relations, which is also supported by Karns’ (2008) line of 
reasoning. 
 
4.6. General Remarks on the relationship between the European Union 
and Australia 
In order to fully understand the origin, development, and future of the relationship 
between the European Union and Australia, it is indispensable to outline certain 
distinctive features with regard to Australia’s geography, history, and trade with the EU. 
 
4.6.1. Australia’s struggle between geography and history 
“The struggle between Australia’s history and geography – the 
history dominated by British influence, the geography by 
proximity to Asia – has been an enduring theme in the country’s 
contemplation of itself.” 
(Blainey 1995, 72) 
 
Australia can be regarded as a nation of predominantly European origin and 
culture living on a “misplaced continent” (Murray 2005, 35) in close proximity to 
southeast Asia. During his first visit to Brussels, Prime Minister Rudd outlined the 
connections between Europe and Australia in a European Policy Centre Briefing (PM 
2008c): 
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“The historical connections between Europe and Australia are profound. 
Europe has nurtured Western civilisation. Australia has inherited, 
embraced and adapted that great civilisational tradition. The modern state 
of Australia is heir to European philosophical and political thought.” 
 
An understanding of these historical and geographical circumstances is vital to the 
analysis of Australian foreign policy choices. Moreover, these circumstances have two 
implications for the relationship between the European Union and Australia.  Firstly, as 
discussed in previous sections, at different points in time Australian foreign policy 
priorities have been attached to the Asia-Pacific, the US alliance or Europe – depending 
on the incumbent government. These changing priorities clearly reflect the “struggle 
between history and geography” (Blainey 1995, 72). Secondly, Australia’s proximity to 
and expertise in Asia have implications for European companies, which often choose to 
establish regional headquarters in Australia in order to plan further expansions into the 
Asia-Pacific as a “Western” country in the region and in order to draw on local experts 
(Murray 2005, 257-258; Papadakis 2001, 138). 
With regard to geography, the factor of distance is worth mentioning, given Canberra is 
located approximately 17,000 km southeast of Brussels. However, in times of 
globalisation, modern telecommunication technology and countless flights connecting 
Australia with Europe make the matter of distance seem negligible: “[Australia] may 
well be regarded as a misplaced continent, but that is not tremendously useful in 
understanding EU-Australia relations once the role of distance has been understood” 
(Murray 2005, 35). 
 
4.6.2. Remarks on asymmetry 
Another aspect which is frequently mentioned by Australian commentators is the 
asymmetry in EU-Australian relations. In fact, this asymmetry refers to many factors, 
including population size, economy and trade balance. Table Table 3 on page 86 
compares geographical, demographical, and economical parameters of the EU and 
Australia. 
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Table 3: Comparison Australia - European Union (geography, population, economy) 
 Australia European Union 
GEOGRAPHY   
Total area 7,686,850 sq km 4,324,782 sq km 
Area in comparison to 
the world 
12 13 
Coastline 25,760 km 65,992.9 km 
POPULATION   
Total population 21,262,641 (July 2009 est.) 491,582,852 (July 2009 est.) 
Population in 
comparison to the world 
55 3 
Urban population 89% of total population 
(2008); population 
concentrated along the 
eastern and south-eastern 
coasts 
n/a 
ECONOMY   
GDP (purchasing power 
parity) 
800.5 billion USD (2008 est.) 
783.2 billion USD (2007) 
753.1 billion USD (2006) 
14.82 trillion USD (2008 est.) 
14.66 trillion USD (2007) 
14.34 trillion USD (2006) 
GDP in comparison to 
the world 
19 1 
GDP per capita (PPP) 38,100 USD (2008 est.) 
37,700 USD (2007 est.) 
36,800 USD (2006 est.) 
 
33,400 USD (2008 est.) 
33,400 USD (2007 est.) 
32,600 USD (2006 est.) 
GDP per capita (PPP) in 
comparison to the world 
26 37 
Source: Own illustration based on data provided by the CIA World Factbook (CIA 
2009a; CIA 2009b) 
 
This data clearly mirrors the EU’s dominant position with regard to population 
and economy size and explains why the relationship between the European Union and 
4. Development of EU-Australia relations 
87 
Australia is often regarded as asymmetrical to the disadvantage of Australia. Moreover, 
the disproportionateness with regard to population and economy also affects the 
economic relations between the EU and Australia. Therefore, an overview of EU-
Australian economic relations with regard to trade in goods, trade in services, and the 
level of foreign investment will be given in the following section. The data presented is 
only intended to summarise general trends in the economic relationship between the EU 
and Australia. Complete statistics can be found in Appendix 3. 
 
4.6.3. Economic relations 
The latest available data published by the Delegation of the European 
Commission to Australia (EC DEL 2008) and by the Directorate-General for External 
Trade of the European Commission (EC TRADE 2008) was used for the analysis of 
EU-Australian trade relations. Data was partly available in euro (EUR) and partly in 
Australian dollars (AUD), therefore annual euro exchange rates were calculated based 
on monthly exchange rates published by the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA 2009). In 
order to compare the statistics in one currency, all available data was converted into 
euro prior to analysis. In this context it is also important to mention, that with regard to 
trade in goods, “EU import figures are expected to be significantly higher than 
Australian export figures since the cost of overseas freight and insurance is included in 
EU import values but excluded from Australian export values” (ABS 1998). However, 
the purpose of the study at hand is not to go into unnecessary detail, but to highlight 
general trends, which are of vital importance in order to develop a deeper understanding 
of EU-Australian relations. Consequently, the possible discrepancies between 
Australian and EU data are negligible, as they are not significant enough to influence 
the general trends (see section 4.6.3.1). 
Nevertheless, general remarks on the balance of payments and on the 
diversification of trade have to be made prior to the discussion of the economic 
relationship between the European Union and Australia. The balance of payments can 
be regarded as the “most complete measure” (EC DEL 2008, 2) of an economic 
relationship between two countries or blocs, as it takes into account trade in goods and 
services, foreign investment income, as well as transfer payments. Consequently, the 
European Union has been Australia’s most significant economic partner in terms of the 
balance of payments since “at least 1980, when the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
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(ABS) first began keeping records of this” (ibid.). In 2007, the European Union 
accounted for approximately 68.5 billion Euros, the equivalent of 19 per cent of all 
Australian overseas transactions (ibid.). By comparison, the United States only 
accounted for 14 per cent of Australia’s overall two-way trade balance in 2007, 
followed by ASEAN (13 per cent), Japan (11 per cent) and China (10 per cent) (ibid.). 
It may therefore be argued that the European Union has been Australia’s “largest 
economic partner” (ibid.) for almost 30 years. 
Apart from mere volume, the diversification of trade is another distinctive feature 
of Australia’s economic relationship with the European Union (EC DEL 2008, 3). 
According to the Delegation of the European Commission in Canberra, “the diverse 
nature of Australia’s trade with the EU reflects the maturity of the economic 
relationship in comparison with most other major partners” (ibid.). Accordingly, 
merchandise trade amounted to 54 per cent of Australia’s economic relations with the 
EU, while trade in services represented 17 per cent and investment made up 27 per cent 
of total transactions in 2007 (ibid.). From all of Australia’s major economic partners 
only the United States’ economic relationship with Australia is similarly diversified. 
Bearing all these considerations in mind, the following analysis of EU-Australian 
trade relations will comprise three parts: (1) trade in goods (also referred to as 
merchandise trade), (2) trade in services, and (3) foreign investment. These three parts 
(sections 4.6.3.1. to 4.6.3.3.) will be based on an analysis of data provided by the 
European Commission’s Delegation to Australia (EC DEL 2008, 10 &13), which will 
not be additionally quoted hereinafter. Only quotations referring to sources other than to 
these stated above will be specified. 
 
4.6.3.1. Trade in goods 
“The EU has been Australia’s most important trade partner in terms of total 
merchandise trade since 1996” (EC DEL 2008, 3). This development is also illustrated 
by Figure 8 on page 89 and by Figure 19 on page 153 (in percentage points). In 2007, 
Australia exported goods worth 11.7 billion Euros (or 11.4 per cent of all exports) to the 
European Union, making the EU its third largest export market behind Japan (19.5 
billion Euros) and China (14.5 billion Euros), but well ahead of ASEAN (11.1 billion 
Euros) and the USA (6.1 billion Euros). Conversely, the EU had a much more dominant 
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position as Australia’s largest source of merchandise imports amounting to 25.2 billion 
Euros or 21.9 per cent of total imports in 2007 (see Figure 9). In 2007, the EU was the 
destination for only 11.4 per cent of all Australian merchandise exports.  Still its 
dominance of the Australian import market (21.9 percent) strengthened its position as 
Australia’s most significant two-way merchandise partner.  However, this discrepancy 
between exports to and imports from the EU resulted in Australia’s significant 
merchandise trade deficit of 13.4 billion Euros (see Figure 18 on page 153). 
 
Figure 8: Australia’s two-way merchandise trade with major partners (imports + 
exports) 
 
Source: Own illustration based on data provided by EC DEL 2008, 10 
Figure 9: Australia’s major merchandise import partners 2007 / major export partners 
2007 
 
Source: Own illustration based on data provided by EC DEL 2008, 10 
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This trade deficit of 13.4 billion Euros in 2007 can be regarded as evidence for a 
significant asymmetry in EU-Australian economic relations. The asymmetrical 
relationship also becomes evident in another aspect, while the EU is Australia’s most 
important partner in terms of both merchandise imports (share of 21.9 per cent) and 
total merchandise trade (share of 16.9 per cent), as well as Australia’s third largest 
export market (share of 11.4 per cent), Australia only ranks 17th on the list of the EU’s 
main trade partners, accounting for only 1.29 per cent of the EU’s total merchandise 
trade in 2007 (EC TRADE 2008, 1-3). Similarly, Australia was only the twelfth largest 
merchandise export market (1.8 per cent of all EU exports) and only the 27th largest 
source of imports at 0.8 percent of all imports to the EU (ibid.). Table 4 and Table 5 on 
page 90 and 91 summarise the main aspects of asymmetry in the EU-Australian 
economic relationship. 
 
Table 4: EU: Merchandise trade with Australia and the world 2007 
 EU: Merchandise trade with 
Australia and the world 2007; 
in million EUR 
Two-way trade with the world (imports + exports) 2,665,926 
Two-way trade with Australia (imports + exports) 34,478 
Australia’s share of total EU two-way trade 
(imports + exports) 
Rank 
1.29 % 
 
17th 
Imports from the world 1,426,008 
Imports from Australia 11,769 
Australia’s share of total EU imports 
Rank 
0.83 % 
27th 
Exports to the world 1,239,919 
Exports to Australia 22,709 
Australia’s share of total EU exports 
Rank 
1.83 % 
12th 
Source: Own illustration based on data provided by EC TRADE 2008, 1-3 
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Table 5: Australia: Merchandise trade with the EU and the world 2007 
 Australia: Merchandise trade 
with the EU and the world 2007; 
in million EUR 
Two-way trade with the world (imports + exports) 217,781 
Two-way trade with the EU (imports + exports) 36,878 
EU’s share of total Australian two-way trade 
(imports + exports) 
Rank 
16.93 % 
 
1st 
Imports from the world 114,847 
Imports from the EU 25,152 
EU share of total Australian imports 
Rank 
21.90 % 
1st 
Exports to the world 102,934 
Exports to the EU 11,726 
EU’s share of total Australian exports 
Rank 
11.40 % 
3rd 
Source: Own illustration based on data provided by EC DEL 2008, 10 
 
While the most significant features and general trends of merchandise trade 
relations between the European Union and Australia were outlined above, additional 
tables and figures can be found in Appendix 3. 
However, only concentrating on mere numbers would sell the diverse economic 
relations between the European Union and Australia short. It is noteworthy that primary 
products comprise a declining proportion, whereas higher growths could be observed in 
Elaborately Transformed Manufactures (ETM) (EC DEL 2008, 4).  This development 
also underlines the declining importance of the CAP to EU-Australian relations. 
Furthermore, “Germany has surpassed the UK as a source of merchandise imports, and 
has been the largest source of imports from the EU for the last six years” (EC DEL 
2008, 5), which also supports the hypothesis that there has been a shift in EU-Australian 
relations, as Australia liberated from a CAP-centered and anglo-centric focus. 
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4.6.3.1. Trade in services 
Australia’s two-way trade in services with the EU amounted to 11.5 billion Euros 
in 2007, a share of approximately 20 per cent of Australia’s total trade in services. 
Moreover, the European Union is Australia’s largest partner for two-way services trade, 
well ahead of ASEAN and the United States, Australia’s next largest partners after the 
EU. However, in 2007, there was a significant gap of almost two billion Euros between 
the first and the second largest Australian partner as Figure 10 illustrates. Nevertheless 
these figures seem considerably smaller compared to the 36.9 billion Euros of two-way 
merchandise trade with the EU. Yet the importance of the services sector should not be 
underestimated. According to recent estimates approximately 70 per cent of the GDP of 
the EU and Australia are made up of the services sector (EC DEL 2008, 8). It may 
therefore be argued that “[a]s global trade in this sector continues to expand, Australia 
and the EU will no doubt become even more important partners in two-way services 
trade” (ibid.).  
 
Figure 10: Australia’s two-way services trade with major partners (imports + exports) 
 
Source: Own illustration based on data provided by EC DEL 2008, 10 
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At this stage, the European Union is Australia’s most important partner in services 
trade, accounting for 21.9 per cent (6.1 billion Euros) of total services imports and 18.1 
per cent (5.3 billion Euros) of total services exports in 2007. Consequently, as Figure 11 
indicates, the EU is both the “largest market for Australia’s services exports […] and 
the largest source of services imports” (EC DEL 2008, 7). However, the asymmetry in 
the economic relationship can also be observed in terms of trade in services. From a 
European Union perspective, Australia is the EU’s 9th largest destination for services 
exports and its 11th largest source of services imports (EC DEL 2008, 7).  
 
Figure 11: Australia’s major services import partners 2007 / major export partners 2007 
 
Source: Own illustration based on data provided by EC DEL 2008, 10 
 
With regard to the composition of EU-Australian services trade, travel services 
dominate the relationship accounting for 52 per cent of Australia’s two-way trade in 
services in 2007 (EC DEL 2008, 8). In 2007, trade in transportation services represented 
24 per cent of Australia’s two-way trade with the European Union and is the second 
most important sector. 
While the most significant features and general trends of services trade relations 
between the European Union and Australia were outlined above, additional tables and 
figures can be found in Appendix 3. 
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4.6.3.3. Foreign direct investment 
In 2007, the European Union was Australia’s second most important two-way 
investment partner, accounting for 31.5 percent of Australia’s total two-way investment 
worth 509.8 billion Euros. Only the US surpassed the EU by 9.3 billion Euros as 
Australia’s most important two-way investment partner. Figure 12 illustrates the 
fluctuations in the development of the US and the EU as Australia’s most important 
two-way investment partners. This figure clearly demonstrates the strength and 
importance of the EU and the US to Australia’s stock of investment, while it highlights 
the lack of Asian presence. 
 
Figure 12: Australia’s two-way investment with major partners (inflows + outflows) 
 
Source: Own illustration based on data provided by EC DEL 2008, 13 
 
The United States’ role as Australia’s most important two-way investment partner 
stems from its dominant position with regard to being the most important destination for 
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Australian investment overseas. In 2007, Australian investment in the United States 
amounted to 246.6 billion Euros (or 40.9 per cent of total Australian overseas 
investment) compared to only 175.1 billion Euros invested by Australia in the EU (29 
per cent of total overseas investment). Conversely, the European Union is Australia’s 
largest source of investment comprising 33 per cent of total foreign investment in 
Australia (334.7 billion Euros) in 2007. By comparison, the United States only 
accounted for 26.9 per cent of foreign investment in Australia in 2007 (272.5 billion 
Euros). Figure 13 illustrates the stock of foreign investment in terms of inflows and 
outflows in 2007. Additionally, tables and figures in Appendix 3 outline and visualise 
complete investment statistics. 
 
Figure 13: Level of foreign investment in Australia by major partners 2007 (inflows) / 
Level of Australian overseas investment by major partners 2007 (outflows) 
 
Source: Own illustration based on data provided by EC DEL 2008, 13 
 
The importance of European Union investment in Australia also becomes evident 
in terms of foreign direct investment (FDI) and jobs created. In 2007, the EU remained 
Australia’s largest source of foreign direct investment valued at 83.1 billion Euros or 36 
per cent of total FDI stocks, in comparison to the US accounting for 25 per cent or 
Japan accounting for 7 per cent of total FDI stocks (EC DEL 2008, 8). Moreover, a 
2006 survey on EU investment in Australia (carried out by the Delegation of the 
European Commission and diplomatic missions of EU member states to Australia) 
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revealed that the approximately 2,300 EU companies in Australia57 generated a total 
estimated turnover of 110 billion Euros (or 12 per cent of total sales in Australia) and 
directly created an estimated 400,000 jobs in Australia (EC DEL 2008, 9). When taking 
into account flow-on (multiplier) effects, these 2,300 EU companies can possibly be 
credited with the creation of an additional 775,000 jobs (ibid.). “This makes total direct 
and indirect employment generated by EU investment more than 1.2 [sic!] million jobs, 
or around 12% of the Australian workforce” (ibid.). 
Once again asymmetrical tendencies can be observed with regard to investment 
flows. While the EU is Australia’s largest source of foreign direct investment (inflows 
of 83.1. billion Euros), Australia is the sixth largest “identified source of foreign direct 
investment in the EU, with stocks of FDI totalling 17.3 [billion Euros] in 2006” (ibid.). 
Consequently, these asymmetries are not as striking as in merchandise or services trade.  
 
4.6.4. Concluding remarks on asymmetry and economic relations 
Section 4.6.3. set out to outline and analyse EU-Australian economic relations in 
terms of merchandise trade, trade in services and foreign investment. The highlights of 
EU-Australian trade relations are summarised in Figure 14 on page 97. Drawing on this 
analysis, the following two conclusions can be drawn: 
Firstly, bearing in mind the development of political relations between the 
European Union and Australia, “[…] it can certainly be argued that the economic 
relationship has been undervalued by both the EU and Australia” (Brooking from a 
publication in 1996 cited in Murray et al. 2002, 405). From an Australian perspective, 
trade with Asia was promoted in the 1990s due to impressive economic growth in this 
region. At the same time, trade relations with the European Union received less media, 
public, and political attention. On the other hand the European Union did not seem to 
take much notice of its hegemonic status as Australia’s most important and most stable 
partner in terms of economic relations.  
Secondly, asymmetry is often mentioned in the context of EU-Australian 
economic relations – mostly by Australian commentators. Interestingly, this asymmetry 
                                                
57 According to this survey, 42 percent of the total turnover of EU companies is generated in 
manufacturing, while the finance and insurance sector accounts for another 17 per cent. Mining and 
wholesale trade account for just under 10 per cent each, while construction can be credited with another 9 
per cent (EC DEL 2008, 9). 
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often seems to have a negative connotation. Therefore two concluding remarks on 
asymmetry have to be made: (1) Asymmetry in the economic relationship between the 
European Union and Australia is a matter of fact. It should be commented on and 
analysed unemotionally. Asymmetry does not necessarily disadvantage the weaker 
partner, as can be observed in EU direct investment in Australia. (2) Once asymmetry 
has been accepted as the “natural environment” of EU-Australian relations (see Table 3 
on page 86 and trade statistics in Appendix 3), it is necessary to note that 
 
“Apart from the transatlantic relationship, the EU is always the senior 
partner in its dialogues and this asymmetry applies not just to Australia but 
to most countries. This is one reason why many states negotiate with the EU 
as a bloc, evening out asymmetry somewhat.” 
(Murray 2005, 173). 
 
Figure 14: Highlights of EU-Australian economic relations 
HIGHLIGHTS OF EU-AUSTRALIA ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
• The EU has been Australia’s largest economic partner for over 25 years; 
• The EU is Australia’s largest partner in terms of two-way trade in goods, being 
its largest source of imports and third largest market for exports; 
• The EU is the largest market for Australia’s services exports and largest source 
of its services imports; 
• The EU is the largest investor in Australia and the second-largest destination 
for Australian investment overseas; 
• The EU is the principal destination for Australian exports of alcoholic 
beverages (mainly wine), nickel ores and lead, and the principal source for 
Australian imports of medicaments and specialised machinery; 
• Australia is the EU’s seventeenth largest partner in terms of two-way trade in 
goods, being its twenty-seventh largest source of imports and twelfth largest 
export market; 
• EU companies operating in Australia generate an estimated 1.2 million jobs. 
Source: EC DEL 2008, 1 
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4.7. Current status of research with regard to EU-Australian relations 
Asymmetry and inequality can also be observed in terms of academic attention 
and research on EU-Australian relations. According to Elijah (et al. 2000, p. 1), “the 
relationship between Australia and the European Union has received little attention in 
academic literature,” which might stem from the fact that Australian foreign policy 
analysts and commentators have discovered the increasing importance of the European 
Union “only recently“ (Murray et al. 2002, 395). Moreover, literature research revealed 
that even though this topic might have “received little attention” (Elijah et al. 2000, p. 
1) in Australian academic literature, it has been virtually neglected by scholars in the 
European Union. According to Murray (2003, 104), “study from the EU side has been 
minimal”. Moreover, these analyses have usually concentrated on the relationship 
between Australia and the UK, clearly “for historical and Commonwealth reasons” 
(ibid.). Consequently, no considerable research on EU-Australian relations has been 
undertaken by scholars in the European Union. 
Despite the lacking academic discourse, Philomena Murray, Director of the 
Contemporary Europe Research Centre at the University of Melbourne, published some 
benchmark research on this topic, investigating the history and nature of EU-Australian 
relations (Murray 2000, 2002a, 2002b, 2003, 2005; Murray et al. 2002). Although it 
was undertaken from an Australian perspective, this research is undoubtedly highly 
valuable. Still, new research on this topic is necessary, as the most recent relevant 
academic publications date back as far as 2005 (Kenyon & Kunkel 2005; Murray 2005). 
Consequently, current developments like the change of government in Australia in 
November 2007 (which might lead to a new period of convergence between the EU and 
Australia as a consequence of Prime Minster Rudd’s foreign policy), the willingness of 
both interlocutors to “upgrade EU-Australia relations through a new Partnership 
Framework” (EC RELEX 2008), the promotion of a “new era of creative engagement 
between Australia and the EU” (ibid.), and planned cooperation in international trade, 
climate change, the Asia-Pacific, and the fight against international security threats 
(ibid.) all could not be analysed in past publications. Thus, the analysis of these current 
developments from a European Union perspective will constitute a crucial part of this 
thesis and shall be undertaken in the following chapters. 
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5. METHODOLOGY 
5.1. Research objectives and rationale 
The main objective of this study is to provide an analysis of EU-Australia 
relations from a European Union perspective with a particular emphasis on 
developments and potential changes after the election of Prime Minister Rudd on 24 
November 2007. 
As outlined in section 4.7., the relationship between the European Union and 
Australia has “received little attention” (Elijah et al. 2000, p. 1) in Australian academic 
literature apart from Philomena Murray’s studies (Murray 2000, 2002a, 2002b, 2003, 
2005; Murray et al. 2002). The lack of European scholarly publications on this topic and 
the fact that the last relevant Australian publications date back as far as 2005 (Kenyon 
& Kunkel 2005; Murray 2005) both provide the basis for the study at hand. 
Therefore, bearing in mind the nature of the relationship and the moderate levels 
of academic attention, this study aims at exploring the relationship between the EU and 
Australia from a European Union perspective. Consequently, the following current 
developments shall be taken into consideration: (1) the change of government in 
Australia in November 2007, which might lead to a new period of convergence between 
the EU and Australia as a consequence of Prime Minster Rudd’s foreign policy, (2) the 
willingness of both interlocutors to “upgrade EU-Australia relations through a new 
Partnership Framework” (EC RELEX 2008), (3) the promotion of a “new era of 
creative engagement between Australia and the EU” (ibid.), and (4) planned 
cooperation in international trade, climate change, the Asia-Pacific and the fight against 
international security threats (ibid.). 
 
Thus, taking into account the change of government in Australia in November 
2007, the main research objectives are 
(1) to analyse the past, current, and potential future nature and state of EU-
Australia relations from a European Union perspective with particular focus 
on changes introduced by the incumbent Rudd administration, 
(2) to identify points of interest with regard to cooperation and conflict in the 
relationship between the European Union and Australia, 
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(3) to assess the probability of a future convergence between the European Union 
and Australia with particular emphasis placed on areas of future importance, 
areas of future cooperation and potential synergies in spite of the 
asymmetrical nature of the relationship. 
 
5.2. Research instrument 
Bearing in mind the research questions to be answered in the present study, semi-
structured interviews (Mason 2004) with predominantly European experts on EU-
Australia relations were found to be the most suitable research instrument. The choice 
of this particular qualitative approach was influenced by two factors: (1) the limited 
amount of available information due to the small number of relevant publications and 
(2) the idea of a new EU-Australia Partnership Framework, which in the preparatory 
phase of the study at hand (May - July 2008) only existed as a plan and was in the 
process of being developed “by bureaucrats from both sides” (O’Malley 2008). 
Consequently, obtaining first-hand information from experts directly involved in this 
process was inestimably valuable. 
Semi-structured interviews are based on an interview guide, which comprises 
themes, topics or questions to be covered during an interview, rather than “a sequenced 
script of standardized questions” (Mason 2004, 1020). This “relatively open, flexible, 
and interactive approach” (ibid.) also enables respondents to talk about “events and 
experiences that are important from [their] point of view, that are relevant to the 
research but have not been anticipated” (ibid.) by the interviewer. Therefore, this 
specific approach seems particularly suitable for the present study, given the interviews 
are intended to constitute the source of previously unavailable information. Therefore, 
qualitative interviews in general and semi-structured interviews in this context can be 
referred to as “a construction site of knowledge” (Kvale 1996, 2). 
 
5.3. Sample size and sample characteristics 
As for the sample size, six interviews with experts on EU-Australia relations were 
conducted in the course of this study. Initially, a total of six interviews was planned, 
five interviews with European experts working for European Union institutions and one 
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interview with an Australian expert based at the Australian Mission to the European 
Communities in Brussels. This initial choice of interviewees corresponds with Gläser & 
Laudel’s (2004, 9) definition of the term “expert”: 
 
“Experts belong to a functional elite with specific, well-grounded expertise. 
The obvious interpretation of the term ‘expert interview’ is therefore an 
interview with members of these elites, who have access to special 
information due to their position.” 
(Gläser & Laudel 2004, 9; translated from German by the author58) 
 
Moreover, the need to maximise previously unavailable information is mirrored 
by the choice of semi-structured interviews with experts and is in line with Behnke’s (et 
al. 2006, 238) line of reasoning: 
 
 “Expert interviews shall be regarded as a source of information; not the 
experts’ general knowledge per se is tested, rather their expertise on 
specific issues is drawn on.” 
(Behnke et al. 2006, 238; translated from German by the author59) 
 
At the outset, an extensive search for experts who could possibly be contacted for 
interviews was carried out beginning in June 2008, prior to the summer break in EU 
institutions in July and August. From the very beginning it was known that most of 
these experts were located in Brussels. EU institutions are comparatively transparent in 
terms of the amount of information published online, therefore, the search for experts 
was carried out on the Internet. While organisational charts and full staff directories are 
available for most EU institutions, it is difficult to locate the proper individuals, because 
the European Union’s web appearance is not particularly user-friendly due to its 
                                                
58 Original German quotation: „Experten [...] sind Angehörige einer Funktionselite, die über besonderes 
Wissen verfügen. Die nahe liegende Interpretations des Begriffs ‚Experteninterview’ wäre deshalb die 
des Interviews mit Angehörigen solcher Eliten, die aufgrund ihrer Position über besondere Informationen 
verfügen“ (Gläser & Laudel 2004, 9). 
59 Original German quotation: „Experteninterviews sind als Informationsquellen zu betrachten, nicht das 
Wissen der Experten an sich wird erhoben, sondern das Wissen der Experten über einen bestimmten 
Sachverhalt“ (Behnke et al. 2006, 238). 
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complexity. As it takes some time to become acquainted with the Internet portal of the 
European Union60, the Representation of the European Commission in Vienna was 
contacted with the request for assistance with regard to finding experts on the European 
Union’s external relations with Australia. The Representation immediately provided 
potential contacts in the European Parliament and the European Commission. This 
prompt support definitely stems from the fact that liaising with and providing support 
and information for the general public is one of the main tasks of the respective 
European Commission Representations in the member states. 
The next step was to contact the Australian Mission to the European Communities 
in Brussels. As the embassy’s website does not comprise a detailed staff directory, it 
took a while to identify the adequate expert for the purpose of the study at hand. 
However, the embassy’s willingness to help should find special mention here: Not only 
did a staff member agree to an interview, also an extensive contact list with potential 
experts outside the embassy (including European Union staff as well as former 
Australian officials currently working for other institutions in Brussels) was provided. 
Subsequently, the potential respondents (found in the online staff directory of the 
European Commission and the European Parliament, as well as those recommended by 
the Representation of the European Commission in Vienna and the Australian Mission 
to the European Communities in Brussels) were contacted by telephone. This said, it 
should be noted that the Australian Embassy in Brussels and the Representation of the 
European Commission in Austria were also contacted by telephone, as experiences 
gained in past research projects have shown that this is the most effective method of 
contacting experts and senior officials. 
Finally, six appointments for interviews with experts could be made, two with 
European Commission staff, two with Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), 
and two with Australian experts, one former and one present official currently working 
in Brussels. As absolute privacy was guaranteed to all respondents, the interviewees and 
interviews will remain anonymous. Hereinafter, respondents working for the European 
Commission will be referred to as European Commission experts or European 
Commission officials, Members of the European Parliament will be referred to as MEPs 
and the former and present Australian officials will be referred to as Australian experts 
or Australian officials. Moreover, a code was assigned to each group of respondents. 
                                                
60 Europa Internet portal, <http://europa.eu>. 
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European Commission experts were coded EC1 and EC2, Members of the European 
Parliament MEP1 and MEP2, and Australian experts AUS1 and AUS2. Table 6 
summarises the codes assigned to each expert and outlines the location, where the 
interview was conducted. 
 
Table 6: Codification of respondents 
Code Position Location for conduction 
of interview 
EC1 European Commission official Brussels (BE) 
EC2 European Commission official Telephone 
MEP1 Member of the European Parliament Brussels (BE) 
MEP2 Member of the European Parliament Graz (AT) 
AUS1 Australian official Brussels (BE) 
AUS2 Australian official (formerly) Brussels (BE) 
Source: Own illustration 
 
Surprisingly, the response rate was high (75%), given the sample consisted of 
high officials. Therefore, possible reasons for this outcome shall be addressed. Firstly, 
careful research was undertaken with regard to the selection of adequate experts (with 
the help of the Internet, the Representation of the European Commission in Austria and 
the Australian embassy in Brussels). Secondly, all respondents and officials were 
contacted by telephone and often multiple times. In some cases it was possible to dispel 
initial concerns after the purpose and scope of the research project was explained in 
detail. Thirdly, Brussels’ businesses resume their normal pace in September.  Therefore, 
all potential respondents were contacted approximately two months in advance in order 
to schedule appointments for the last week of August and not conflict with normal 
business. Fourthly and most importantly, most respondents were happy to cooperate, 
resulting in a favourable atmosphere during most interviews. 
 
5.4. Method of data collection 
After the appointments with experts were arranged, an interview guide was 
developed based on the topics covered in the previous chapters. In order to address all 
research questions outlined in section 5.1., the interview guide was tailored to the 
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respondent’s area of expertise. Consequently, a set of general questions (e.g. on the 
nature, state and future of EU-Australia relations) was included in every interview 
guide. Additionally, every interview guide comprised specific questions covering the 
respondent’s area of expertise (e.g. trade, security issues). All interview guides can be 
found in Appendix 4.  
Eventually, six personal interviews were conducted.  Five were conducted in 
person and one via telephone. Four out of the five in-person interviews were carried out 
in Brussels during the last week of August 2008 and one in Graz in September 2008. 
Four interviews were conducted in English, as it is the official working language in EU 
institutions and because two of the respondents were native speakers. Two interviews 
were conducted in German, as this created a more “natural” conversation, given the 
interviewer and the two respondents are German native speakers. Moreover, conducting 
the interviews in the respective native or working language was intended to enable the 
respondents to be more precise in their responses and formulations. The interviews 
lasted between 35 and 75 minutes, however the average length was approximately 55 
minutes. All interviews were recorded upon approval by the interviewees and absolute 
privacy was guaranteed. 
 
5.5. Method of data analysis 
With regard to data analysis, a strategy described by Miles & Huberman (1994, 
10) was followed. According to Miles & Huberman (ibid.) data analysis consists of 
three steps: data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing. 
In the first step of data analysis, all recorded interviews were transcribed. As King 
(from a pubclication in 1994 cited in Gläser & Laudel 2004, 188) noted, “difficult and 
timeconsuming though transcription is, there really is no satisfactory alternative to 
recording and fully transcribing qualitative research interviews”. In line with Gläser & 
Laudel’s (2004, 188) suggestions, interviews were transcribed in standard orthography 
excluding non-verbal expressions, apart from the rare cases where these expressions 
influenced the meaning of the statement. 
Next, a qualitative content analysis suggested by Gläser & Laudel (2004, 191-
196) was performed. This is also in line with Miles & Huberman’s (1994) step of data 
reduction, which refers to “the process of selecting, focussing, simplifying, abstracting, 
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and transforming the data that appear in written-up field notes or transcriptions” 
(Miles & Huberman 1994, 10). Gläser & Laudel (2004) modified a method developed 
by Mayring (2000, 1), “an approach of systematic, rule guided qualitative text analysis, 
which tries to preserve some methodological strengths of quantitative content analysis 
and widen them to a concept of qualitative procedure”. Accordingly, the texts 
(transcripts) are regarded as “material containing data” (Gläser & Laudel 2004, 193; 
translated from German by the author61). The core of qualitative content analysis is the 
extraction of data found in the texts, i.e. “reading the text and deciding, which 
information is relevant for the study” (Gläser & Laudel 2004, 194; translated from 
German by the author62). Previously defined categories (based on theoretical 
considerations and the research question to be answered) are used as a “search grid” 
during this extraction process (ibid.). However, in contrast to Mayring’s method, these 
categories can be adapted during extraction and new categories can emerge “if relevant 
information, which does not fit into the system of categories, is found in the text” 
(Gläser & Laudel 2004, 195; translated from German by the author63). Consequently, 
this approach takes into consideration both ex-ante defined categories, as well as ex-
post developed categories, which are tailored to the actual information provided in the 
interviews. 
Consistent with Miles & Huberman’s (1994, 10) sequence of steps, displays were 
produced. After the extracted data has been assigned to the respective categories, it was 
checked for redundancies and contradictions. In order to summarise the extracted data 
and make the analysis easier, within-case displays as suggested by Miles & Huberman 
(1994, 128) were produced, specifically because this format “includes all respondents 
and all responses to the […] research questions”. Finally, following within-case 
analysis, cross-case displays (Appendix 5, Appendix 6, Appendix 7) were created out in 
order to “be more conceptual, seeing main trends” (Miles & Huberman 1994, 184), i.e. 
differences and similarities across the cases. 
The last step of data analysis in Miles & Huberman’s (1994) model is conclusion 
drawing. After the presentation and discussion of the main findings in chapters 6 and 7, 
                                                
61 Original German quotation: “[…] Material, in dem die Daten enthalten sind” (Gläser & Laudel 2004, 
193). 
62 Original German quotation: “Extraktion heißt den Text zu lesen und zu entscheiden, welche der in ihm 
enthaltenen Informationen für die Untersuchung relevant sind” (Gläser & Laudel 2004, 194). 
63 Original German quotation: “[…], wenn im Text Informationen auftauchen, die relevant sind, aber 
nicht in das Kategoriensystem passen” (ibid.). 
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the conclusions drawn will be presented in chapter 8. Moreover, a summary of the 
analytical procedure applied to this study is displayed in Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15: Analytical procedure 
 
Source: Own illustration 
6. Findings 
107 
6. FINDINGS 
This chapter provides a comprehensive summary of the conducted qualitative 
interviews with experts on EU-Australia relations, thereby paving the way for the 
interpretation of these results in chapter 7. The following presentation of findings is 
based on cross-case displays as proposed by Miles & Huberman (1994, 184). These 
tables can be found in Appendix 5, Appendix 6 and Appendix 7. 
Firstly, the nature and state of EU-Australia relations will be characterised. 
Secondly, points of interests, i.e. areas of cooperation as well as conflict will be 
outlined. Thirdly, the future of EU-Australia relations will be anticipated. Finally, other 
issues of importance brought up by the respondents will be discussed. 
 
6.1. Nature and state of EU-Australia relations 
6.1.1. Present nature and state of EU-Australia relations 
In general, the current relationship between the European Union and Australia 
was described as good or very good. Five out of six respondents (AUS1, EC1, EC2, 
MEP1, MEP2) highlighted the relationship in a particularly positive way. While 
interviewee EC1 labelled EU-Australia relations as “fantastic, very good, very 
promising” in the light of the “landmark change after the elections in November 
[2007]“, respondent MEP2 emphasised the “relatively close relations”. Similarly, 
interviewee AUS1 mentioned “a major upgrade in relations” after the meeting of 
European Commission President Barroso and Australian Prime Minister Rudd. 
Only one interviewee (AUS2) stressed that at the time he was an Australian senior 
official (1998-2001), the EU was not high on the agenda, as there were more immediate 
security concerns in the wider region after 9/11, e.g. in Indonesia. Moreover, both 
respondent EC1 and AUS1 declared the finalisation of the Partnership Framework 
agreement as both an overarching priority and a major upgrade of EU-Australia 
relations. 
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6.1.2. Partnership Framework64 
In the opinion of interviewee AUS1, the Joint Statement by European 
Commission President Jose Barroso and Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd (EC 
RELEX 2008), in which the Partnership Framework was introduced, “is the new 
diplomatic script”. According to respondent EC1, the motivation for the adoption of a 
new Partnership Framework covering “the entire scope of relations” (EC1) was to 
provide a backbone for EU-Australia relations and to create a new, more modern, more 
flexible, more up-to-date, more practical and more result-oriented document, which 
would allow the taking of the stock of relations at any time. Therefore, due to the result-
oriented nature of the document and the inclusion of “action plans”, Australian officials 
hope this document “will add momentum towards things actually being done” (AUS1). 
As the Partnership Framework is only “a political declaration” (EC1) (which is not 
legally binding) the adoption process is much faster than for other official agreements, 
therefore allowing for the official adoption at the EU-Australia Ministerial Troika 
Consultations in Paris, 29 October 2008 (EC1). 
With regard to the effects of the Partnership Framework on the general 
relationship between the European Union and Australia, the positive outcomes are 
twofold. Firstly, close cooperation and frequent working meetings and 
videoconferences of European Commission and Australian officials in the preparatory 
phase led to a reinforcement of EU-Australia relations (EC1). Secondly, the EU-
Australian Partnership Framework is important in a global context, as these Partnership 
Frameworks are intended to set an example to other countries (MEP2). 
 
6.1.3. Changes after Prime Minister Rudd came to power 
All respondents mentioned changes in the relationship between the European 
Union and Australia after Prime Minister Rudd’s inauguration.  Interviewee EC1 even 
referred to the recent developments as “landmark change”. The importance Prime 
Minster Rudd attaches to climate change, environmental issues, and the ratification of 
the Kyoto protocol were given credit for a major diplomatic thaw (AUS1, EC1, EC2, 
                                                
64 At the time the interviews were conducted (August and September 2008), the Partnership Framework, a 
new political declaration on EU-Australia relations to supersede the 2003 Agenda for Cooperation, was 
being negotiated. Therefore, gaining information at first hand was one of the main objectives of the 
interviews. 
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MEP1, MEP2). In this context both interviewee EC2 and MEP1 stressed that 
Australia’s new stance on climate change and the Kyoto protocol positively changed the 
way Australia was perceived in the European Union. With regard to the public 
perception of Australia in the EU, respondent AUS1 explained that Prime Minister 
Rudd’s national apology to the Aboriginal community quite unexpectedly generated a 
positive response in the EU. 
Secondly, the importance Prime Minister Rudd attaches to multilateralism in 
general and EU-Australia relations in particular as well as the significant increase of 
Australian high-level visits to Brussels undoubtedly improved the relationship (AUS1, 
AUS2, EC1, EC2). Conversely, respondent AUS2 remarked that the increase of high-
level visits to Brussels might just be “the initial flurry of visits after a change of 
government“ and it was too early to judge the importance of these visits to the overall 
relationship, as in terms of Australian priorities the EU would always rank behind the 
United States and Asia. 
Thirdly and more interestingly, EU-Australia relations under former Prime 
Minister Howard were also described as good, however, there used to be “bad 
chemistry between individuals” (EC1), i.e. between Prime Minister Howard and the 
European Commission (AUS1). Interviewee MEP2 also mentioned these personal 
relations in the context of centre-right developments in the European Union. 
Fourthly, EU-Australia relations have improved due to the European Union’s 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) losing some of its conflict potential (EC1, EC2, 
MEP2). This might stem from more mutual respect for respective positions (EC2) and 
less agricultural overproduction on world markets (MEP2). Consequently, the EU lost 
its scapegoat status in the WTO.  According to respondents EC1 and EC2, the EU and 
its CAP were not blamed for the failure of WTO talks for the first time: 
 
“Four, five years ago, whenever there was an APEC summit, headlines in 
the newspapers would be EU-bashing. Everything that went wrong in the 
world was because of the Common Agricultural Policy. […] More recently, 
Australia does not blame the failure of the Doha Round to the EU. Australia 
kind of sides with the EU blaming the US, which is very novel.” (EC1) 
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Finally, Prime Minister Rudd is closer to the EU stance with regard to climate 
change (MEP1, MEP2) and Australia’s involvement in Iraq (AUS1, AUS2, MEP2) than 
his predecessor Howard, who tended to be much closer to the US in regards to the 
occasional dissatisfaction of the EU. 
 
6.1.4. Trade 
Not surprisingly, the trade relationship between the European Union and Australia 
is of an asymmetrical nature, as outlined in section 6.1.5., implying that in terms of 
trade the EU is more important to Australia than vice versa (EC1). The overall trade 
relationship between the European Union and Australia can be divided into four sub-
groups.  There is a particularly good relationship in terms of business, a good 
relationship in multilateral fora, a bit more complicated relations with regard to trade 
negotiations (even though they have become easier recently) and some frictions in 
bilateral policy (EC2). Furthermore, the EU and Australia are “grown-up, developed 
countries” (EC2), adding value to the relationship in terms of trade in goods and trade 
in services, which experienced strong average growth of approximately ten per cent a 
year over the last decade (EC2). 
Interestingly, the “excellent relationship” (AUS1), between European Trade 
Commissioner Peter Mandelson65 and Australian Trade Minister Simon Crean was 
particularly highlighted by three respondents (AUS1, EC1, EC2). Informal talks 
between these two players take place approximately once a week, resulting in a “very 
good and trustful relationship” (EC2). 
 
6.1.5. Asymmetry 
With regard to the asymmetry of the relationship between the European Union 
and Australia, all respondents acknowledged significant differences with regard to size 
(MEP1, MEP2, AUS1), trade and trade balance (AUS1, AUS2, EC1, EC2), reciprocal 
untying of aid (EC1), accessibility (AUS1) and distance (MEP2). Consequently, the EU 
is a key market and economic partner for Australia, while Australia is not the main trade 
                                                
65 In his capacity as Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson was superseded by Catherine Ashton in 
October 2008, as he assumed office as Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 
in the UK on 3 October 2008. 
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partner for the EU (AUS1, AUS2, EC1, EC2). Moreover, reciprocal untying of aid 
(EC1) would give Australian firms and individuals’ access to the EU aid procurement 
market, which is substantially larger than Australia’s aid procurement market, given the 
EU is the world’s largest single donor of development aid. Finally, there is a 
discrepancy with regard to the accessibility of senior officials (AUS1). It is reportedly 
easier for the EU to approach Australian Ministers and senior officials than it is for 
Australians to approach EU Commissioners. 
In general, however, Australia is not as important to the EU as the EU is to 
Australia (EC1). According to respondent AUS1, “Australia is not close to the top of 
the most important countries the EU deals with”, as Australia has a similar position and 
“does not cause trouble” (AUS1). Consequently, as Australia is not an unstable area, 
and “sees eye to eye” (AUS1) on most issues of importance, “there’s not so much that’s 
required” (AUS1), which the Australian side “understands” (AUS1). Moreover, 
Australia is aware of the EU’s priorities with regard to external relations (AUS1): 
neighbouring states are the highest priority, followed by the main powers (US, China, 
Japan, Russia) and former colonial (ACP) countries. Consequently, given the stable 
nature of the relationship between “friendly partners” (EC1), the asymmetry of 
importance is not surprising. 
Despite the asymmetrical nature of EU-Australia relations, Australia tries to make 
its voice heard in Brussels by engaging in policy areas of common interest, showing 
high levels of expertise in areas the EU is not as well versed in (e.g. Asia, China, the 
Pacific) and by trying to have “as much high-level contacts as possible” (AUS1). 
Notwithstanding the undeniable inequality in size, trade and accessibility, 
respondent MEP1 strongly stressed that asymmetry does not imply one partner is 
necessarily disadvantaged at the expense of the second partner.  Rather both partners 
can benefit. 
 
6.2. Issues of mutual importance in EU-Australia relations 
6.2.1. Areas of cooperation 
With regard to cooperation climate change was frequently mentioned in the 
interviews. According to respondent EC1, “this used to be an area of confrontation, 
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now this is an area of great promise”, which is a stance also supported by interviewee 
AUS1. Moreover, the role of Australia in the context of energy security was brought up 
by respondent EC1: the EU currently relies on energy resources (mainly oil) imported 
from instable countries or through instable regions. Australia is the world’s third largest 
uranium producer accounting for 19.2 per cent of global uranium production in 2007 
(WNA 2009), which is of vital importance to nuclear power plants.  Furthermore, 
Australia has the largest known recoverable resources of uranium, amounting to 23 per 
cent of the world total (ibid.) Apart from the unresolved problem of nuclear waste, 
nuclear power is a comparatively clean type of energy. Consequently Australia’s role as 
a major uranium supplier should not be underestimated in the context of energy 
security. While respondent EC1 mentioned Australia’s role as major uranium supplier 
in the context of cooperation, interviewee MEP1 assigned this issue to the areas of 
conflict. However, respondent MEP1 noted that Australia could draw on European 
expertise with regard to solar power if it was willing to do so. 
Secondly, cooperation in multilateral fora, in general and the WTO, in particular 
was highlighted by two respondents (AUS1, EC2). With regard to cooperation in the 
UN, interviewee AUS1 pointed out that Australia’s stronger commitment to 
multilateralism and the United Nations under incumbent Prime Minister Rudd is 
perceived very favourably in the European Union, as this is in line with its core values. 
According to respondent EC2 the EU and Australia have the same priorities in the WTO 
with regard to rules, services and open markets of emerging countries. 
Thirdly, development aid and security in the Asia-Pacific were included in the list 
of areas of cooperation (AUS2, EC1). However, interviewee AUS2 differentiated that 
point stressing that Africa is the EU’s main development priority, while Australia has 
no particular interests in Africa beyond Zimbabwe.  Uniting forces with regard to the 
promotion of human rights and democracy was mentioned (AUS1, MEP2). 
Fourthly, respondents AUS1 and AUS2 highlighted cooperation in counter-
terrorism activities.  Interviewee AUS2 stressed that cooperation on security issues 
takes place with member states, rather than the EU as a whole, because the EU clearly 
does not have sufficient security or intelligence capacities. 
Finally, Prime Minster Rudd’s expertise on China (EC1) and cooperation with 
regard to international criminal law (MEP2) were also mentioned during the interviews. 
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6.2.2. Areas of conflict 
Generally speaking there are no major differences, only frictions or tensions, as 
noted by the four respondents (AUS1, EC1, EC2, MEP2). However, the scope of these 
frictions is not comparable to the former conflict over the EU’s Common Agricultural 
Policy (EC1, EC2, MEP2), as there is more mutual understanding and 
acknowledgement of CAP reforms in Australia (AUS1) and the “very hard and harsh 
opinions about [the EU’s] Common Agricultural Policy” (EC1) have mellowed over the 
years. As respondent EC1 explained, 
 
“You can’t compare it, because agriculture was something much more 
blatant, you always dragged it with you. Now you have things that pop up 
[…]. But I’m sure we’ll straighten it out. It’s an irritant, not a friction.” 
 
Both European Union and Australian officials (AUS1, EC1, EC2) mentioned 
geographical indications (GIs) as a source of friction. While the European Union urges 
the establishment of a worldwide register for geographical indications (EC1), Australia 
is opposed to extending geographical indications to recipes, e.g. Parma ham (AUS1), 
even though Australia “has given up on wines” (AUS1). 
Moreover, the European Union is not satisfied with Australian bio-security and 
quarantine measures, including sanitary and phytosanitary rules (EC1, EC2).  Consumer 
security and material recognition for goods was named as an area causing tension 
(EC2). 
Conversely, Australian experts mentioned not knowing early enough about EU 
regulation attempts as a source of frictions (AUS1). Accordingly, the plans of the 
European Commission to regulate the level (ppm) of nickel in products caused tensions 
with Canberra, as six billion Australian dollars are at stake for Australian businesses 
(EC1). According to respondent AUS1 “we are not concerned as much about EU 
protectionism, but about EU projectionism” with regard to the EU projecting and 
imposing its standards on “everybody” (AUS1).  
Respondent AUS1 and MEP2 also noted, that Australia’s commitment to the US 
used to be a source of tension, especially with regard to the question concerning who 
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should play the role of a “global policeman” (MEP2). 
In general, however, both sides seem optimistic about resolving whatever 
“irritants” (EC1) may occur, despite the frictions mentioned above. As interviewee EC1 
noted, “We are friendly partners. We talk.” 
 
6.3. Future of EU-Australia relations 
6.3.1. General remarks 
Overall, the future of the relationship between the European Union and Australia 
was described in a very positive way. According to respondent EC1 the future of EU-
Australia relations is “very rosy, very positive”, which corresponds with interviewee 
AUS1’s line of reasoning, who anticipates a “bright future”. 
Moreover, there are no foreseeable dramatic changes in the relationship (EC1).  
Rather, “more of the same” (AUS1) can be expected (MEP2). The reasons for this are 
twofold: On one hand, the EU and Australia are confronted by the same challenges like 
climate change, terrorism (EC1) or globalisation (MEP2). On the other hand, relations 
are already at the “optimal level” (AUS1). Consequently, the EU will probably remain 
Australia’s key market, key partner, and key global player (AUS1). This is also in line 
with respondent AUS2’s statement, who expects EU-Australia relations to “continue on 
a very stable path”, as there is no particular drive that would change the nature of the 
relationship. 
Even though relations have always been quite good, the EU is “very happy” 
(EC1) with the current nature of the relationship. However, the relationship between the 
European Union and Australia will probably be less dynamic than with other regions 
like China or Indonesia (AUS2), as other partners might be less stable or require more 
attention (AUS2). 
 
6.3.2. Areas of future importance and cooperation 
Three out of the six respondents (EC1, MEP1, MEP2) mentioned the importance 
of environmental and climate change related issues for the future cooperation between 
the European Union and Australia. Moreover, renewable energy (EC1, MEP2), trade 
(AUS2, MEP2), cooperation in multilateral fora, and the UN (AUS2) and development 
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aid (MEP2) are believed to be important areas for cooperation and for the future 
relationship between the EU and Australia. Finally, respondent EC2 argued that the EU 
and Australia should work together on new trade initiatives, like investment, raw 
material, or a new WTO round. 
 
6.4. Other issues of importance 
Another interesting issue raised by the Australian experts (AUS1, AUS2) was the 
balance between the European Union and its member states with regard to Australian 
foreign policy priorities.  Australian foreign policy makers always have to decide 
whether the European Union or its member states are the adequate contact in Europe for 
a particular policy issue. Moreover, many strategies require a Europe-wide approach, as 
Brussels has “a monopoly on coordination” (AUS1). 
In contrast to all other respondents’ statements, interviewee AUS2 stressed that 
“Australia’s engagement with Europe is primarily with member states […] and much 
more focused on NATO than on the EU”, given Australia’s biggest appointment 
overseas is in Afghanistan. Moreover, respondent AUS2 also argued that the EU as a 
whole is addressed with regard to trade, while security issues are primarily discussed 
with member states. 
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7. DISCUSSION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
This chapter provides a discussion of the results presented above, whereby each of 
the research objectives is addressed. Firstly, the nature and state of the relationship 
between the European Union and Australia will be discussed from both a European 
Union and an Australian perspective. Secondly, issues of mutual importance with 
regard to cooperation and conflict will be addressed. Finally, the probability of a future 
convergence between the European Union and Australia will be analysed in the light of 
future areas of cooperation and potential synergies. 
 
7.1. Nature and state of EU-Australia relations 
7.1.1. Present nature and state of EU-Australia relations 
In general, the current relationship between the European Union and Australia 
was described in a remarkably positive way both by European Union and Australian 
experts. While the favourable opinion was not surprising, the strength of words 
describing the relationship, e.g. “fantastic” (EC1), “very promising” (EC1) or 
“relatively close” (MEP2), was quite unexpected in this context. 
Only one respondent (AUS2) explained that at the time he was a senior Australian 
official (1998-2001) the EU was not high on the agenda due to more immediate security 
risks in the region and in light of the 2000 Sydney Olympics. This opinion clearly 
contradicts with the stance taken up by the other interviewees. Possible reasons thereof 
shall be addressed. 
Firstly, respondent AUS2 left the Australian public sector in 2001. Therefore, 
interviewee AUS2 is neither particularly acquainted with the developments of EU-
Australia relations in the past seven to eight years nor with the most recent changes 
following Prime Minister Rudd’s inauguration, as he repeatedly stated. Secondly, 
security was respondent AUS2’s area of expertise, which explains his tendency to 
analyse problems and answer questions through a “security lens”. Consequently, he 
sometimes denied the importance of the EU, as it clearly has limited security or 
counter-terrorism responsibilities, while placing emphasis on the member states and 
NATO. Therefore, respondent AUS2’s statements make a differentiated view necessary, 
always bearing in mind the time he has been out of office and his clear security-focus. 
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This shall however not imply that interviewee AUS2’s views were not highly valuable 
for the study at hand; it shall only underline the necessity to put some of his statements 
in perspective. 
 
7.1.2. Changes after Prime Minister Rudd came to power 
The interviews provided strong evidence for an improvement of EU-Australia 
relations after Prime Minister Rudd’s inauguration in 2007. Continuing convergence 
with regard to agricultural trade issues, the adoption of Australian positions closer to the 
EU stance on important issues, Prime Minister Rudd’s commitment to multilateralism, 
the importance Prime Minister Rudd attaches to the EU, and closer ties on a personal 
level were described as the most important changes. 
However positive the changes brought about by the Rudd Government may be, it 
is important to note that the relationship between the European Union and Australia was 
also good before Prime Minister Rudd came to power (EC1), particularly in terms of 
trade. As already mentioned in section 4.6.3., the European Union has been Australia’s 
most important and largest economic partner for more than 25 years (EC DEL 2008, 1). 
Nevertheless, political and diplomatic relations had not developed “as fast as accepted” 
(AUS1) under Prime Minister Howard, mostly as a result of two aspects. Firstly, 
respondent EC1 and AUS1 placed emphasis on “bad chemistry between individuals” 
(EC1), more precisely between the Prime Minister and the European Commission. As 
interviewee EC1 noted,  
 
“We don’t have fights about specific things, there was just a little bit of bad 
chemistry between individuals before the last elections. Actually, the bad 
chemistry might still be there, but the individuals are not there anymore.” 
 
The fact that both an Australian official and a European Union official stressed 
conflicts “at the level of personalities” (AUS1) strongly supports the line of reasoning 
in section 4.4.2. regarding PM Howard’s complicated relationship with the European 
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Commission and the “burden of memory”66 (Murray 2005, 5), therefore affecting the 
overall relationship. 
Secondly, Prime Minister Howard’s unwillingness to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, as 
well as the proximity of his opinion on climate change and environmental issues to the 
US position “tended to close doors in Brussels” (AUS1).  Respondent EC1 mentioned 
that the EU’s aspirations to talk about climate change were “not received very well in 
the Southern hemisphere” at that time. These statements clearly support the line of 
argument in section 4.4.3., indicating that the conflict over climate change could only 
be overcome if both interlocutors either drastically changed their opinions or if the 
political leaders (Prime Minister, Commission President, other important EU Heads of 
State) were replaced. It is therefore not surprising that the change of Government and 
the swift ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by the Rudd Government “received a lot of 
kudos in Brussels” (AUS1), hence leading to “a stepping-up of the pace of interaction” 
(AUS1). 
Consequently, there was “a landmark change after the elections in November 
[2007]” (EC1), as evidenced by cooperation on issues of global importance, frequent 
meetings and Australian high-level visits to Brussels, good working relations between 
individuals and ambitious plans particularly promoted by the Australian side, which 
shall be explained in further detail. 
As far as the improvement of political relations is concerned, Australia’s 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol as the first official act of the new Australian Rudd 
Government was the starting point for a major diplomatic thaw between the continents 
and for cooperation on issues of global importance. Prime Minister Rudd’s stance on 
climate change and the actions taken by his Government absolutely correspond with the 
EU’s core values, just like Australia’s commitment to multilateralism (e.g. UN, WTO). 
Although it may be argued that the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol was a largely 
symbolic act, it undoubtedly generated momentum with regard to closer cooperation 
and warmer relations. 
Moreover, Prime Minister Rudd’s early visit to Brussels emphasised the 
importance he attaches to a good working relationship with the European Union. 
Moreover, “in the new Government, under the instruction of the Prime Minister, 
                                                
66 Note for instance John Howard’s appointment as Minister for Special Trade Negotiations with the EC 
in the late 1970s (Murray et al. 2002, 399), which was not particularly successful. 
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Minsters are coming [to Brussels]” (AUS1). Respondent AUS2 explained this could be 
just the “initial flurry of visits after a change of Government”, however European 
Commission expert EC1 stressed that “the Australians definitely became even more 
ambitious” after the last election. As already outlined in the previous section, 
respondent AUS2’s statements have to be put in perspective due to the time he has been 
out of office and his apparent security-focus. Therefore, the responses of interviewee 
AUS1 and EC1 seem more reliable in this context, given both reiterated the 
implications of such frequent high-level visits to Brussels. According to respondent 
EC1 
 
“[The EU was] also very happy with the fact that Prime Minister Rudd and 
Foreign Minister Stephen Smith have reiterated a number of times that they 
wanted to see more comprehensive, more inclusive relations with the EU. 
And with inclusive I understand […] with the Union as a whole, which 
again is a pretty big step forward.” 
 
Accordingly, the flurry of Australian Ministers arriving in Brussels shortly after 
the elections might be interpreted as a sign of these desired “more comprehensive, more 
inclusive relations” (EC1) with the EU. It may therefore be argued that Australia’s new 
leadership and the actions taken by it “were conducive towards having a productive 
working relationship with the EU” (AUS1), which is also evidenced by the “excellent 
relationship” (AUS1) between European Trade Commissioner Mandelson and 
Australian Trade Minister Crean. 
With regard to ambitious plans, the Partnership Framework shall be analysed in 
the following section. 
 
7.1.3. Partnership Framework67 
At the time the interviews were conducted in Brussels (August – September 
2008), the Partnership Framework was still in the preparatory phase and due to be 
                                                
67 The European Union - Australia Partnership Framework can be downloaded from the European 
Commission’s website: <http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/australia/docs/australia_pfw_en.pdf>, 
viewed 10 July 2009. 
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adopted at the EU-Australia Ministerial Troika Consultations in Paris at the end of 
October 2008. Therefore, obtaining information at first hand was very valuable for this 
study. 
The need for creating a new declaration outlining the framework and goals of EU-
Australia relations stemmed from the five-year lifespan of the previously adopted 2003 
Agenda for Cooperation. As respondent EC1 noted, the EU and Australia decided to 
make a “more modern, more flexible, more up-to-date”, more practical and result-
oriented document instead of merely renewing the 2003 Agenda, which has also been 
done with New Zealand in 2007. Irrespective of the initial plans to call the new 
document Joint Declaration, the document was drafted as a Partnership Framework. 
This development also stems from a stronger commitment of the Australian 
Government; According to respondent EC1 
 
“The Australians definitely became even more ambitious after the election 
of Kevin Rudd and did not want to call it Joint Declaration, but Partnership 
Framework. We [i.e. EU representatives] always add document to that, 
because framework feels like agreement, and it is in fact just a political joint 
declaration called EU-Australia Partnership Framework.” 
 
The Partnership Framework is only a political declaration and not legally binding.  
This could imply that it will not affect or change the overall relationship in any case. 
This is true to a certain extent. As respondent EC1 noted, “it’s not like we are going to 
be confronted with something sea change different, just because we have this 
document.” However, the process of drafting the document resulted in more frequent 
working meetings and videoconferences, consequently leading to more comprehension 
of each other’s procedures and closer ties between officials from both sides. As a result, 
the overall relationship has been reinforced. This is also in line with respondent EC1’s 
definition of diplomacy: “You do diplomacy and external relations because you want to 
maintain and expand your friendly relations with friendly partners.” In the light of this 
definition, the Partnership Framework will probably not dramatically change the 
relationship between the European Union and Australia. Rather, it will rather improve 
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the general comprehension either interlocutor’s procedures and positions, therefore, 
reinforcing the relations. 
Despite its lacking legally binding character, the Partnership Framework does 
constitute a leap forward compared to the preceding 1997 Joint Declaration and the 
2003 Agenda for Cooperation. Apart from the much more general nature of the two 
preceding documents, the stronger commitment to the relationship is evidenced by the 
mere scope of the documents. While the Joint Declaration and Agenda for Cooperation 
only comprised four and six pages, respectively, the Partnership Framework utilises 22 
pages to cover the entire range of EU-Australia relations. Moreover, it should definitely 
live up to the drafters’ expectations, as it is truly more modern, more up-to-date, more 
practical and more result-oriented than its forerunners. With regard to the structure of 
the Partnership Framework, issues of mutual importance, shared challenges, areas of 
cooperation and the general nature of the relationship are outlined in the 
“perambulatory” part, followed by the definition of five common goals, the review 
mechanism as well as the framework for dialogue and consultations. Next, all five goals 
are discussed in detail. Therefore, rationale, long and medium-term objectives and areas 
of on-going collaboration are defined for each of the goals. Most importantly, an 
“immediate action” plan was included for all goals, outlining the actions and their 
desired outcomes. 
Thus, the Partnership Framework really allows taking stock of the relations at any 
point in time, ticking off implemented actions and planning future measures. Figure 16 
on page 122 provides a summary of the goals defined in the Partnership Framework, as 
well as the framework for dialogue and consultations. 
 
7.2. Issues of mutual importance 
7.2.1. Asymmetry / Areas of on-going and future cooperation 
With respect to the asymmetrical nature of EU-Australia relations all respondents 
quite rightly acknowledged major differences in size, trade and trade balance, reciprocal 
untying of aid, accessibility and distance. According to interviewee EC1, asymmetry in 
this case is “a matter of numbers”. Certainly asymmetry in size, population, trade 
balance and importance to each other is undeniable. However, the guiding question 
should not be, which partner is weaker and hence disadvantaged by this inequality; 
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rather the focus should be on how an asymmetrical relationship can be beneficial to 
both partners. 
 
Figure 16: Goals of the EU-Australia Partnership as defined in the 2008 Partnership 
Framework 
 
Source: Own illustration 
 
As respondent MEP1 noted, asymmetry does not necessarily imply one partner is 
inevitably disadvantaged. Inequality does not equal disadvantage. Both partners can 
make the most of their relations and achieve synergies if they are committed to a fruitful 
partnership. However, both the EU and Australia have to meet some prerequisites in 
order to benefit from their relationship, albeit its asymmetrical nature. First, 
prerequisites to be met by the EU will be outlined, followed by a detailed discussion of 
Australian prerequisites. 
Firstly, in order to achieve synergies in the EU-Australia relationship, the EU has 
to recognise these potential synergies as a result of closer cooperation. Secondly, the 
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European Union should realise Australia’s importance as a strategic partner in 
diplomatic “niches”, e.g. in the Pacific region, in Asia in general or China in particular. 
Thirdly, the EU should be more conscious of Australia’s importance as “a global 
energy actor and key energy partner to the EU” (Europa Press Releases 2009b), given 
Australia is the world’s fourth largest coal producer, the world’s largest coal exporter 
and the third largest hard coal exporter to the EU (ibid.), not to mention Australia’s 
largest recoverable uranium resources worldwide (WNA 2009). Fourthly, the European 
Union should consider building coalitions with Australia as a like-minded “friendly 
partner” (EC1) on issues of global importance and in multilateral fora.  
The interview with an expert of the European Commission (EC1) provided 
evidence that some of these prerequisites have already been met. Firstly, the European 
Union has come to realise cooperation in specific diplomatic “niches”, e.g. the Asia 
Pacific, can be very fruitful. According to respondent EC1, 
 
“There is a number of areas where we can benefit from friendly partners in 
that part of the world, particularly in the Pacific, where Australia has for 
reasons of geography and history access to a number of regional set-ups, 
Governments and island-states, where for us it is maybe a little bit more 
difficult. Although we are probably as present in an as big way in the 
Pacific as the Australians are, but the ties that exist are not as intense.”  
 
While Australia can provide expertise and access to regional set-ups, the 
European Union has leverage due to “all of the money the EU puts there” (EC1). 
Consequently, strategic cooperation in the Pacific is only a logical consequence of a 
result-oriented approach targeted at bringing stability to the region and scotching global 
security concerns. Moreover, respondent EC1 noted Prime Minister Rudd’s close ties to 
China as another issue of importance to the EU: 
 
“The fact that he is what he is, a Mandarin speaker, he lived in China, he 
likes China […] is important for us as well.” 
 
7. Discussion of research findings 
124 
Conversely, it may also be argued that both Australia and the EU might be 
economically more interested in Asia than in each other (Murray 2005, 257). However, 
the political dimension of EU-Australian cooperation in Asia should not be 
underestimated, as “their combined weight might help push Asian partners to open 
markets as well” (Wise from a publication in 1996 cited in Murray 2005, 257). 
Consequently both Australia and the European Union may be well advised to work 
closely on “befriending the awakening tiger” (Raffin 2008, 86). After all the EU’s 
international weight as a major player in world trade and Australia’s expertise on Asia 
complement one another in a very comprehensive and constructive way, and therefore, 
have the potential for displaying synergetic effects in the future. 
Secondly, the reference made to Australia’s role as major producer and exporter 
of coal and uranium shall not be misunderstood as a promotion of certain types of 
energy in this thesis.  Relying on non-renewable resources is problematic, particularly 
in the context of the current climate change debate. However, the European Union is 
still reliant on non-renewable energy resources, with only 9.2 per cent of the EU’s 
energy consumption in 2006 covered by renewable energy (EEP 2009). Therefore, 
dependency on non-renewable energy imports will remain important at least in the 
medium term. Even though crude oil and natural gas remain the main energy imports, 
Australia’s future role in the global energy market should be given some consideration. 
Still, more importance should be attached to European expertise with regard to solar or 
wind power in Australia. 
Thirdly, there is evidence that the EU and Australia attach particular importance 
to cooperation in multilateral fora, e.g. to cooperation on climate change and the 
commitment to revive negotiations to complete the Doha Round of WTO talks (Europa 
Press Releases 2009c). According to respondent AUS1 and AUS2, Australia will play a 
more proactive role in multilateral fora in general and with the UN in particular. 
Moreover, this strong Australian commitment to multilateralism is perceived well by 
the European Union. As European Commission President Barroso told Radio Australia 
in April 2008 (ABC 2008): 
 
“I think we both have a lot to gain in joining forces and exchanging 
experience in a number of topics of global concern. We have to deepen our 
bilateral relations and work closely on multilateral issues. And he has 
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certainly noticed with satisfaction the emphasis the Prime Minister is 
placing on effective multilateralims [sic!]” 
 
Moreover, a comprehensive study undertaken by Paul Luif (2008) indicates that 
the voting behaviour of Australia in the UN General Assembly has generally been very 
close to the EU. Since 2002, Australia has voted in opposition to the EU only on issues 
concerning the Middle East. Conversely, there has been much more consensus on 
human rights and security issues. Likewise Australia’s application to join ASEM (Asia-
Europe Meeting) in 201068 and the EU’s participation at the Pacific Islands Forum in 
Cairns in 200969 recently strongly emphasises both interlocutors’ decisive commitment 
to multilateralism. 
 
With regard to prerequisites to be met by Australia in order to achieve synergies 
in EU-Australia relations, Australia will have to accept its role as a junior partner, 
position itself as a confident middle power on the world stage, and raise awareness 
about the EU at home. 
In some publications, Australian scholars see the asymmetrical nature of EU-
Australia relations as rather problematic. As Murray (2005, 7-8) noted, “It is clear that 
Australia is far from the EU’s thoughts. Perhaps the EU is not interested in Australia, 
but simply engrossed in its internal reform, constitutional processes and its new 
member countries.” On the other hand Murray highlighted the fact that the EU is always 
the senior partner in its external relations except for its relationship with the United 
States (Murray 2005, 173). Consequently “asymmetry applies not just to Australia but 
to most countries” (ibid.). While both opinions might be true, Australia would be well 
advised to accept the role of the “junior partner”, position itself as a self-confident 
middle power and, using business terminology, focus on its competitive advantage with 
regard to thorough expertise on Asia and the Pacific. This is also in line with Evans & 
Grant’s (1995, 344) analysis, which focuses on characteristic methods of middle power 
diplomacy being coalition-building with like-minded countries and employing “niche 
                                                
68 Australia will join the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) at the next Leaders’ Summit in Belgium in 2010 
after successfully applying for membership in October 2008 (AMFA 2009). 
69 A large Delegation from the European Union attended the Post Forum Dialogue at the Pacific Islands 
Forum 2009 in Cairns, inter alia discussing greater donor harmonisation and between Australia and the 
EU (EC DEL 2009d). 
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diplomacy”, i.e. “concentrating resources in specific areas best able to generate returns 
worth having, rather than trying to cover the field”. This argument is also supported by 
Ungerer (2007), who states that Australia is a middle power with regard to external 
relations, regardless of its labelling (e.g. former Foreign Minister Downer’s “pivotal 
power” as opposed to the Labour Party’s “middle power”). 
Therefore, the Rudd Government’s efforts to make Australia’s voice heard in 
Brussels, its strong commitment to cooperation on climate change, and world trade 
issues, as well as the fruitful dialogues in multilateral settings (e.g. WTO, UN, ASEM, 
Pacific Island Forum) provide strong evidence for Australia becoming a more self-
confident and proactive middle power on the world stage. It may therefore be argued 
that both interlocutors meet the prerequisites to benefit from their relationship, albeit its 
asymmetrical nature. 
 
Having outlined the basis for fruitful cooperation and potential synergies in the 
EU-Australian relationship, it is necessary to reiterate that the European Union is 
undoubtedly more important to Australia than vice versa, most specifically in terms of 
trade. This shall however not imply that the EU has nothing to gain from Australia. 
Consequently having “a friendly partner“ (EC1) on the other side of the world, should 
not be underestimated, given that “friendly partner“ started whistling the same tune 
with regard to most issues of importance to Europe. Furthermore, having a “friendly 
partner” (EC1) with a thorough knowledge of its own Asian and Pacific backyard can 
also be advantageous at times. As Professor Anthony Miller noted at a meeting of the 
First Annual Future Summit in 2004, “We need to be armed to the teeth with knowledge 
of Asia” (cited in Murray 2005, 178-179). Nevertheless, Australia should also be 
“armed with knowledge and comprehension about Europe” (ibid.). This 
recommendation brought forward by Murray (ibid.) does not only apply to the public 
sector, but mostly to the private sector, which is the key player in EU-Australia 
economic relations. Both European Union and Australian authorities should raise 
awareness in the Australian private sector about opportunities and characteristics of 
healthy trade relations with the EU. As Murray (2005, 179) argued, “the impact of the 
EU is not always obvious – hence the tendency to undervalue its impact and to 
misunderstand it”. Equally, closer cooperation in higher education and the promotion of 
exchange programs could contribute to providing more mutual comprehension and 
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raising the general awareness. 
 
7.2.2. Trade / Areas of conflict 
While areas of cooperation were discussed in the previous chapter, areas of 
conflict shall be addressed in this section. Interestingly, all specified areas of conflict, 
i.e. geographical indications, Australian bio-security, quarantine and SPS rules, the 
European Union’s “projectionism” (AUS1), refer to trade. Nevertheless, all these areas 
of conflict were defined as “frictions” (EC2), “tensions” (AUS1), or “irritants” (EC1). 
In general, however, both Australian and European Union experts agreed that these 
differences are not “huge” (AUS1) and cannot be compared to the former conflict over 
the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Positions on agriculture are still 
diverging, but they have “mellowed” (EC1) over the years, in part due to more 
comprehension and respect for each other’s positions (EC2). Moreover, the optimistic 
attitude with regard to overcoming those frictions was quite surprising. As respondent 
EC1 mentioned, “I’m sure we’ll straighten it out. […] We are friendly partners. We 
talk.” 
With regard to the general EU-Australia economic relations, section 4.6.3. shall 
be mentioned, where the latest available trade statistics were discussed and analysed in 
detail. Despite the extensive analysis in section 4.6.3., one aspect mentioned by 
respondent EC2 shall briefly be touched on. Interestingly, interviewee EC2 explained 
that there are particularly good relations in terms of bilateral trade and in multilateral 
fora, whereas trade negotiations and bilateral policy sometimes tends to be a bit more 
complicated (see areas of conflict described above). Thus, good relations in multilateral 
fora like the WTO might stem from the “excellent” (AUS1), “good and trustful 
relationship” (EC2) between European Trade Commissioner Mandelson and Australian 
Trade Minister Crean, who have regular (approximately once a week) discussion. 
 
7.3. Future of EU-Australia relations 
7.3.1. General remarks 
Two aspects are interesting with regard to the future that the interviewed experts 
anticipate for the relationship between the European Union and Australia. On one hand, 
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no relevant changes are foreseeable.   On the other hand, the expectations for the future 
are very positive and optimistic. Given Australia is a like-minded, stable country, 
independent from EU development aid, there is certainly less EU-attention required 
than with international “problem children”. Moreover, relations are expected to 
“continue on a very stable path” (AUS2), as the EU will remain a “key global player” 
(AUS1), key partner and key market to Australia.  In addition, no relevant policy 
changes with regard to issues of importance (e.g. climate change, trade talks, 
multilateralism) are foreseeable at least as long as the Rudd Government remains in 
office. As respondent AUS1 noted, relations are already at the “optimal level”, making 
future prospects “very rosy, very positive” (EC1). 
 
7.3.2. Areas of future importance and cooperation 
 
Figure 17: Areas of cooperation and potential synergies 
 
Source: Own illustration 
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While areas of on-going and future cooperation were discussed in section 7.1.4., 
Figure 17 on page 128 shall illustrate potential synergies, which could be achieved 
through stronger cooperation between the European Union and Australia. The left and 
right columns refer to specific Australian and European Union interests and assets, 
respectively, whereas the shaded column in the middle displays possible synergies as a 
result of cooperation between the European Union and Australia. Consequently, 
synergies may be achieved in the following four areas outlined below. 
Firstly, Australia’s expertise on and intense ties to the Pacific region are a 
consequence of history (strong engagement in the region) and geography (immediate 
vicinity). The European Union has recently become more ambitious and committed to 
providing development aid in the Pacific. 500 million euro will be made available for 
the period between 2008 and 2013, hence making the EU the second largest donor in 
the region after Australia. Moreover, the EU’s decision to participate in the Pacific 
Island Forum in Cairns in August 2009 can be regarded as evidence for its interest in 
the region. Consequently, combining Australia’s expertise and access to regional set-
ups with significant EU funds is likely to display synergetic effects with regard to 
bringing stability to the partly volatile region. The crises in East Timor, Fiji or the 
Solomon Islands mirror the instability in the region and are often mentioned as a 
possible breeding ground for terrorism and insecurity. Therefore, joining Australian and 
EU efforts in the region is likely to favour the promotion of democracy and stability and 
prevent potential security threats. Similarly, potential synergies are probable in 
Indonesia with regard to the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC), 
a “joint Australian-Indonesian initiative to enhance knowledge of counter-terrorism” 
(Murray 2005, 216). Australian expertise and close ties with Indonesia can be combined 
with EU “support and funding” (ibid.) in order to achieve synergies with regard to 
tackling security threats in the region with a clear focus on preventive measures.  
Secondly, “neither Canberra nor the Union hide the fact that, as traders, they are 
more interested in Asia than in each other” (Wise from a publication in 1996 cited in 
Murray 2005, 257). Even though this view might be a bit exaggerated or at least 
focussed on the future (given the strong economic relations between the European 
Union and Australia), Asian markets have been credited with unequalled dynamics, 
growth and potential, consequently being very attractive for both interlocutors. Thus, 
Australia’s expertise on Asia and the European Union’s economic and political clout, 
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i.e. “their combined weight may help push Asian partners to open markets as well” 
(ibid.). 
Thirdly, Australia and the EU belong to the same “clubs and grouping” (Murray 
2005, 256), e.g. the United Nations Organisation, its bodies and its “Western European 
and Others Group”, the OECD, the WTO or the ASEAN Regional Forum. 
Consequently, both interlocutors could achieve synergies with regard to pushing issues 
of mutual importance by building coalitions with like-minded partners as well as 
facilitating stronger cooperation in these multilateral fora. The EU’s and Australia’s 
commitment to revive negotiations to complete the Doha Round (WTO) can be 
regarded as an example in this context. 
Fourthly, Australia has recently joined the “EU camp” with regard to climate 
change policy. The EU has positioned itself as “moral leader” in the climate change 
debate and was happy to see that Australia abandoned the formerly adopted US stance 
and ratified the Kyoto Protocol. Consequently, both the European Union and Australia, 
which has been given much kudos in Europe for its proactive approach to climate 
change, could unite to raise awareness of the importance of this issue and put it on the 
political agenda in multilateral fora. 
Finally, it is important to highlight that the above list is not exhaustive. Any areas 
of cooperation, e.g. in higher education and exchange programs, science and 
technology, migration and asylum or bilateral trade could be added to the list, as most 
of these issues are emerging in a global context. However, the four areas outlined in 
Figure 17 on page 128 are expected to generate the most substantial synergies in the 
medium-term. 
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8. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 
The present study set out (1) to examine the nature and state of EU-Australia 
relations, (2) to identify issues of mutual importance with regard to cooperation and 
conflict, and (3) to assess areas of future cooperation and potential synergies. Based on 
the previous presentation and discussion of research findings, this chapter is intended to 
draw conclusions. 
The first objective of this research was to examine the past, current and potential 
future nature and state of EU-Australia relations, whereas particular attention was paid 
to changes introduced by the incumbent Rudd Government. While relations were 
described as good in the past, there has been a landmark change after the election of 
Prime Minister Kevin Rudd in November 2007. Current relations were described in a 
particularly positive way, with attributes ranging from “relatively close” (MEP2) to 
“fantastic” (EC1). Particular sea change was reported to have occurred due to the 
following developments: (1) the “bad chemistry” (EC1) between former Prime Minister 
Howard and the European Commission, (2) the swift ratification of the Kyoto Protocol 
by the Rudd Government, (3) the proximity of Prime Minister Rudd’s opinions to core 
values of the EU, (4) the Rudd Government’s commitment to multilateralism, and (5) 
Prime Minister Rudd’s determination to foster “more comprehensive, more inclusive 
relations with the EU” (EC1), including his early visit to Brussels, the flurry of 
Ministers regularly coming to Brussels, the “excellent” (AUS1) working relationship 
between European Trade Commissioner Mandelson and Australian Trade Minister 
Crean as well as the joint effort to adopt a “more modern, more practical, more result-
oriented” (EC1) Partnership Framework. 
The second research objective was to identify issues of mutual importance with 
regard to cooperation and conflict between the European Union and Australia despite 
the asymmetrical nature of the relationship. Asymmetry in size, trade and trade balance, 
reciprocal untying of aid, accessibility, and distance are undeniable. However, 
inequality does not equal disadvantage if both partners choose to make most of their 
relations and foster cooperation in order to achieve synergies. In order for synergies to 
occur, the European Union has to: (1) recognise synergies as a result of cooperation, (2) 
acknowledge Australia’s importance as a strategic partner in the Asia-Pacific, (3) be 
more conscious of Australia’s role as a “global energy actor” (Europa Press Releases 
2009b), and (4) consider building coalitions with like-minded “friendly partners” (EC1) 
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on issues of global importance and in multilateral fora. Likewise, Australia has to (1) 
accept its role as a junior partner, (2) position itself as a confident middle power and (3) 
raise awareness and increase comprehension of the EU within Australia. Moreover, 
there are particularly good relations in terms of trade. The EU has been Australia’s most 
important economic partner for over 25 years (EC DEL 2008, 1). In 2007, the EU was 
Australia’s largest partner in terms of two-way trade in goods and services and was the 
largest investor in Australia (ibid.). Relations in multilateral fora are credited with being 
good, too. Only trade negotiations and bilateral policy are areas of conflict. More 
specifically, geographical indications, Australia’s sanitary and phytosanitary rules, 
biosecurity and quarantine as well as the European Union’s “projectionism” (AUS1) are 
“irritants” (EC1) and cause “frictions” (EC2). However, most respondents agreed that 
the occasional frictions are not comparable to the severe and long-lasting conflict over 
the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Even though positions with 
regard to agricultural trade are still diverging, this issue lost much of its conflict 
potential due to more mutual comprehension and respect. 
The third research objective was to assess the probability of a future convergence 
between the European Union and Australia with particular emphasis being placed on 
areas of future cooperation and potential synergies. Four areas of future cooperation and 
potential synergies could be identified: (1) cooperation in the Pacific region in order to 
promote democracy and stability as means of scotching insecurity and terrorism, (2) 
cooperation in Asia to tackle security threats (e.g. JCLEC) and push Asian partners to 
open markets, (3) cooperation in multilateral fora to push issues of mutual importance 
and build coalitions, and (4) cooperation with regard to climate change in order to raise 
awareness and push this issue in multilateral fora. 
 
In conclusion, Australia’s importance to the EU should not be overestimated. 
However, it should not be sold short either. This thesis shall do justice to Australia’s 
role on the world stage and its importance to the European Union. Australia is a 
“Western” culture in an Asian neighbourhood, a “friendly partner” (EC1) and a friendly 
middle power with thorough expertise on certain diplomatic niches, as with the Asia-
Pacific region. Moreover, Australia has recently joined the “EU camp” supporting 
issues of global importance in line with the EU stance and the EU core values (e.g. 
climate change). In accordance with the main findings of the present study, the relations 
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between the European Union and Australia have improved recently and have reached 
the “optimal level” (AUS1). Although, they are not expected to change dramatically in 
the foreseeable future, it would be desirable to tap the full potential of this 
asymmetrical, yet fruitful relationship. As an expert of the European Commission (EC1) 
noted: 
 
“We are confronted with the same global challenges, be it international 
multilateral trade, where now we are definitely on the same end of the table, 
or global challenges like climate change or counter terrorism. We have 
exchanges, we work together. That is always very positive. I’m very 
optimistic.” 
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APPENDIX 1: HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL CONTACTS BETWEEN 
AUSTRALIA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
 
Source: Murray 2005, 64-65 
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APPENDIX 2: LIST OF BILATERAL TREATIES BETWEEN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION AND AUSTRALIA 
Official Title Date of Signature Type 
Agreement between the European Union and Australia 
on the processing and transfer of European Union-
sourced passenger name record (PNR) data by air carriers 
to the Australian customs service 
30/06/2008 Bilateral 
Agreement between the European Community and the 
Government of Australia on certain aspects of air 
services (*) 
29/04/2008 Bilateral 
Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters 
between the European Community and Australia 
pursuant to Article XXIV:6 and Article XXVIII of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 
relating to the modification of concessions in the 
schedules of the Czech Republic, the Republic of 
Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, 
the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the 
Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic 
of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic in the course of 
their accession to the European Union 
07/02/2006 Bilateral 
Agreement between the European Community and 
Australia amending the Agreement on trade in wine 10/12/2003 Bilateral 
Agreement amending the Agreement relating to scientific 
and technical cooperation between the European 
Community and Australia 
08/07/1999 Bilateral 
Agreement on mutual recognition in relation to 
conformity assessment, certificates and markings 
between the European Community and Australia - Final 
Act - Joint Declarations 
24/06/1998 Bilateral 
Exchange of Letters recording the common 
understanding on the principles of international 
cooperation on research and development activities in the 
domain of intelligent manufacturing systems between the 
European Community and the United States of America, 
Japan, Australia, Canada and the EFTA countries of 
Norway and Switzerland  
04/04/1997 Bilateral 
Agreement for the conclusion of negotiations between 
the European Community and Australia under Article 
XXIV:6 (Annex I) 
22/12/1995 Bilateral 
Exchange of letters between the European Community 
and Australia for the conclusion of negotiations under 
Article XXIV:6 
22/12/1995 Bilateral 
Agreement relating to scientific and technical 
cooperation between the European Community and 
Australia - Declaration of the Council and the 
Commission 
23/02/1994 Bilateral 
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Official Title Date of Signature Type 
Exchange of letters between the European Economic 
Community and the Government of Australia on the 
Arrangement between Australia and the Community 
concerning cheese 
11/12/1984 Bilateral 
Agreement between the Government of Australia and the 
European Atomic Energy Community concerning 
transfers of nuclear material from Australia to the 
European Atomic Energy Community - Letters sent to 
Australia from Euratom Member States which do not 
have bilateral agreements with Australia - Side Letters 
21/09/1982 Bilateral 
Agreement in the form of an exchange of letters between 
the European Economic Community and Australia on 
trade in mutton, lamb and goat meat 
14/11/1980 Bilateral 
(*) This treaty has not entered into force yet. 
Source: EC TO 2009 
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APPENDIX 3: AUSTRALIA'S TRADE STATISTICS - 
ADDITIONAL FIGURES  
1. Merchandise trade 
Table 7: Australia's merchandise trade statistics (in million EUR) 
Exports 
              Share 
of total 
(%) 
% 
change 
2007 on 
% 
change 
2007 on 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007   2007 2006 2002 
EU27 8,679 8,947 7,897 9,244 12,340 11,726  11.40 -6.80 6.40 
Japan 12,761 11,342 13,143 17,481 19,447 19,520  19.00 -1.50 10.70 
USA 6,645 5,449 5,646 5,690 6,047 6,133  6.00 -0.50 -1.50 
ASEAN 8,395 6,967 8,130 9,742 11,267 11,127  10.80 -3.10 7.60 
China 4,819 5,237 6,514 9,905 12,220 14,544  14.10 16.80 25.80 
Other 27,458 24,262 28,325 33,357 36,895 39,885  38.70 6.10 8.40 
World 68,756 62,204 69,653 85,420 98,217 102,934   100.00 2.80 9.40 
             
             
Imports 
              Share 
of total 
(%) 
% 
change 
2007 on 
% 
change 
2007 on 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007   2007 2006 2002 
EU27 17,145 18,056 19,941 22,206 21,894 25,152  21.90 12.70 6.30 
Japan 9,056 9,348 9,860 10,513 10,362 11,032  9.60 4.50 2.60 
USA 13,321 11,829 12,141 13,143 14,736 14,458  12.60 -3.70 2.00 
ASEAN 11,054 11,602 13,671 17,202 21,072 22,649  19.70 5.50 15.80 
China 7,393 8,214 10,601 13,122 15,285 17,737  15.40 13.90 18.70 
Other 15,503 15,847 17,333 19,461 22,267 23,819  20.70 5.00 8.40 
World 73,472 74,896 83,547 95,647 105,616 114,847   100.00 6.70 8.80 
             
             
Imports 
+ 
Exports 
              Share 
of total 
(%)     
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007   2007    
EU27 25,823 27,004 27,838 31,450 34,235 36,878   16.93    
Japan 21,817 20,690 23,003 27,995 29,809 30,552   14.03    
USA 19,966 17,277 17,787 18,833 20,784 20,590   9.45    
ASEAN 19,449 18,569 21,800 26,944 32,338 33,776   15.51    
China 12,212 13,451 17,115 23,027 27,504 32,281   14.82    
Other 42,960 40,109 45,657 52,818 59,162 63,704   29.25    
World 142,228 137,100 153,200 181,067 203,832 217,781   100.00     
Source: Own illustration based on data provided by EC DEL 2008, 10 
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Figure 18: Australia’s merchandise trade balance with major partners 2007 
 
Source: Own illustration based on data provided by EC DEL 2008, 10 
 
Figure 19: Australia’s major two-way merchandise trade partners 2007 (imports + 
exports) 
 
Source: Own illustration based on data provided by EC DEL 2008, 10 
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2. Trade in services 
Table 8: Australia's services trade statistics (in million EUR) 
Credits 
(Exports)             
  Share of 
total (%) 
% change 
2007 on 
% change 
2007 on 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007   2007 2006 2002 
EU27 4,007 4,284 4,712 4,889 4,952 5,314   18.10 5.30 4.10 
Japan 1,988 1,755 1,919 1,961 1,856 1,632   5.60 -13.70 -3.50 
USA 2,914 2,942 2,777 3,030 3,328 3,535   12.00 4.20 2.80 
ASEAN 3,214 3,039 3,100 3,551 3,695 4,280   14.60 13.70 5.00 
China 899 1,103 1,502 1,865 1,992 2,402   8.20 18.30 20.20 
Other 7,709 7,840 8,866 9,674 10,509 12,219   41.60 14.10 8.40 
World 20,732 20,963 22,875 24,971 26,332 29,383   100.00 9.50 6.00 
             
Debits 
(Imports)             
  Share of 
total (%) 
% change 
2007 on 
% change 
2007 on 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007   2007 2006 2002 
EU27 4,376 4,463 5,256 5,738 5,944 6,161   21.90 1.70 6.50 
Japan 1,018 1,072 1,182 1,275 1,267 1,175   4.20 -9.00 2.40 
USA 3,669 3,693 3,868 4,172 4,484 5,046   17.90 10.40 5.20 
ASEAN 3,157 2,855 3,823 4,267 4,563 5,200   18.50 11.80 10.70 
China 529 509 659 741 668 773   2.70 13.60 7.00 
Other 6,691 6,758 7,677 8,348 8,713 9,764   34.70 10.00 6.70 
World 19,440 19,349 22,465 24,541 25,638 28,119   100.00 7.60 6.80 
             
             
Imports + 
Exports 
              Share of 
total (%)    
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007   2007    
EU27 8,383 8,747 9,968 10,628 10,896 11,475   19.96    
Japan 3,006 2,827 3,101 3,236 3,124 2,807   4.88    
USA 6,583 6,634 6,644 7,203 7,811 8,581   14.92    
ASEAN 6,371 5,895 6,923 7,818 8,258 9,481   16.49    
China 1,428 1,612 2,161 2,606 2,660 3,175   5.52    
Other 14,400 14,598 16,543 18,022 19,222 21,984  38.23    
World 40,172 40,313 45,340 49,512 51,970 57,503   100.00     
Source: Own illustration based on data provided by EC DEL 2008, 10 
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Figure 20: Australia’s services trade balance with major partners 2007 
 
Source: Own illustration based on data provided by EC DEL 2008, 10 
 
Figure 21: Australia’s major two-way services trade partners 2007 (imports + exports) 
 
Source: Own illustration based on data provided by EC DEL 2008, 10 
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3. Foreign direct investment 
Table 9: Australia's stock of foreign investment 
Inwards 
        
Share of 
total 
(%) 
% 
change 
2007 on 
% 
change 
2007 on 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007   2007 2006 2002 
EU 187,324 197,930 226,917 257,802 293,481 334,747   33.00 11.90 11.30 
Japan 28,484 26,745 29,069 31,337 30,897 35,162   3.50 11.70 3.20 
USA 137,364 165,681 214,288 205,299 223,263 272,548   26.90 19.80 11.50 
ASEAN 19,862 18,767 19,677 22,993 28,557 32,297   3.20 11.00 10.20 
China 1,636 1,722 1,352 1,397 2,104 3,811   0.40 77.70 13.40 
NZ 10,639 11,443 12,818 16,689 21,147 26,190   2.60 21.50 19.20 
Other 136,338 147,187 172,843 215,645 274,942 309,754   30.50 10.50 17.80 
World 521,647 569,476 676,964 751,162 874,392 1,014,509   100.00 13.80 12.90 
           
           
Outwards 
              
Share of 
total 
(%) 
% 
change 
2007 on 
% 
change 
2007 on 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007   2007 2006 2002 
EU 90,256 95,149 119,159 117,460 152,089 175,102   29.00 13.00 12.90 
Japan 11,578 12,532 14,181 19,501 24,892 21,481   3.60 -15.30 15.40 
USA 119,471 132,816 165,463 186,424 205,832 246,584   40.90 17.50 14.00 
ASEAN 11,487 11,181 13,509 10,783 14,192 19,202   3.20 32.80 7.70 
China 704 778 746 1,249 1,814 3,149   0.50 70.30 33.40 
NZ 19,074 23,549 27,509 37,781 41,352 43,293   7.20 2.70 17.50 
Other 43,161 43,160 48,519 51,374 76,619 94,596   15.70 21.10 16.20 
World 295,732 319,165 389,086 424,573 516,790 603,408   100.00 14.60 14.20 
           
           
Inwards + 
Outwards 
            
  Share of 
total 
(%)     
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007   2007   
EU 277,579 293,079 346,075 375,262 445,570 509,849   31.51   
Japan 40,062 39,277 43,250 50,839 55,789 56,643   3.50   
USA 256,836 298,498 379,751 391,723 429,095 519,132   32.09   
ASEAN 31,349 29,949 33,187 33,776 42,749 51,499   3.18   
China 2,340 2,500 2,098 2,646 3,918 6,960   0.43   
NZ 29,713 34,991 40,327 54,470 62,499 69,483   4.29   
Other 179,499 190,347 221,362 267,019 351,561 404,349   24.99   
World 817,379 888,641 1,066,0
50 
1,175,73
4 
1,391,18
2 
1,617,917   100.00 
  
Source: Own illustration based on data provided by EC DEL 2008, 13 
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Figure 22: Australia major two-way investment partners 2007 (inflows + outflows) 
 
Source: Own illustration based on data provided by EC DEL 2008, 13 
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APPENDIX 4: INTERVIEW GUIDES 
Interview guide: EC1 
1.) How would you describe the current state of the relationship between the 
European Union and Australia? 
2.) How would you describe the importance of the relationship between the European 
Union and Australia (from a European Union and Australian perspective)? 
3.) Has the relationship changed over the years? If yes, how? 
4.) Has the relationship between the EU and Australia changed since Mr. Rudd was 
elected PM of Australia? 
5.) Prof. Murray (Head of the Contemporary Europe Research Centre at the 
University of Melbourne) refers to the relationship between the EU and Australia 
as being “asymmetrical“. Moreover, she sometimes uses the term “European 
Superpower“. Do you agree with this opinion? 
6.) The 1997 Joint Declaration identifies a framework for dialogue and consultations 
(consultations at Ministerial level, consultations between officials on both sides, 
summit meetings, inter-parliamentary delegations). How is this framework 
translated into practice? 
7.) Where can you identify areas of major conflict and areas of close cooperation / 
common interests? 
8.) Which issues are currently being emphasised (quotation joint statement 
Barroso/Rudd: “priorities for cooperation on international security, trade, 
development issues, the Asia-Pacific region, climate change and energy, science 
and education, aviation and movement of people, including visas“)? 
9.) Would you rate political links or trading links between the EU and Australia as 
being stronger? 
10.) How would you assess the importance of the main agreements between the 
European Union and Australia? (1997 Joint Declaration, 2003 Agenda for 
Cooperation) 
11.) How would you assess the newly planned Partnership Framework between the EU 
and Australia? (Is it truly an upgrade, as mentioned in the Joint Statement by Mr. 
Barroso and Mr. Rudd?) 
12.) When will the Partnership Framework be finalised? What is the current state of 
negotiations? 
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13.) Who is involved in the development of the Partnership Framework? 
14.) In 1996/1997 negotiations of a Framework Agreement failed due to the 
unwillingness of the Australian government to include a human rights clause. Will 
the new Partnership Framework include a human rights clause? 
15.) If adopted, what will the Partnership Framework change with regard to the 
relationship between the EU and Australia (in practical terms)? 
16.) What is the future of EU-Australia relations? 
17.) Are closer ties between the EU and Australia desirable / beneficial to either 
partner / probable? 
18.) In which areas is cooperation between the EU and Australia probable and 
desirable? 
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Interview guide: EC2 
1.) How would you describe the current state of the relationship between the 
European Union and Australia? 
2.) How would you describe the importance of the relationship between the European 
Union and Australia? 
3.) Has the relationship changed over the years? If yes, how? 
4.) Has the relationship between the EU and Australia changed since Mr. Rudd was 
elected PM of Australia? 
5.) Prof. Murray (Head of the Contemporary Europe Research Centre at the 
University of Melbourne) refers to the relationship between the EU and Australia 
as being “asymmetrical“. Moreover, she sometimes uses the term “European 
Superpower“. Do you agree with this opinion? 
6.) The 1997 Joint Declaration identifies a framework for dialogue and consultations 
(consultations at Ministerial level, consultations between officials on both sides, 
summit meetings, inter-parliamentary delegations). How is this framework 
translated into practice? 
7.) The Joint Statement by EC President Barroso and Australian PM Rudd stressed 
the will of both partners to bring the Doha negotiations to a conclusion this year. 
a. Was there any cooperation prior to the negotiations in Geneva? 
b. How would you describe this cooperation (who worked together?) 
c. What are the joint interests of the EU and Australia and what are the 
points of intersection with regard to the Doha negotiations? 
d. Is the conclusion of the Doha round still on the agenda with regard to 
EU-Australia talks? 
8.) Where can you identify areas of major conflict and areas of close cooperation / 
common interests? 
9.) Which issues are currently being emphasised? 
10.) How would you assess the importance of the main agreements between the 
European Union and Australia (1997 Joint Declaration, 2003 Agenda for 
Cooperation)? 
11.) How would you assess the newly planned Partnership Framework between the EU 
and Australia? (Is it truly an upgrade, as mentioned in the Joint Statement by Mr. 
Barroso and Mr. Rudd?) 
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12.) If adopted, what will the Partnership Framework change with regard to the 
relationship between the EU and Australia (in practical terms)? 
13.) What is the future of EU-Australia relations? 
14.) Are closer ties between the EU and Australia desirable / beneficial to either 
partner / probable? 
15.) In which areas is cooperation between the EU and Australia probable and 
desirable? 
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Interview guide: MEP1, MEP2 
1.) Wie würden Sie die Beziehungen zwischen der EU und Australien allgemein 
beschreiben? 
2.) Prof. Murray (Leiterin Contemporary Europe Research Centre - University of 
Melbourne) beschreibt die Beziehungen zwischen der EU und Australien als 
„asymmetrisch“ zu Gunsten der EU. Desweiteren spricht sie manchmal von einer 
„European Superpower“. Inwiefern teilen Sie diese Einschätzung? 
3.) Gibt es Unterschiede in den Beziehungen zu Australien seit dem 
Regierungswechsel in Australien im November letzten Jahres? 
4.) Wo sehen Sie Konfliktpunkte, wo gemeinsame Interessen bzw. Kooperation 
zwischen der EU und Australien? 
5.) Wie schaut die parlamentarische Zusammenarbeit mit Australien in der Praxis 
aus? 
6.) Welche Themen stehen zurzeit im Fokus der parlamentarischen Zusammenarbeit 
mit Australien? 
7.) Wie wichtig ist der parlamentarische Austausch für die Beziehungen allgemein? 
8.) Gibt es innerhalb der EU-Institutionen eine Zusammenarbeit bzw. einen 
Informationsaustausch in Bezug auf Australien (z.B. nach Besuch von PM Rudd)? 
9.) Wie beurteilen Sie die Pläne von PM Rudd und der EK, ein 
Partnerschaftsabkommen (Partnership Framework) auszuarbeiten? Welche 
Implikationen könnte dies – aus Ihrer Sicht – für die Zukunft der Beziehungen 
zwischen der EU und Australien haben? 
10.) Wie beurteilen Sie die Zukunft der EU-australischen Beziehungen? 
11.) Wo sehen Sie Bereiche, in denen eine engere Zusammenarbeit zwischen der EU 
und Australien a) erstrebenswert und b) wahrscheinlich ist? 
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Interview guide: AUS1 
1.) How would you describe the current state of the relationship between the 
European Union and Australia? 
2.) How would you describe the importance of the relationship between the European 
Union and Australia (from a European Union and Australian perspective)? 
3.) Has the relationship changed over the years? If yes, how? 
4.) Has the relationship between the EU and Australia changed since Mr. Rudd was 
elected PM of Australia? 
5.) Prof. Murray (Head of the Contemporary Europe Research Centre at the 
University of Melbourne) refers to the relationship between the EU and Australia 
as being “asymmetrical“. Moreover, she sometimes uses the term “European 
Superpower“. Do you agree with this opinion? 
6.) How does Australia make its voice heard in Brussels? What is the embassy’s role 
in this process? Who is involved in the formulation of foreign policy concerning 
the EU (in practical terms)? Is there a coordination of actions within DFAT? 
7.)  (How) Is DFAT trying to find a balance between the engagement with the EU 
and the direct engagement with member states? 
8.) Where can you identify areas of major conflict and areas of close cooperation / 
common interests? 
9.) Which issues are currently being emphasised? 
10.) How would you assess the importance of the main agreements between the 
European Union and Australia (1997 Joint Declaration, 2003 Agenda for 
Cooperation)? 
11.) How would you assess the newly planned Partnership Framework between the EU 
and Australia? (Is it truly an upgrade, as mentioned in the Joint Statement by Mr. 
Barroso and Mr. Rudd?) 
12.) Are you involved in the development of the Partnership Framework? 
13.) When will the Partnership Framework be finalised? What is the current state of 
negotiations? 
14.) In 1996/1997 negotiations of a Framework Agreement failed due to the 
unwillingness of the Australian government to include a human rights clause. The 
new Partnership Framework will not include a human rights clause – was this a 
consensus decision between the EU and Australia? 
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15.) If adopted, what will the Partnership Framework change with regard to the 
relationship between the EU and Australia (in practical terms)? 
16.) What is the future of EU-Australia relations? 
17.) Are closer ties between the EU and Australia desirable / beneficial to either 
partner / probable? 
18.) In which areas is cooperation between the EU and Australia probable and 
desirable? 
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Interview guide: AUS2 
1.) How would you describe the (former and) current state of the relationship 
between the European Union and Australia? 
2.) How would you describe the of the relationship between the European Union and 
Australia (from an Australian perspective)? 
3.) Has the relationship changed over the years? If yes, how? 
4.) Has the relationship between the EU and Australia changed since Mr. Rudd was 
elected PM of Australia? 
5.) Prof. Murray (Head of the Contemporary Europe Research Centre at the 
University of Melbourne) refers to the relationship between the EU and Australia 
as being “asymmetrical“. Moreover, she sometimes uses the term “European 
Superpower“. Do you agree with this opinion? 
6.) What were the major Australian national security issues when you were part of 
the bureaucracy? 
7.) What are the major national security issues at the moment? 
8.) The president of the European Commission and the Australian Prime Minister 
agreed to “upgrade EU-Australia relations through a new partnership framework, 
including priorities for cooperation on international security, trade, development 
issues, the Asia-Pacific region, climate change and energy, science and 
education, aviation and movement of people, including visas.” Being an expert on 
international security issues, could these two blocks of countries really cooperate 
constructively on these issues? 
9.) How could the EU and Australia cooperate on international security issues and in 
the South-Pacific in practice? 
10.) Would it be beneficial to Australia seeing the European Union engage in e.g. 
development aid in its own “backyard”? 
11.) What is the future of EU-Australia relations? 
12.) Are closer ties between the EU and Australia desirable / beneficial to either 
partner / probable? 
13.) In which areas is cooperation between the EU and Australia probable and 
desirable? 
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APPENDIX 5: CROSS-CASE DISPLAY (AUSTRALIAN EXPERTS) 
Table 10: Cross-case display Australian experts, part 1 
 
Source: Own information 
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Table 11: Cross-case display Australian experts, part 2 
 
Source: Own illustration 
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Table 12: Cross-case display Australian experts, part 3 
 
Source: Own information 
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Table 13: Cross-case display Australian experts, part 4 
 
Source: Own illustration 
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APPENDIX 6: CROSS-CASE DISPLAY (EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION EXPERTS) 
Table 14: Cross-case display European Commission experts, part 1 
 
Source: Own illustration 
Appendices 
171 
 
 
Table 15: Cross-case display European Commission experts, part  2 
 
Source: Own illustration 
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Table 16: Cross-case display European Commission experts, part 3 
 
Source: Own illustration 
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APPENDIX 7: CROSS-CASE DIPLAY (MEMBERS OF THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT) 
Table 17: Cross-case display Members of the European Parliament, part 1 
 
Source: Own illustration 
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Table 18: Cross-case display Members of the European Parliament, part 2 
 
Source: Own illustration 
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Abstract (English) 
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ABSTRACT (ENGLISH) 
While the history of EU-Australia relations began with the British accession to the 
European Union, the further development was marked by turbulent disagreement over 
the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and a period of convergence and stronger 
cooperation beginning in the early 1990s. The topic of EU-Australia relations has 
generally received little academic attention; while there are some Australian 
publications, scholars in the European Union have virtually neglected this issue. 
Therefore, the ultimate goal of this thesis is to examine the current nature and state of 
the relationship between the European Union and Australia in the light of recent 
changes like the election of a new Australian Government, to outline specific issues of 
mutual importance in the relationship, i.e. areas of cooperation and conflict, and to 
specify areas of future cooperation and potential synergies. For these purposes 
qualitative interviews with experts from the European Commission, Members of the 
European Parliament and Australian experts were conducted. Results of this qualitative 
study suggest that there have been significant changes to EU-Australia relations since 
the election of Prime Minister Rudd, resulting in closer cooperation on some issues of 
global importance and a more favourable diplomatic environment. While the CAP 
appears to have lost most of its conflict potential, there are some comparatively minor 
frictions with regard to trade negotiations and bilateral policy. Also, future cooperation 
on four specific issues was discovered to be a significant element in fostering synergies. 
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ABSTRACT (DEUTSCH) 
Die Beziehungen zwischen der Europäischen Union und Australien begannen mit 
dem Beitritt Großbritanniens zur EU. Die darauf folgende Entwicklung der 
Beziehungen war vom Konflikt über die Gemeinsame Agrarpolitik der EU 
gekennzeichnet. Erst in den 1990er Jahren fand eine Annäherung der beiden Partner 
statt, die in verstärkter Zusammenarbeit resultierte. Dennoch wurde dem Thema der 
EU-australischen Beziehungen kaum akademische Beachtung geschenkt. Während es 
einige australische Publikationen gibt, wurde dieses Thema von europäischen 
Wissenschaftlern geradezu vernachlässigt. Aus diesem Grund ist es das Ziel dieser 
Arbeit den Charakter und Zustand der gegenwärtigen Beziehungen zwischen der EU 
und Australien zu analysieren, besonders vor dem Hintergrund aktueller Ereignisse, wie 
beispielsweise dem Regierungswechsel in Australien. Darüber hinaus sollen 
Schnittpunkte der Beziehungen in Bezug auf Zusammenarbeit und Konflikte 
herausgearbeitet werden, sowie zukünftige Kooperationen und sich daraus ergebende 
mögliche synergetische Effekte erläutert werden. Zu diesem Zweck wurden qualitative 
Experteninterviews mit Mitarbeitern der Europäischen Kommission, 
Europaabgeordneten und australischen Experten durchgeführt. Die Ergebnisse dieser 
qualitativen Studie lassen darauf schließen, dass der australische Regierungswechsel 
einen signifikanten Einfluss auf die Beziehungen zwischen der EU und Australien hatte, 
beispielsweise in Bezug auf eine engere Zusammenarbeit in Bereichen von globaler 
Bedeutung oder in Bezug auf ein freundlicheres diplomatisches Umfeld. Während die 
gemeinsame Agrarpolitik augenscheinlich an Konfliktpotential verloren hat, gibt es 
kleinere Spannungen im Bereich der Handelsgespräche oder bilateraler Richtlinien. 
Darüber hinaus wurden vier besondere Bereiche identifiziert, die aller 
Wahrscheinlichkeit nach synergetische Effekte in der Zusammenarbeit zwischen der EU 
und Australien fördern könnten. 
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